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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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WHO SPEAKS FOR MAN?

(after a fable by Lord Dunsany)

There was silence in the House of Judgment. Man was on trial for his life, charged with murder. And it seemed as if every living creature had come to testify.

The Great Voice asked, "Who speaks against Man?" And a clamor rent the air. And a Great Thumb appeared over Man.

Then the Great Voice asked, "Who speaks for Man?" And there was silence in the House of Judgment. The Great Thumb began to descend.

Then Man cried out and called on this one and that one to speak for him. But he alone spoke for Man.

The Great Thumb stopped just above his head. And the Great Voice said, "If one other will speak for Man, he may live." And there was silence in the House of Judgment.

Until a high, thin hum fluttered the air: "I, the Mosquito, will speak for Man. He is my food."

Today, in truth, Man lives with a Great Thumb over his head. It is of his own making, and he alone can save himself from it. Today, Man has not even a mosquito to speak for him. He must speak for himself . . . to his own kind.

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

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

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Why Some People Don't Buy Harper's

By John Fischer
Editor

Harper's is a singular kind of magazine, with a special flavor. Some people like it—so much, in fact, that they become lifelong addicts. Yet when taken regularly and in moderation it appears to do them little harm.

In honesty, however, it must be admitted that other readers find it hard to stomach. They complain that it is unsettling—even dangerous—and that its contents are too sharp and pungent for general taste.

Harper's has never been produced for the mass market. Its founders designed it 111 years ago for a small, specific clientele. They had no other choice.

A century ago, before the days of universal public education, the so-called educated class was the only group that had the ability, the leisure, and the money to read much of anything. It was, in effect, the governing class of the country—those people in the professions, industry, and public service who largely decided the issues and set the standards of taste for the rest of the population.

Within six months of its founding, the magazine had reached a circulation of 50,000 copies, a remarkable figure for the time. (The editor—a young man named Henry J. Raymond—was encouraged by this success to branch out on his own; he founded The New York Times.)

Harper's was treasured by its subscribers; hundreds of them bound their old copies into leather-covered volumes, and carried them across the plains in covered wagons or around the Horn to the gold camps of California. By the light of whale-oil lamps they were read aloud in innumerable family circles from Maine to Oregon. By the time the Civil War broke, Harper's was firmly established as the leading national monthly—"a mirror," as a later editor put it, "of American life and ideas."

During the succeeding generations, Harper's has, of course, undergone many changes in format, content, and editorial techniques. Yet its chosen audience remains much the same; those people who assay considerably higher than average in discrimination, intellectual curiosity, and concern for the national well-being. As a result, it has developed certain characteristics:

1. It deals primarily with ideas. Especially the ideas which will make important news a year—or five or ten years—later. In fields ranging from oceanography to economics, from the theater to religion, Harper's tries to find the fresh, seminal thinkers whose ideas may have a real impact on the future shape of the world.

2. It provides a highly selective kind of news coverage. Harper's makes no attempt to cover the ephemeral happenings which fill about 90 per cent of the space in news magazines and the daily press. What it does attempt to report are those events and personalities that may have a lasting historical significance—and it tries to cover them in a more authoritative, carefully considered, and analytic fashion than the daily or weekly publications can ordinarily achieve. Harper's articles have shaken up state governments, labor unions, political parties, and state and federal laws.

3. It seeks an independent assessment of public issues. Harper's keeps apart from any party, pressure group, or commercial interest. It peddles no ideology, grinds no private axes. It tries to reflect the widest possible spectrum of responsible opinion—including many opinions with which the editors personally disagree. It is skeptical of the public relations counselor and the official pronouncement. It has a special respect for the sharp-eyed individual observer who, as Frederick Lewis Allen, former editor of Harper's, once said: "...sits all by himself, unorganized, unrecognized, unorthodox, and unterrified."

4. It welcomes controversy. The mass media usually have to shun controversial subjects, because they dare not risk offending any substantial number of their readers. Harper's does not try to woo everybody—and it assumes that its kind of reader is tough-minded enough to enjoy a lively argument, even when it rubs him on a raw spot. Consequently, Harper's is able to examine the behavior of Sacred Cows—for example, U. S. Savings Bonds, the veterans' and farmers' lobbies, the giant charity fund-raising outfits, and the F.B.I.—with a candor not often found elsewhere.

5. It provides a vehicle for the artist in literature. The short story writer, the poet, the essayist, the critic, and the humorist find here a welcome for their best work—uncramped by popular formulas or conventional forms. And the work of an entirely unknown writer is considered just as eagerly as that of a William Faulkner or Arthur Miller.

All too often these five standards measure the aspirations rather than the accomplishments of the editors. Yet now and then they feel that they have come somewhere near the mark, and that a proportion of the things they publish may have a permanent value.

We hope that at least some of those who try Harper's will find the flavor robust, well matured, and a pleasure. In the meantime, we have tried to explain why some people *don't* buy Harper's. *And* why *many do.*

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

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
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

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

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IS THE NEW GERMANY REALLY NEW?

AS a result of the Eichmann trial and the new Berlin crisis, the full force of public interest has been turned on West Germany. In the wake of this publicity, a spate of books has been hastily turned out, many of which alarmingly—and profitably—claim to have discovered a Nazi in every nook, a vast army of termites undermining the "shaky" foundations of German democracy.

These events have coincided with the climax of the campaign against Berlin—a campaign in pursuit of a priority goal of the Soviets—to divide Germany from the West. Thus, more than ever, an accurate understanding of Germany is indispensable to the development of the NATO alliance and the survival of the free world.

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The authors are life-long students of Germany. Both were active in the anti-Nazi movement; and Mr. Muhlen was himself a refugee from Hitler. Mr. Emmet was Secretary of the Christian Committee to Boycott Nazi Germany and a founder of William Allen White's Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. After the war he published the first pamphlets on mass expulsion of some 12 million people of German descent from Communist-controlled Eastern Europe. Mr. Muhlen is author of *The Return of Germany* and *The Incredible Krupps*, and has spent most of his time since the war in covering German developments.

Now especially, as the Soviets push forcibly towards their number one objective of splitting the free world asunder—to "divide and rule"—it is vital for all Americans to have the true facts about Germany—unbiased by the frenzied emotion of recent publicity.

THE VANISHING SWASTIKA

Facts and Figures on Western Germany
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 40 OCTOBER 1961 No. 1

FOR A CONCERT OF FREE NATIONS

By J. W. Fulbright

THE Soviet Union has demanded that the United Nations be reorganized on the "troika" principle, with equal executive power given the West, the Communist bloc and the neutral states. Each would wield a veto. This proposal quite clearly aims to emasculate the United Nations and in particular reduce the office of the Secretary-General to the same impotence which blights the functioning of the Security Council.

In this situation it has been suggested that a general conference of U.N. members be called to review and possibly revise the Charter. I believe that a review conference at this time would be an exercise in futility. Quite obviously, the Western powers—and, hopefully, many of the neutrals—will reject the Soviet scheme. And the Russians can hardly be expected to agree to any Western proposals for strengthening the organization when their own objective is diametrically opposed to this.

Whatever inadequacies there may be in the U.N. Charter, the problem is not basically a legal matter but one of power politics in a divided world. Instead of engaging in an arid and irrelevant exercise in legalities, we would be far better advised to seek feasible means of building a cohesive community of free nations. This objective should be pursued as far as possible within the United Nations. In large measure, however, it must be pressed outside of the U.N., through instrumentalities that reflect a limited but real community of common interests.

Despite the existence of a very imposing array of international organs of consultation and coöperation, the free nations of the world seem chronically unable to unify and coördinate their policies. They are at the same time confronted with an adversary

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who has repeatedly demonstrated an impressive capacity to mobilize diverse resources for the achievement of single-minded objectives. The question quite naturally arises whether some new machinery or system can be devised through which the free nations can advance their common interests with a far greater degree of coördinated effort and shared responsibility than has yet been achieved in the postwar era.

We have created extensive international machinery since World War II—the United Nations, a global system of alliances and, most recently, the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development. Despite the existence of these and other organs, the United States continues to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of world responsibility—a burden, I fear, which overtaxes even our own considerable resources. Throughout the world, both allied and uncommitted nations display a distressing tendency to stand aside, even when their own vital interests are involved, and leave it to the United States to act while reserving for themselves the right to criticize or to condemn.

A psychology of aloofness has taken hold in much of the free world. Even in Britain the illusion has become widespread, although not in official circles, that somehow the United Kingdom can be neutral in a world-wide power struggle in which only the United States and the Soviet Union have vital interests at stake. France has lessened her military participation in NATO and taken other steps which gravely impair the effectiveness of the alliance. Germany adheres loyally to NATO, but refuses to accept an obligation commensurate with her wealth and resources to carry out the common Western responsibility for assisting the world's underdeveloped nations. India, the largest free nation of Asia, acts as though the expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia is a problem outside her own interests, in which she can act at most as a disinterested "honest broker."

The psychology of aloofness can be readily understood in terms of a profound feeling of impotence on the part of once-dominant nations which have lost both empire and preëminence, and also on the part of new nations beset with overwhelming internal problems. It is all too easy for such nations to despair of their own ability to influence the course of events and to leave the arena to the giants.

In the case of Western Europe this sense of impotence is as

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unfounded as it is regrettable. Together the nations of Western Europe surpass the Soviet Union in population, in productivity and perhaps as well in the human skills that are essential to modern industrial societies. Their impotence, in short, is largely self-imposed, a function of disunity and inadequate will to mobilize the full weight of their impressive resources.

The trouble with this psychology of aloofness is that it both underestimates the power of the nations who succumb to it and overestimates the power of the United States, and in so doing exerts a very definite and detrimental influence on events. The fact is that the United States alone has neither the power, the resources nor the will to bear unaided the crushing burden of world responsibility. It is largely trying to do so now, and, as anyone can testify who has followed recent events in Laos, in Cuba or in Geneva, it is not doing well at all.

In the past, the free nations of the world have performed impressive tasks of coördinating their efforts and mobilizing their joint resources in the face of grave external threats. They did so in both world wars and again in the early years of the cold war. Over the past decade, however, their efforts have flagged, while the external danger is more grave than ever from a powerful and skillful adversary whose successes have been stunning and whose ambitions are unlimited. In the face of this danger, the course of both reason and necessity for *all* of the free nations is to accept a fair share of the responsibility for the defense of their common interests.

The question is how and whether a dynamic "concert of free nations" can be put together. It is clear that the United Nations, although it was designed to form just such a concert, has fallen far short of the hopes which attended its creation; we must look elsewhere for a system that can unify the forces of freedom effectively.

The dilemma of any effort to create an organic unity among nations or even a loose comity is that there is no necessary correlation between human need and human capacity. The need for a new "concert of nations" is very clear: it derives from the formidable threat of aggressive imperialistic Communism. The capacity to build such a concert requires something more than the negative spur of fear and common danger; it requires the positive force of a sense of *community,* which means a feeling and deep conviction of shared values and interests, a feeling that effective

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communication is possible, a feeling of trust and confidence in each other's purpose.

It is precisely because no such community is within reach on a world-wide scale that even the United Nations, to say nothing of proposals for world federation, goes far beyond our capacity in its aspirations, however defective it may be in terms of our needs. Indeed the great paradox of this century is that the divisive force of nationalism appears to have reached its historical peak at precisely the time when developments in science and military technology have unified the world in the physical sense and established the need for political units far beyond existing national frontiers.

It is thus imperative that we strive for a broader unity, a unity which is oriented to our needs but rooted in our capacity. While the United Nations will remain a symbol of our aspirations, we can hope at the most, as things stand, to build a viable community of the free world. The question is whether we have yet done all that we can to develop it. Although such a community must for the foreseeable future be limited to the free nations, it can set its sights on universal values.

II

Prescriptions for the future, if they are to prove effective, must be rooted in the experience of the past. It is more than an academic exercise, therefore, to look back in history for models and examples of a viable spirit of international community.

Such a spirit prevailed in remarkable measure in nineteenth century Europe. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe developed a primitive but effective system of public law based on the treaty structure erected by the Congress of Vienna. In order to provide permanent security against a resurgence of French militarism and aggression, Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia formed in 1815 a quadruple alliance of which Article 6 provided for "periodic meetings of sovereigns or their ministers" for preserving the peace and stability of Europe. France, the defeated aggressor, was granted remarkably generous terms and within three years of her defeat was brought into the system of consultation. Thus emerged the Concert of Europe, an oligarchy of great powers, but none the less a genuine community of nations who identified their common interests in preserving a rough balance of power and the basic integrity of the treaty structure.

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The Vienna settlement opened a century of relative peace. The guiding rule of the Concert, never made explicit but none the less effective, was that no change in the treaty structure could be made without the consent of the five-power oligarchy. Thus, for example, with "due process of law," the Concert decreed the independence of Belgium in 1830, a definite régime for the Turkish straits in 1840, the independence of Bulgaria in 1878, and, as late as 1913, the Concert successfully imposed a settlement of the Balkan wars.

The role of Britain in the Concert of Europe is especially instructive. As the leading financial, industrial and naval power, Britain accepted special responsibilities for the enforcement of the public law of Europe. She initiated something of a Marshall Plan after 1815, providing loans and subsidies to revive the war-torn economies of the European powers. Britain was the "holder" of the balance of power and her weight was thrown when necessary to the support of the weaker side in continental controversies and against the potential violator of treaties. When forcible changes in treaty requirements were unavoidable, as in the case of Russia's denunciation in 1871 of the naval restrictions imposed upon her in the Black Sea at the end of the Crimean War, Britain insisted upon a conference to put the stamp of legality on a foregone conclusion and thus to avoid a dangerous precedent.

The point which is most instructive for America in our own time is that Britain led but did not dominate the Concert. She was not the mistress of Europe but its *primus inter pares*. Her role, in short, was not to exercise sole responsibility but to lead a system of shared responsibility. The *Pax Britannica* was thus a multilateral system which depended at least as much on its members as on its leader.

The Concert of Europe represented a limited community and a fragile system of law, but it kept the peace for a hundred years —a splendid achievement by contrast with the far more structured and sophisticated international machinery of the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, the Concert had major flaws, and these ultimately proved fatal. It was first of all an oligarchy of great powers which imposed its will on the lesser states with little regard for their desires and aspirations. Secondly, the Concert at times showed little understanding of the rising forces of democracy and nationalism in nineteenth century Europe. Indeed, the

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eastern powers—Austria, Russia and Prussia—were quite hostile to these forces and sought in vain to use the Concert as an instrument to suppress them and to "make Europe safe for autocracy." Thirdly, the absence of established machinery of obligatory consultation reduced the workings of the Concert to hazardous uncertainty. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, tried desperately and vainly to invoke the Concert in the crisis of the summer of 1914. The chaos of telegrams frantically exchanged among the chancelleries of Europe at that time persuaded Grey that, if the Concert of Europe had had some established machinery of obligatory consultation, war might have been prevented.

The most serious handicap to the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe, however, proved to be the disintegration of the international community of shared values on which it rested. During the first half of the nineteenth century, nationalist movements were also liberal and democratic and Europe was increasingly dedicated to the rule of law. This trend was arrested and then reversed by the rise of a new form of nationalism—militant, aggressive and ultimately xenophobic. The prime mover of the new nationalism was Germany, whose unification and preëminence were won by the arms of autocratic Prussia. After the defeat of France by Prussia in 1871, Germany became the predominant nation in Europe, dedicated to Bismarckian "blood and iron." Europe in the late nineteenth century was prey to militarism, secret alliances and nationalist rivalries. The demise of the Concert of Europe in 1914 reflected the gradual enfeeblement and final disintegration of the community which had given Europe its happiest and most productive century.

Out of the ruins of the old European order, British and American statesmen devised the League of Nations—a radically new idea for the creation of a world-wide community of law. The British conceived of the League of Nations as an enlarged and improved Concert, but Woodrow Wilson thought of it as a universalized application of the Monroe Doctrine, which he regarded as a partnership of American states for the advancement of democracy in world affairs. British thinking was empirical in terms of European experience, a latter-day effort to bring in the new world to redress the balance of the old. Wilson's conception was universal and idealist, generalizing the Monroe Doctrine as he conceived it into a world moral order. These two views were not

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mutually exclusive. The British hoped to revive a community that had disintegrated; the Americans hoped to build a new one. Both looked to their own deeply rooted traditions of ordered society under the rule of law.

The chief British contribution to the Covenant was a system of obligatory consultation, peaceful settlement of disputes, and sanctions against violators. The objective, inspired largely by the disastrous experience of 1914, was to enforce delay and an attempt at peaceful settlement before nations actually resorted to war.

The major American contribution was Article 10, a mutual guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity among the members of the League. Article 10, said President Wilson, was the "backbone of the whole of the Covenant." It represented the guarantee which is the *sine qua non* of any valid system of collective security, an obligation inherent in membership, flowing directly from the Covenant, and not dependent upon the decisions of any organ of the League.

The founders of the League believed that it reflected the birth of a new world order and that its very processes would guide a nascent community to full maturity. Wilson had no illusions as to the existence at that time of a genuine international community, but he firmly believed that the historical moment had arrived for such a community to be born. The League, said Wilson in presenting the Covenant to the Peace Conference on February 14, 1919, would depend ultimately on the "moral force of the public opinion of the world." "Armed force," said the President, "is in the background in this program, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort. . . ."

The year 1919 was perhaps the high-water mark of democracy in world history. The victory was won by democratic nations, unshared with great totalitarian powers. It marked the occurrence of an epochal opportunity to lay the foundations of a world community of law—not to create a community full-grown, for that is the work of generations, but to give birth to a prospect of world peace under world law.

The opportunity so briefly presented in 1919 was lost, and lost completely, by the generation of statesmen who governed during the interwar years. It is not necessary here to rehearse the tragic annals of that era—the retreat of America to isolation, the capit-

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ulation of the League to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Italian aggression in Ethiopia and German aggression in Europe. The result was World War II, more devastating than the first war. By 1945 the statesmen of the West were ready to retrieve the errors of the interwar years. They had the will perhaps, but the opportunity of 1919 was not to be repeated. The victory of 1945 was shared by a dynamic new totalitarianism, one which rejected the values which underlay both the nineteenth century Concert and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

III

Under these conditions the United Nations was conceived and created, an organ of international community far more ambitious than the League and launched under far less auspicious circumstances. There is no mystery in the failure of the United Nations to fulfill its promise. That promise rested on the assumption that President Roosevelt brought back from Yalta in February 1945—that we had achieved unity "in spirit and in purpose" with our allies. Events proved that hope illusory and with it went the promise of a genuine system of collective security on a world-wide scale.

There are at least three preconditions of a viable system of collective security: (1) a status quo on which the principal powers agree; (2) the availability of overwhelming force to those nations who support the status quo or at least oppose change by violence; (3) a high degree of political and moral solidarity among the great powers. These are the minimum conditions of a minimum international community. None of them existed at the end of World War II. The success of the United Nations depended upon the presence of all of them.

The United Nations' Charter reflects the ambivalence of excessive aspirations toward a world community and the existence in the world of conflicting powers and ideologies. In the words of the distinguished international lawyer, Julius Stone: "The very ambition of the Charter turned it into a two-faced instrument. One face looks nobly towards the beginnings of a super-State well beyond the League of Nations; the other looks grimly backwards to the anarchic self-help of the old world, well before the foundation of the League of Nations. Which was the real face?"[1]

The answer, unfortunately, is the "second face." The global

[1] Julius Stone, "Legal Controls of International Conflict." New York: Rinehart, 1954, p. 280.

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community which the Charter assumed exists today neither in fact nor in prospect. If the social fabric essential to institutions does not exist, even the most brilliant statecraft cannot create it.

The "first face" of the Charter appears in the peace enforcement powers of the Security Council, an organ vested with full authority to apply all sanctions, including the use of force, against any nation which commits a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." The Security Council has the theoretical power to decide on such measures and all members of the United Nations are bound under Article 25 to "accept and carry out" these decisions.

The veto reduces these powers to a nullity because it renders the great powers immune, leaving the enforcement of the peace to their fiat. The Charter was never intended for use against the great powers. They were the policemen, set above the law, whose compliance with the Charter depended not on law but on their own consent, and on the illusion of their unity "in spirit and in purpose."

The history of the United Nations has been in large measure a history of retreat from false hopes and of adjustment to the reality of a divided world. The veto in fact is an accurate reflection of that reality. Its removal would not result in a genuine system of collective security. More likely it would mean the end of the organization. The veto is the reflection, not a cause, of conflict. In its absence, a great power would not comply with the Charter but would rebel against it. The real problem is one not of legalities but of power politics in a divided world.

The veto represents the "second face" of the Charter; it is a clause of escape and evasion. So does Article 51, which recognizes an "inherent" right of individual and collective self-defense. As Western statesmen have repeatedly pointed out, their system of defense alliances is wholly valid under the Charter, clearly licensed by Article 51. But NATO is an essential instrument of collective security precisely because of the failure of the U.N. It is not a realization of the Charter but a substitute for it authorized by a clause of escape and reservation.

The primitive parts of the Charter, those which look to anarchic self-help, have proven viable because they reflect reality. The grand innovation of an authoritative international executive quickly broke down because it defied history and falsely assumed the existence of a community of the great powers.

The gradual transfer of authority from the Security Council to

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the General Assembly has been an effort to adjust to reality by retreating to looser and more traditional forms of coöperation. Such was the intent of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 1950. The Security Council has all but ceased to function and it was the General Assembly which dealt more or less successfully with the Suez crisis of 1956 and quite unsuccessfully with the Soviet suppression of Hungary. The difficulty with the General Assembly is that it is a most unwieldy body and one which bears no relationship to the realities of world power. A body in which Guatemala or Bulgaria exercises the same voting power as the United States or the Soviet Union can scarcely be expected to serve as a reliable instrument of peace enforcement or even of consultation.

The anarchic face of the U.N. dominates. Its forward-looking face is but a shadow and a promise. It seems quite clear that if we are to develop a working concert of free nations, we must look elsewhere for a model and an instrumentality.

IV

By far the most impressive achievements of policy coördination among sovereign powers have occurred in wartime. In both world wars the Western powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States, achieved a high degree of coöperation along specific functional lines in the common war effort.

During the First World War the Allied and Associated Powers dealt through international agencies with such problems as the coördination of military strategy, the allocation of shipping and the maintenance of supplies of food and raw materials. The Supreme War Council, for instance, under Marshal Foch, was virtually an international cabinet for the conduct of the war. Before the war was over, some European statesmen began to think of it as a "rudimentary league of nations." A number of other functional international organs operated with great success during the war and the Peace Conference.

Impressive achievements of close coördination, indeed unification, of policy were achieved by Great Britain and the United States in World War II. The grand strategy of the war was planned in constant and intimate consultations between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and the British and American armed forces were put under a joint command known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Under the direction of

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the political leaders of the two countries, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, sitting in Washington, formulated and executed policies and plans relating to the strategic conduct of the war, allocation of munitions and transportation requirements. A close working relationship developed between the top British representative, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, and General George Marshall, who together made major policy decisions in an informal manner. The Allied war effort was also unified by a system of combined boards whose task was to muster the full economic resources of Great Britain and the United States and Canada.

The combined boards as well as the Combined Chiefs of Staff were created and carried on in an atmosphere in which the common purpose of defeating the enemy overrode all other motives. Survival itself depended upon common effort and a united front. National and group interests were readily subordinated by the two English-speaking nations with their common interests, their similar outlook and their community of democratic values. Underlying the ability of British and American officials to work closely together was a sense of community derived from long association and a common heritage. It is significant that at no point was the Soviet Union brought into the system of unified conduct of the war.

The experience of the joint war effort points to the efficacy of a functional approach toward the building of an international community. Common efforts to deal with specific concrete problems are likely to be more productive in the long run than comprehensive and spectacular attempts at world constitution-making.

In times of clear and present danger, custom, inertia, vested interests and traditional viewpoints give way to the needs of the times. The problem that now confronts us is whether they will give way in a time of ominous danger, but danger which is vague, ambiguous and lacking in dramatic urgency. That is the nature of the peril which confronts the free world. Unless we can forge something like the unity of purpose and common action that we so successfully forged in wartime, we may well fall victim if not to cataclysm then to creeping catastrophe.

V

In a speech on June 10, 1961, to a rally of Young Conservatives, Sir Anthony Eden called for a "political general staff" of Western leaders to enable free countries to stand up to "the

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monolithic mass which is the Communist world." In a pessimistic assessment of the cold war, Eden declared: "There must be much closer unity within the West before there can be effective negotiation with the East." Ordinary methods of diplomacy within the free world are inadequate, said the former Prime Minister. "Something much more thorough is required." Citing the experience of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II, Eden said that all would have been confusion and disarray without them. "This," he said, "is exactly what has been happening between the politically free nations in the postwar world. We need joint chiefs of a political general staff." Citing the advances of Communist power in recent years, Sir Anthony observed: "This very grave state of affairs will continue until the free nations accept together the reality of the danger that confronts them and unite their policies and resources to meet it."

While I fully agree with Sir Anthony's contention, I think that we must carry the analysis farther, bearing in mind that while common peril may be the measure of our *need,* the existence or absence of a positive sense of community must be the measure of our *capacity*.

While it is hazardous to project the trend of history, it seems clear that a genuine community is painfully emerging in the Western world, particularly among the countries of Western Europe. At the end of World War II, free Europe was ready for a new beginning. The excesses of nationalism had brought down upon Europe a generation of tyranny and war, and a return to the old order of things seemed unthinkable. Under these conditions a new generation of Europeans began to discover the bonds of long association and shared values that for so long had been subordinated to nationalist xenophobia. A slow and painful trend toward unification has taken hold, a trend which may at any time be arrested and reversed but which may also lead to a binding federation of Europe. It may well be that the unification of Europe will prove inadequate, that the survival of free society will require nothing less than the confederation of the entire Western world.

The movement toward European unity has been expressed in two currents: federalism and functionalism, one looking to the constitution of a United States of Europe, the other building on wartime precedents of practical coöperation for the solution of

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specific problems. Thus far the advances made have been almost entirely along functional lines.

Many factors contributed to the growth of the European movement. In 1946 Sir Winston Churchill, who had spoken often of European union during the war, advocated the formation of "a kind of United States of Europe." Had Churchill been returned to office in 1945, it is just possible that Britain, instead of standing fearfully aloof, would have *led* Europe toward union.

In 1947 and 1948 the necessity of massive coördinated efforts to achieve economic recovery led to the formation of the Organization for European Economic Coöperation to supervise and coördinate the uses of American aid under the Marshall Plan. The United States might well have exploited the opportunity provided by the European Recovery Program to push the hesitant European nations toward political federation as well as economic coöperation, but all proposals to this effect were rejected by the United States Government at the time.

Another powerful factor in the European movement was the threat of Soviet aggression. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was followed immediately by the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty, a 50-year alliance among Britain, France and the Benelux countries. And of course the Soviet threat was responsible for NATO, the grand alliance of the Atlantic nations.

New organs of unification proliferated in the decade following the conclusion of the NATO alliance. In 1949 the Council of Europe came into existence, a purely consultative parliamentary body but the first organ of political rather than functional unity. In 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community was launched, placing the coal and steel production of France, West Germany, Italy and Benelux under a supranational High Authority. For a time it appeared that a common European army might be created, but the project for a European Defense Community was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954. In 1957 the social-economic approach to European integration was capped by the formation among "the Six" of a tariff-free European Common Market, and Euratom for coöperation in the development of atomic energy.

The "overseas" democracies have generally encouraged the European unification movement without seriously considering the wisdom of their own full participation in a broader Atlantic

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community. The United States and Canada belong only to NATO and the new O.E.C.D. Britain until recently went along in some areas with all of the enthusiasm of the groom at a shotgun wedding. In other areas it held back, pleading its Commonwealth bonds. Now Britain has decided to seek admission to the European Economic Community and it seems certain that she will be joined by some of her partners in the loose Free Trade Area of the "Outer Seven." Besides its historical significance as a break with the centuries-old tradition of British insularity, Britain's move, if successful, will constitute an historic landmark of the first importance in the movement toward the unification of Europe and the Western world.

If a broader Atlantic community is to be formed—and my own judgment is that it lies within the realm of both our needs and our capacity—a ready nucleus of machinery is at hand in the NATO alliance. The time is now ripe, indeed overdue, for the vigorous development of its non-military potentialities, for its development as an instrument of Atlantic community. What is required is the full implementation of Article 2 of the Treaty, which provides: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any and all of them." As Lester Pearson wrote in 1955: "NATO cannot live on fear alone. It cannot become the source of a real Atlantic community if it remains organized to deal only with the military threat which first brought it into being."

The problem of NATO is not one of machinery, of which there is an abundance, but of the will to use it. The NATO Council is available as an executive agency, the Standing Group as a high military authority. The unofficial Conference of Parliamentarians is available as a potential legislative authority. This machinery will not become the instrument of an Atlantic community by fiat, but only when that community evolves from potentiality to reality. The existence of a community is a state of mind—a conviction that goals and values are widely shared, that effective communication is possible, that mutual trust is reasonably assured.

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An equally promising avenue toward Atlantic community may lie through the development and expansion of the O.E.C.D. Conceived as an organ of economic coöperation, there is no reason why O.E.C.D. cannot evolve into a broader instrument of union if its members so desire. Indeed it might be a more appropriate vehicle than NATO for the development of a parliamentary organ of the Atlantic nations, because it could encompass *all* of the members of the Atlantic community including those, like Sweden and Switzerland, who are unwilling to be associated with an essentially military alliance like NATO.

Underlying these hopes and prescriptions is a conviction that the nations of the North Atlantic area do indeed form a community, at least a potential community. There is nothing new in this; what is new and compelling is that the West is now but one of several powerful civilizations, or "systems," and that one or more of the others may pose a mortal danger to the West. For centuries the North Atlantic nations dominated the world and as long as they did they could afford the luxury of fighting each other. That time is now past and the Atlantic nations, if they are to survive, must develop a full-fledged community, and they must also look beyond the frontiers of "Western civilization" toward a world-wide "concert of free nations."

VI

The burden of these reflections is that a broader unity among the free nations is at the core of our needs. And if we do not aspire to too much, it is also within our capacity. A realistic balancing of the need for new forms of international organization on the one hand, and our capacity to achieve them on the other, must be approached through the concept of "community." History has demonstrated many times that concerts of nations based solely on the negative spur of common danger are unlikely to survive when the external danger ceases to be dramatically urgent. Only when a concert of nations rests on the positive foundations of shared goals and values is it likely to form a viable instrument of long-range policy. It follows that the solution to the current disunity of the free nations is only to a very limited extent a matter of devising new machinery of consultation and coördination. It is very much a matter of building the foundations of community.

It is for these reasons that proposals for a "new world order,"

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through radical overhaul of the United Nations or through some sort of world federation, are utterly fatuous. In a recent book called "World Peace Through World Law," two distinguished lawyers, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, call for just such an overhaul of the U.N., basing their case on the world-wide fear of a nuclear holocaust. I believe that these proposals, however meritorious in terms of world needs, go far beyond our capacity to realize them. Such proposals look to an apocalyptic act, a kind of Lockian "social contract" on a world-wide scale. The defect of these proposals is in their attempt to outrun history and their assumption that because something may be desirable it is also possible.

A working concept of the organic evolution of community must lead us in a different direction. The failures of the U.N. and of other international organs suggest that we have already gone beyond what was internationally feasible. Our problem, therefore, is to devise processes more modest in their aspirations, adjusted to the real world of sovereign nation states and diverse and hostile communities. The history of the U.N. demonstrates that in a pluralistic world we must develop processes of influence and persuasion rather than coercion. It is possible that international organization will ultimately supplant the multi-state system, but its proper function for the immediate future is to reform and supplement that system in order to render pluralism more compatible with an interdependent world.

New machinery of coördination should not be our primary objective in the foreseeable future—though perhaps the "political general staff" of Western leaders proposed by Sir Anthony Eden would serve a useful purpose. Generally, however, there is an abundance of available machinery of coördination—in NATO, in O.E.C.D., in the U.N. and elsewhere. The trouble with this machinery is that it is not used and the reason that it is not used is the absence of a conscious sense of community among the free nations.

Our proper objective, then, is the development of a new spirit, the realization of a potential community. A "concert of free nations" should take its inspiration from the traditions of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe with its common values and accepted "rules of the game." Constitutions of and by themselves mean little; the history of both the League of Nations and

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the United Nations demonstrates that. But a powerful sense of community, even with little or no machinery, means a great deal. That is the lesson of the nineteenth century.

A realistic "concert of free nations" might be expected to consist of an "inner community" of the North Atlantic nations and an "outer community" embracing much or all of the non-Communist world.

The North Atlantic nations represent an almost-existing community and, because they do, they can press forward in the development of supranational institutions. Because their community is fragile, these institutions for the time being should be functional rather than federal, piecemeal and pragmatic rather than general. In practice, this would mean the further development of NATO as an organ of political and economic coöperation, the vigorous implementation of the O.E.C.D., and the expansion of existing organs of European integration, with Great Britain, Canada and the United States moving toward full participation.

The "outer community" poses much more difficult problems, because it is a *potential* community still far from realization. Our objective must be to bring it into existence, a task which will take time and patience. The problem here is to persuade the new and underdeveloped nations that for certain purposes at least their interests and objectives coincide with our own. Their aspirations for economic development, for military security and for freedom are all objectives which represent our interests as well as their own. The way to persuade these nations of this community of interests is for the West to assist them in their realization. In practice, this means a unified Western program of economic assistance for sound development programs, rigorous respect for the sovereignty of newly independent nations, and a growing practice of consulting these nations on specific common problems.

Such a policy also means the encouragement of a greater sense of responsibility among the underdeveloped nations than now exists. If their economic development programs are unsound, we must not be "blackmailed" into providing lavish aid for fear they will otherwise go to the Communists. When we consult them on matters of security, we must make it clear that their security as well as our own is involved and they must accept responsibility accordingly.

In all these ways we can work toward a "concert of free na-

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tions," a community rooted not only in common peril but also in common values and aspirations. Such a community falls far short of the stable *world* order we desire. Its merit is that it represents a realistic accommodation between our needs and our capacity.

Freedom is not its own defense. Its survival in this century will require the construction of a new community of unified effort and shared responsibility. In the words of the Spanish philosopher Salvador de Madariaga: "The trouble today is that the Communist world understands unity but not liberty, while the free world understands liberty but not unity. Eventual victory may be won by the first of the two sides to achieve the synthesis of both liberty and unity."

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BRAZIL'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY

By Jânio Quadros

THE interest shown in the position of Brazil in international affairs is in itself proof of the presence of a new force on the world stage. Obviously my country did not appear by magic, nor is it giving itself momentarily to a more or less felicitous exhibition of publicity seeking. When I refer to a "new force," I am not alluding to a military one, but to the fact that a nation, heretofore almost unknown, is prepared to bring to bear on the play of world pressures the economic and human potential it represents, and the knowledge reaped from experience that we have a right to believe is of positive value.

We are a nation of continental proportions, occupying almost half of South America, relatively close to Africa and, ethnically, having indigenous, European and African roots. Within the next decade, our population will amount to close to 100,000,000 inhabitants, and the rapid industrialization of some regions of the country heralds our development into an economic power.

At present we are still beset by the evils of underdevelopment which make of the greater part of our country the scene for quasi-Asiatic dramas. We have poverty-stricken areas which are overpopulated, and we have vast regions—the largest in the world—still unconquered. And yet, great cities are becoming industrial and trade centers of major significance.

If Brazil is only now being heard of in international affairs, it is because on taking office I decided to reap the consequences of the position that we had achieved as a nation. We had been relegated unjustifiably to an obscure position, while—even in our own hemisphere—there were accumulating errors and problems in our way that jeopardized our very future. We gave up the subsidiary and innocuous diplomacy of a nation aligned with worthy though alien interests and, to protect our rights, placed ourselves in the forefront, convinced as we were of our ability to contribute with our own means to the understanding of peoples.

Before I undertake an objective analysis of Brazil's foreign policy, the reader will, I hope, bear with me in a somewhat subjective statement of views. It will serve to clarify the underlying

Editor's Note: This article was written for FOREIGN AFFAIRS shortly before President Quadros resigned from office, and the official translation was approved the week before he left the Presidency. We believe this defense of his policies has a continuing interest.

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reasons why we have taken particular positions on world issues.

To be genuine, a nation's foreign policy, as such, must be the embodiment of the ideals and common interests that govern its existence. Idealistic aspirations are defined by the explicit or implicit establishment of the goals aimed at. They reflect the common interests and all those economic, social, historic and political circumstances that at a given moment influence the choice of immediate aims and the selection of ways and means of action.

The ideals of the community are the backdrop against which the national drama unfolds, and are the constant source of inspiration of true leadership. They generally permeate the means and resources for the enforcement of political decisions. A national policy—as a tool for action—seems at times to turn against the fundamental impetus that gave it birth, in order the better to serve it; but in terms of the very essence of that policy, the truth of certain realities cannot be refuted. In order to ensure that the formulation of a national strategy is viable, popular desires and ideals cannot be ignored; but the truth of the matter is that very often the tactics must be neutralized and divested of idealistic or sentimental content in order to meet urgent interests and strengthen the ideals of the community itself.

There are two moments in the life of nations when complete freedom is permitted in the expression of what might be called a national ideology: when they are undergoing dire poverty, as the sole romantic consolation left to the people; and when they are thriving in abundance, as a duty imposed upon the nation by the multitude of interests asserted but never entirely satisfied.

A nation which no longer is so poor or unprotected as to be able to indulge in the luxury of dreamy consolations, yet is struggling against mighty odds to achieve the full possession of its wealth and to develop the potentialities of its own nature, must ever remain in the arena—alert, aware and vigilant. Such a nation cannot lose sight of its objectives, yet must avoid jeopardizing them by submitting to policies which—though in keeping with remote ideals—do not, at the moment, satisfy its true interests.

There can be no doubt that Brazil—thanks to a tremendous national effort—is making gigantic strides toward breaking the barrier of underdevelopment. The rate of national growth speaks for itself, and I am convinced that at the end of my term of office the country's rate of progress will be such as to make the population explosion no longer a somber prospect but rather an addi-

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tional and deciding factor for advancement in the process of economic development.

We have no right to dream. Rather it is our duty to work—but at the same time to trust and hope—and work with our feet firmly on the ground.

In time, the foreign policy of Brazil will reflect the craving for developmental progress. Obviously, underlying the decisions which we are compelled to take in order to meet the problems of material growth inherent in the desire of the Brazilian people for economic, social, political and human freedom lies the interweaving of the country's material needs. Keeping our aims ever in mind, we must choose those of our country's sources of inspiration that can best be mobilized to assist the national effort.

II

Because of our historical, cultural and Christian background as well as our geographical situation, ours is a predominantly Western nation. Our national effort is directed toward the achievement of a democratic way of life, both politically and socially. It may not be idle to stress here that our dedication to democracy is greater than that of other nations of our same cultural sphere. We have thus become the most successful example of racial coexistence and integration known to history.

Common ideals of life and organization draw us close to the major nations of the Western bloc, and on many issues Brazil can, in a leading position, associate itself with this bloc. This affinity is underlined by our participation in the Inter-American regional system, which entails specific political commitments.

However, at the present juncture, we cannot accept a set national position exclusively on the basis of the above premises. It is undeniable that we have other points in common with Latin America in particular, and with the recently emancipated peoples of Asia and Africa, which cannot be ignored since they lie at the root of the readjustment of our policy, and on them converge many of the main lines of the development of Brazilian civilization. If it be true that we cannot relegate our devotion to democracy to a secondary place, it is no less true that we cannot repudiate ties and contacts offering great possibilities for national realization.

The closeness of Brazil's relations with neighboring countries of the continent and with the Afro-Asian nations, though based

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on different reasons, tends to the selfsame end. Among these, in the majority of cases, are historical, geographic and cultural motives. Common to them all is the fact that our economic situation coincides with the duty of forming a single front in the battle against underdevelopment and all forms of oppression.

From all this, naturally, certain points stand out that may be deemed basic to the foreign policy of my government. One of these is the recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle for economic and political freedom. Development is an aim common to Brazil and to the nations with which we endeavor to have closer relations, and the rejection of colonialism is the inevitable and imperative corollary of that aim.

It is, furthermore, in the light of these political determinants that today we consider the future of the Inter-American regional system of first importance. The growth of Latin America as a whole and the safeguarding of the sovereignty of each nation of the hemisphere are the touchstones of a continental policy as the Brazilian government understands it.

The mistakes created by an erroneous equating of continental problems are only too well known. Insufficient or misdirected aid has increased regional disagreements. Nations at grips with grave problems in common—that is, all the countries of Latin America —must take stock of their needs and plan accordingly. Latin Americans are interested not in the prosperity of the small, leading groups, but in the national prosperity as a whole, which must be sought at all costs and regardless of the risks.

The United States must realize that today it confronts a challenge from the socialist world. The Western world must show and prove that it is not only Communist planning that promotes the prosperity of national economies. Democratic planning must also do so, with the assistance of those economically able, if the political system of a perplexed two-thirds of the Western world is to avoid the risk of bankruptcy.

We cannot too often stress the extent to which poverty separates us from North America and the leading European countries of the Western world. If by their success these represent, in the eyes of underdeveloped peoples, the ideal of achievement of the élite of European cultural origin, there nevertheless is taking root in the minds of the masses the conviction that this ideal, for a country without resources and hamstrung in its aspirations for progress is a mockery. What solidarity can there be between a

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prosperous nation and a wretched people? What common ideals can, in the course of time, withstand the comparison between the rich, cultivated areas of the United States and the famine-ridden zones of the Brazilian Northeast?

Thinking of this sort irrevocably creates in us a sense of solidarity with those poverty-stricken peoples who, on three continents, are struggling against imperialist interests which, under the umbrella of democratic institutions, mislead—if not destroy—attempts to organize popular economies. When nations competing with the democratic group make demonstrations of real or pretended and disinterested economic help, this problem seems more acute under the pressure of the conflict of interests.

At this point it might be appropriate to refer to the ideological prejudices of the capitalist democracies, ever ready to decry the idea of state intervention in countries where either the state controls and governs economic growth—which has become a question of sovereignty—or nothing at all is achieved. We are not in a position to allow the free play of economic forces in our territory, simply because those forces, controlled from outside, play their own game and not that of our country.

The Brazilian Government is not prejudiced against foreign capital—far from it. We stand in dire need of its help. The sole condition is that the gradual nationalization of profits be accepted, for otherwise it no longer is an element of progress but becomes a mere leech feeding on our national effort. Let it be known that the state in Brazil will not relinquish those controls that will benefit our economy by channeling and ensuring the efficiency of our progress.

III

Economic imbalance is doubtless the most critical of all the adverse factors that beset the Inter-American regional system, and from it almost all others stem. My government is convinced that it is fighting for the recovery of Pan Americanism and that this must start with the economic and social fields. Politically we are trying to give shape and content to the imperative principles of self-determination and non-intervention, and it is these principles that guide us in relation to the Americas as well as to the rest of the world.

The still dramatically present question of Cuba convinced us, once and for all, of the nature of the continental crisis. In defend-

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ing with intransigence the sovereignty of Cuba against interpretations of an historical fact which cannot be controlled *a posteriori,* we believe we are helping to awaken the continent to a true awareness of its responsibilities. We stand by our position on Cuba, with all its implications. Surely the Brazilian attitude has been understood by other governments, and as it gains ground, the entire regional system shows signs of a regeneration in the assessment of the responsibilities of each member nation.

The government of the United States, through its recent aid programs, took an important step toward the revision of its classical and inoperative continental policy. We hope that President Kennedy, who is not lacking in the qualities of leadership, will carry the revision of his country's attitude to the very limit and will sweep away the considerable remaining obstacles on the road to a truly democratic, continental community.

As to Africa, we may say that today it represents a new dimension in Brazilian policy. We are linked to that continent by our ethnic and cultural roots and share in its desire to forge for itself an independent position in the world of today. The nations of Latin America that became politically independent in the course of the nineteenth century found the process of economic development delayed by historical circumstances, and Africa, which has only recently become politically free, joins us at this moment in the common struggle for freedom and well-being.

I believe that it is precisely in Africa that Brazil can render the best service to the concepts of Western life and political methods. Our country should become the link, the bridge, between Africa and the West, since we are so intimately bound to both peoples. In so far as we can give the nations of the Black continent an example of complete absence of racial prejudice, together with successful proof of progress without undermining the principles of freedom, we shall be decisively contributing to the effective integration of an entire continent in a system to which we are attached by our philosophy and historic tradition.

The attraction exerted by the Communist world, by Communist techniques and by the spirit of Communist organizations upon the countries but recently freed from the capitalist yoke is common knowledge. Generally speaking, all underdeveloped countries, including those of Latin America, are susceptible to that appeal. It must not be forgotten that whereas the independence of the Latin American nations was inspired by a liberation

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movement rooted in the French Revolution, the autonomy obtained by the new Asian and African nations was preceded by a wave of hope aroused by the socialist revolution in Russia among the oppressed classes and peoples all over the world. The Afro-Asian liberation movement arose against the domination by nations that compose—if not lead—the Western bloc.

These historical factors are of decisive importance and must be borne in mind when gauging the role that a country such as Brazil can play in the task of reappraising the dynamic forces that are at work in the new world of today in Asia and Africa.

For many years Brazil made the mistake of supporting European colonialism in the United Nations. This attitude—which is only now fading—gave rise to a justified mistrust of Brazilian policy. Misinformed circles, overly impressed with European patterns of behavior, contributed to a mistake which must be attributed more to a disregard of the deeper commitments of our country than to political malice. Our fraternal relationship with Portugal played its part in the complacency shown by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil in this matter.

Therefore, everything points to a necessary change of position with regard to colonialism, which in all its guises—even the most tenuous—will from now on meet with the determined opposition of Brazil. This is our policy, not merely in the interests of Africa, nor for the sake of a platonic solidarity, but because it is in keeping with Brazilian national interests. These to a certain extent are still influenced by the most disguised forms of colonialist pressure, but call for a rapprochement with Africa.

I might add that the raising of the economic standards of the African peoples is of vital importance to the economy of Brazil. Even from a purely selfish standpoint, we are interested in seeing the social betterment and improvement in the production techniques of Africa. The exploitation of Africans by European capital is detrimental to the Brazilian economy, permitting as it does the fostering of commercial competition on the basis of low-salaried Negro workers. Competition on a civilized and human level must be found to replace that of enslavement by underpayment of an entire race. Here and now, the industrial growth of my country guarantees to the Africans a most important source of supply, which could even serve as the basis for arrangements for the linking together of our respective production systems.

We are setting up regular diplomatic and trade relations with

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several African countries and my government's emissaries have visited that continent to study concrete possibilities for coöperation and exchange. In time, the potentialities of this closer relationship, destined to be a milestone in the history of human affairs, will be fulfilled.

IV

Here I must underscore another important aspect of the new Brazilian foreign policy. My country has few international obligations; we are bound only by pacts and treaties of continental assistance which commit us to solidarity with any member of the hemisphere that may become the victim of extra-continental aggression. We have not subscribed to treaties of the nature of NATO, and are in no way forced formally to intervene in the cold war between East and West. We are therefore in a position to follow our national inclination to act energetically in the cause of peace and the relaxation of international tension.

Not being members of any bloc, not even of the Neutralist bloc, we preserve our absolute freedom to make our own decisions in specific cases and in the light of peaceful suggestions at one with our nature and history. A group of nations, notably of Asia, is also careful to remain on the sidelines in any clash of interests which are invariably those of the great powers and not necessarily those of our country, let alone of world peace.

The first step in making full use of the possibilities of our position in the world consists in maintaining normal relations with all nations. Brazil, either through misinterpretation or distortion of its better political judgment, spent many years without regular contacts with the countries of the Communist bloc, even to the point of having only roundabout and insufficient trade relations with them. As a part of my government's program, I decided to examine the possibility of renewing relations with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania; these have now been established. Negotiations for the reopening of relations with the Soviet Union are in progress and an official Brazilian mission is going to China to study exchange possibilities. Consistent with this revision of our foreign policy, my country, as is known, decided to vote in favor of including on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly the question of the representation of China; this initial position will, in due course, have its logical consequences.

The possibilities of trade relations between Brazil and the

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Orient are practically *terra incognita.* Even in the case of Japan, to which we are bound by so many ties, our barter relations are far from complete. China, Korea, Indonesia, India, Ceylon and all of Southeast Asia provide room for the development of our production and commercial endeavors, which neither distance nor political problems can discourage.

The world must be made aware of the fact that Brazil is intensively increasing its production, looking not only to the domestic market, but specifically seeking to attract other nations. Economically speaking, my government's motto is "Produce everything, for everything produced is marketable." We shall go out to conquer these markets: at home, in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, in Oceania, in countries under democracy, and in those that have joined the Communist system. Material interests know no doctrine and Brazil is undergoing a period where its very survival as a nation occupying one of the most extensive and privileged areas of the globe depends on the solution of its economic problems. Our very faithfulness to the democratic way of life is at stake in this struggle for development. A nation such as ours, with 70,000,000 inhabitants and with the world's highest rate of population growth, will not permit even a slowing down of its movement toward the full utilization of its own wealth.

Without fear of error I can say that the experiment in democratic progress being carried out in Brazil is decisive both for Latin America and for all the underdeveloped areas of the world. Therefore, this experiment is of deep interest to prosperous nations which are also proud of being free. They will remain so to the extent that success crowns the efforts for economic emancipation of the underdeveloped nations living under the same system. Freedom once again becomes the outgrowth of equality.

It must be pointed out that the idea behind the foreign policy of Brazil, and its implementation, has now become the instrument for a national development policy. As part and parcel of our national life, foreign policy has ceased to be an unrealistic academic exercise carried out by oblivious and spellbound élites; it has become the main topic of daily concern. With it we seek specific aims: at home, prosperity and well-being; elsewhere, to live together amicably and in world peace.

There is no need to spell out to Brazilians what we are in the world today. We are fully aware of the mission we must accomplish—and can accomplish.

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THE ROAD AROUND STALEMATE

By Harlan Cleveland

IN his short story, "The Bear," William Faulkner wrote that sometimes a dog has to be brave "so she can keep on calling herself a dog." At the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly this fall, the United Nations will have to be brave so it can keep on calling itself the United Nations.

Almost all the major issues of American foreign policy are before the Sixteenth General Assembly, for every international trouble that remains unsettled in lesser forums gets into the United Nations sooner or later. We will cheerfully confront them there—because our foreign policy, unlike the Soviet Union's, is rooted in the conviction that the United States has serious business in the United Nations. We are not out to destroy other governments, so we must negotiate with them.

In the public prints, the September song in the General Assembly promises to sound like standoff and stalemate. The broadcasts and the banner headlines will be about Berlin and about plans to arm, disarm and rearm. The General Assembly will meet in the shadow of these questions, but will not make decisions about them. It will, however, make decisions about next steps in building international institutions with the power to act on behalf of all nations, the weakest as well as the most powerful.

In his speech before the National Press Club on July 10, Secretary of State Dean Rusk restated our commitment to "the survival and growth of the world of free choice and the free coöperation pledged in the United Nations Charter." Most countries are joined with us in this commitment. Not to be so joined is folly for a small nation, which has no alternative, and criminal folly for a great one, which has.

In the same speech, the Secretary of State said: "All nations have commitments arising out of their own interests and out of their own hopes for the future. In the United Nations commitments to the Charter can weave the fabric of common interest which, by reaching beyond the cold war, may determine its outcome." The citizen, watching the United Nations at its complex work, will be less baffled if he keeps in mind the distinction between the issues which the U.N., reaching beyond the cold war, can *do* something about, and the issues on which U.N. action is

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necessarily limited to talk—useful, clarifying talk sometimes, but talk nevertheless.

The great cold war issues will not be settled by committee work in the United Nations, because they are questions whose outcome may be more important to the great powers than considerations of world opinion.

Berlin is certainly in this class. So is nuclear disarmament. So, too, is the continuing problem of Communist China and its relationship to the world community. These unsettling issues are not really subject to a show of hands in the General Assembly. But all are subject to negotiation, and U.N. debate performs a signal service in pushing the great powers toward talking with each other about them.

Disarmament, for example, is everybody's concern, and as such it has been in and out of the U.N. for years. This year the frame of the debate may be fundamentally different. It is a fair generalization, though an oversimple one, that for the past decade disarmament talks—both the secret talks and those amplified through the U.N.'s megaphone—have been largely a dialogue of the deaf. Pragmatic U. S. plans for practical next steps have been answered with Soviet exhortations to sign first a treaty favoring a totally disarmed world, with details left vague about how this world can be safely reached. This year, by contrast, we are not only discussing next steps, but also setting forth our own picture of a world disarmed, one in which there are effective international organizations designed to keep the peace secure against secret arms and secret aggression; a world in which people are free to choose and rechoose their several destinies and their plural leaders, rather than being free to choose only one master, in one revolution, once in a lifetime. (The Soviets will no longer, in such a debate, get away with such sophistry as the offer to accept any inspection scheme if we will only accept their concept of disarmament—which amounts to saying that if we will let them do whatever they want to do, they will be glad to let us watch them do it.) The United Nations is certainly a proper forum for such a debate on the fundamental building blocks of mankind's destiny.

China policy is another great overhanging issue in the General Assembly—an issue on everybody's mind in whatever form it appears on the Assembly's agenda. Like the yearning for disarmament, the cumulative frustration about China policy is a factor in the domestic power struggle in every major nation. The

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recognition of Peking, and its admission to the United Nations, serve as an inexpensive blunt instrument with which leftist oppositions in a dozen countries beat the sitting governments over the head. By the same token, to favor the seating of Communist China in the U.N. is an easy way for Presidents and Prime Ministers to throw a bone to quiet the growling on their left. (The bone costs nothing as long as the United States can be counted on to prevent delivery.)

The seating of Communist China will again be "debated" in the General Assembly, as it has been debated for the past two years in spite of the symbolic "moratorium." The Assembly can theoretically decide on a status for Peking in the Assembly (though not in the Security Council, which decides these matters for itself). But the Assembly cannot solve the underlying problem, which is that Peking is not yet ready to accord a status in its foreign policy to the United Nations.

From our point of view, the Berlin problem is how to prevent the Soviet Union from changing the rules of the game before new rules have been agreed upon among the parties at vital interest. Since failure to reach a peaceful solution might cause nuclear particles to fall on the world's population without discrimination as to race, color or political belief, Berlin is a proper concern of all. The U.N. cannot impose a solution, but it can—and probably will—beg for one. Debate in the General Assembly can usefully contribute by making clear that self-determination is not only for Africans and Asians but for Berliners and other Germans as well.

Questions like Berlin, nuclear disarmament and China policy are certainly not beyond negotiation. We would be glad to find somebody in the Communist world willing to talk sense about them. Talk in the United Nations committees can be useful in framing the debate between the "world of free choice" and the "world of coercion." But the issues themselves can only be clarified, they cannot be settled, by a roll call in the General Assembly. On these issues the United Nations is no better off than Cleopatra's eunuch servant, Mardian, in the dialogue by Shakespeare:

> Cleo. . . . Hast thou affections?
> Mar. Yes, gracious madam.
> Cleo. Indeed!
> Mar. Not in deed, madam; for I can do nothing. . . .
> Yet I have fierce affections and think
> What Venus did with Mars.

The policy of the Soviet Union in the United Nations is to

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play on these fierce affections in the hope that some of the blame for the cold war's stalemated issues will fall on the United States and its allies. In the process, the Soviets do what lawyers often do—in court they dispute the court's jurisdiction, and at the same time in the newspapers outside they argue their case as though the court had jurisdiction. The Soviet Union has just about given up the pretense that it will trust the United Nations with any decision affecting the Soviet Union, but it still argues loudly that the West is laggard in carrying out U.N. resolutions on colonialism. Our own record may include a few inconsistencies in this debate, but they are dwindling. President Kennedy opened his Administration with a pledge to the United Nations "to enlarge the area in which its writ may run."

Our position in the United Nations on the stalemated issues is vitally important since it will affect our progress on the road around stalemate. We are not just prepared to state our case in the United Nations. We are determined to do so.

Our main purpose is not to change the position of the Soviet Union, although we will certainly try. Our efforts are not even designed to produce solid support for our policies by all the U.N.'s other members. We would welcome this support, but we have no illusion that Soviet intransigence will crumble before even a unanimous indictment.

Our goal is to prove that all issues, cold-war or otherwise, can be resolved by free choice and free coöperation and that the United States is ready to resolve them that way. Some members of the United Nations have never learned this; others, with more good will but less experience, have forgotten it in the panic to settle issues that the Soviet Union will not allow to be settled. Judging from past experience, the reaction of many of the under-committed countries of Asia and Africa to the Soviet-created tensions will be to urge the West to compromise; they know the Soviets won't. The facts are, however, that on the test-ban issue, on general disarmament, on the delicate dilemmas of Western colonialism and on other issues such as Berlin that are present even without a place on the agenda—on each of these issues, the United States' position is a Charter position. Nothing that we seek would do violence to the Charter, or require a special interpretation of it for our benefit. To keep restating the Charter position, an exercise in equal parts exhilarating and exhausting for those who engage in it, is perhaps the only way to bring the

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United Nations back through the cold-war looking-glass into the world where things are what they seem.

II

United States strategy in the Sixteenth General Assembly, then, is to help bind together the nations committed to the Charter into an open international society. The Communists can join this society if they wish, but it can get along nicely while awaiting their pleasure. We may not have to wait forever. The resources of the open society, including the matured capacities of the United Nations, can ultimately prove to the last dogmatist the proposition that "those who would not be coerced" will not, in fact, be coerced. It already displays some surprising and impressive capacities in this regard.

The United Nations has not done much to resolve the cold war, but it has demonstrated a *capacity to act* on behalf of peace and security, in situations involving something less than a global confrontation between the nuclear powers. It has not noticeably raised the level of brotherly love, but it has shown a *capacity to befriend* the oppressed, especially on the issue of colonialism. It has not ended poverty, but it has acquired a unique *capacity to create* those institutions that are prerequisite to plenitude in the developing nations. *Act, Befriend* and *Create:* these are at least a beginning, an ABC of world order. They are indeed the loom on which the Western world and the Southern Hemisphere will "weave the fabric of common interest"—with or without the threads of Soviet coöperation.

The capacity of the United Nations to act on behalf of peace and security has just survived the test of the Congo operation. Its actions there already qualify as a great achievement of international administration. Overnight in the Congo, the United Nations found itself in the midst of a struggle at once political, military and economic. It had to mobilize and direct hundreds of civilian administrators and technicians to save the sum of things from complete collapse and begin the process of nation-building. At the same time it had to build, transport, supply and command a polynational multilingual army of 20,000 troops for a unique and hazardous mission; the air transport of these troops, handled mostly by the U.S. Air Force without a single accident to date, is itself one of the great safety stories of our time. It had to help the faction-ridden leadership of the Congo to arrest the

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fragmentation of their new nation, and begin the tortuous task of fashioning a national government in a still tribal society. Reaching out beyond the cold war in operations designed to prevent a Spanish Civil War in Central Africa, it had to act decisively to prevent the cold war from reaching out to displace the United Nations itself.

As this is written, the intricate comings and goings of Congolese politics have somehow produced a new government of national union, legitimized by a Parliament which the U.N. sealed off in monastic seclusion on a college campus until it could agree on a sense of direction for the Congo. By insisting on a government of unquestioned legitimacy, the U.N. gambled on self-determination by the Congolese—and won. The implications of its success are enormous. Troops and administrators representing the aroused conscience of the world community were brought into a situation of chaos and made some order out of it—frustrating the indirect aggression and imported separatism that were sponsored by some of the U.N.'s own members.

The Congo is the biggest example by far of the United Nations' capacity to take executive action. It is by no means the only significant one. Consider the variety of present and potential U.N. "presences" around the world.

On the Asian continent, the Laotian civil war is already deeply penetrated by major-nation power on both sides; the United Nations "presence" there is on vacation, but it could still become at a later stage the middleman in the process of building in Laos something resembling a national government. There has been a form of United Nations presence in Cambodia, too, for handling refugee matters and whatever else comes up. Further to the southeast, both sides in the dispute over West New Guinea are talking about some kind of United Nations involvement. The United Nations has been "seized of" Kashmir, that stickiest leftover of the partition of British India, for more than a decade; only an heroic measure of bilateral tolerance by both Pakistan and India will prevent another seizure in this regional cold war.

In the Middle East, a precarious calm has been maintained partly by the presence of the United Nations—a sometime representative of the Secretary-General in the Jordanian capital of Amman, the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, a massive relief program for a million refugees, and a 5,000-man United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip. The relief

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agency is before the Assembly now for abolition or continuation next year; in the resulting cacophony, there is danger that the plight of the refugees themselves will be forgotten.

In North Africa, the Bizerte affair will still be on everybody's mind, and may still be on the United Nations agenda. Bizerte, in turn, could bring the Algerian question back into the United Nations. South of the Sahara, Angola, apartheid in South Africa and the status of South West Africa will doubtless be debated again, even though U.N. committees cannot travel to these places; the atmosphere will predictably be inflamed by stubborn adherence to principle on both "colonial" and "anti-colonial" sides. The issue of "target dates" for independence will also be with us again, as U.N. commissions travel around the world wherever they are permitted to go, examining how fast and how well the remaining colonies are being readied for self-determination.

Just under the surface of the public consciousness, the Secretary-General is extending the U.N.'s capacity to act as technical consultant to new nations on a wide range of matters. In Togo, for example, a Special Representative of the United Nations regularly travels from Geneva. In Somalia, a U.N. adviser operates from a base as Resident Representative of the Technical Assistance Board. Arrangements are contemplated to provide a similar service in Tanganyika. Ruanda-Urundi is being assisted toward independence by a United Nations Commission set up at the Fifteenth Assembly; some continuing United Nations concern for internal security and governmental institution-building is inevitable after Belgium's formal grant of freedom for this territory, scheduled for next year. The United Nations thus crops up in many parts of the newly developing world because there is so often no bilateral alternative.

The development of the U.N.'s capacity to act has infuriated the custodians of the cold war. Their voices, however, have sounded surprisingly thin in the face of the determination of the uncoerced nations that this capacity will continue to grow. In the current Assembly, perhaps this capacity to act will be the real "great issue," because on this issue the organs of the United Nations do not only talk, they also make decisions that stick.

III

When we go beyond the capacity to act for peace and security to consider the U.N.'s capacity to befriend the oppressed, we

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confront its least developed aspect. Yet in stressing self-determination for all colonial peoples, a growing majority of the General Assembly has brought independence to pass more rapidly and in more places than would otherwise have been possible.

Until now the "capacity to befriend" has been exercised almost exclusively in the liquidation of the old trading empires. Nonwhite peoples have been its beneficiaries. But in most of the world —virtually all of Latin America and Asia, more than half of Africa—the most serious problems have to do not with colonialism but with the nature of government in the newly independent nations. In this post-colonial era the United Nations also has an important task: to help teach the art of self-government, to help protect independence by frustrating its subversion from outside and building its institutional reality from inside. In the Charter and in several international conventions, ratified and unratified, there are plenty of wonderful words about human rights and freedom of political choice. How to make these words operational inside the developing countries, for both majorities and minorities of whatever color or origin, may prove to be an exciting new frontier for the U.N. of the 1960s.

Equally relevant and further advanced is the U.N.'s capacity to assist in building social, economic and administrative institutions that make an open society meaningful. The United Nations and its Specialized Agencies have proved that the creation and strengthening of institutions can be carried out effectively, in some cases most effectively, by multilateral means. When many of the preconditions for economic growth are absent, the required degree of involvement in a recipient society is often simply too great for a single nation or even a group of nations. But the U.N. is not yet organized for the job ahead.

The answer to this problem, however, is not a huge capital fund to be dispensed by the General Assembly, though this proposal will doubtless be a prominent subject in the forthcoming session. In the business of economic development, the U.N.'s destiny is more relevant and more exciting. A network of aid programs, multilateral and bilateral, has been created or is in the offing. In this network, the United Nations' family of agencies should have a central role to play, especially in helping the most sensitive nations to plan both the use of their own resources and their acceptance of bilateral aid.

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IV

The U.S. position on this and on the other real issues before the United Nations is clearly predictable from policies already set forth by the President and the Secretary of State. It amounts to a philosophy for the United Nations that will be valid with or without Soviet coöperation. Our tactics in the Sixteenth General Assembly flow naturally from our aims:

1. To adopt a posture of evident reason and firmness on the political and security issues, such as Berlin and disarmament, which affect our vital interest.

2. To press for the further strengthening of the executive capacities of the United Nations.

3. To mobilize the moderate elements of the Assembly for debate and action on the problems that must be resolved.

4. To oppose any unparliamentary practices which play into the hands of shouters and shoe-pounders.

The General Assembly will open in September at a time of crisis, not just in world affairs, but in the United Nations itself. The world organization is under sustained attack from the Soviet bloc, which seeks nothing less than to destroy the integrity of the international Secretariat and thus the capacities of the U.N. for executive action. Moreover, the increasing number of new members in the General Assembly has altered the character of the United Nations and weakened the commitment to the organization by several non-Communist governments. It can weaken the commitment of significant sections of American opinion. Without important United States initiatives to defend the United Nations' integrity and strengthen its capacity to operate, the organization may find itself on the fatal slope of compromise.

There is real danger of weakness in the U.N., but there is another danger which its enthusiasts are less likely to perceive: that its developing capacities will be pressed too hard. Potentially, there is a U.N. angle to every problem confronting us, and we have a serious responsibility for rationing the load we place on the organization. Up to a point, loading more onto the United Nations helps to enhance its capacity to act. Beyond that point, overloading can be dangerous if it makes the machinery creak too badly or exposes the executive to too many different kinds of political attack at one time.

The load the United Nations can safely bear must also be geared to the extent of the commitment of the non-Communist

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world to U.N. action. The unwillingness of the Communist countries to recognize how far the writ of the United Nations already runs renders it doubly difficult for free nations to swallow U.N. actions which they find objectionable. But the free nations should not want to emulate the noisy isolationism of the U.S.S.R. Behind the hot Soviet rhetoric is a cold fact: the Soviet Union has not yet shown sufficient maturity to live by twentieth-century rules in a community of nations.

By contrast, the United States is willing to do so, and it is not bashful about urging the other nations of the world to join in an enlarged commitment to the United Nations. That is why we shall continue to insist on the integrity of the Secretariat and vigorously oppose any efforts to inject into its composition any considerations not specified in the Charter. We are not very much concerned about whether or not the Soviets continue to press for the troika—or three-headed-monster—theory of international administration. As nearly every non-Communist country in the world has already made clear, the troika is strictly no sale.

It is not enough merely to preserve the United Nations from the clumsy wrecking tactics of the U.S.S.R. The U.N. has to expand its jurisdiction over the affairs of men and nations faster than men expand the capacity of their nations to destroy each other. And in achieving U.N. growth, there is no substitute for United States leadership. Whether or not we relish our central role in international politics, our power simply denies us the luxury of sitting out every second dance. Our commitment to the Charter is greater than that of other members, not at all because we are wiser than they but because our ability to act or to withhold action still makes us the number one power in the United Nations.

We have at times been short on strategy. Our objectives have often been too dependent on Soviet action. Our objective today, however, is precisely as Secretary Rusk stated it: "In the United Nations, commitments to the Charter can weave the fabric of common interest which by reaching beyond the cold war may determine its outcome."

This is an objective which could be embraced by every member outside the Soviet bloc. It is not just the symbolic stuff of which ringing preambles are made; it is an objective pursued in actions —actions by operational international organizations. Provided the leadership is there, the fundamental condition is favorable

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and the objective realistic—because the United Nations Charter and the constitutions of other major international organizations are vivid expressions of the philosophy of "free choice and free coöperation." But a willingness on our part to lead is a prior decision.

"Leadership" of course does not mean the insistent noisiness of the pitch man. What is involved in leadership is something more subtle and more effective: an activist attitude, a sense of direction and a willingness to be caught in the middle, because the middle is where power has to be exercised. For the United Nations to be brave, its members, including the United States, must first be brave.

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DIPLOMACY THEN AND NOW

By Harold Nicolson

SINCE 1914 the structure of the world has changed. Compared to the present struggle between West and East, the rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sink into insignificance. Today we are faced, not with a clash of interests, but with a fight between ideologies, between the desire on the one hand to defend individual liberties and the resolve on the other hand to impose a mass religion. In the process the old standards, conventions and methods of international negotiation have been discredited. Had it not been for the invention of the atomic bomb, we should already have been subjected to a third world war.

Members of the Communist bloc today are convinced that sooner or later they will acquire world dominion and will succeed in imposing their faith and their authority over the whole earth. They strain towards this objective with religious intensity and are prepared to devote to its achievement their lives, their comfort and their prospects of happiness. Anything that furthers their purpose is "right"; anything that obstructs it is "wrong"; conventional morality, even the creation of confidence, has no part in this scheme of things. Truth itself has lost its significance. Compared to the shining truth of their gospel, all minor forms of veracity are merely bourgeois inhibitions. The old diplomacy was based upon the creation of confidence, the acquisition of credit. The modern diplomatist must realize that he can no longer rely on the old system of trust; he must accept the fact that his antagonists will not hesitate to falsify facts and that they feel no shame if their duplicity be exposed. The old currency has been withdrawn from circulation; we are dealing in a new coinage.

This transformation of values has been aided by a new or "democratic" conception of international relations. In the old days the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted to a small international élite who shared the same sort of background and who desired to preserve the same sort of world. Today the masses are expected to take an interest in foreign affairs, to know the details of current controversies, to come to their own conclusions, and to render these conclusions effective through press and parliament. At the same time, however, current issues have been rendered

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complex and inter-connected; it is not possible to state issues, such as the Common Market, in short and simple terms. Thus, whereas the man in the street is expected to have an opinion on international problems, the very complexity of these problems has rendered it difficult to provide him with the information on which to base his judgment.

A further difficulty arises over the contrast between "secret" and "open" diplomacy. This stems from the misuse of the word "diplomacy" to signify both foreign policy and negotiation. Foreign policy should never be secret, in the sense that the citizen should on no account be committed by his government to treaties or engagements of which he has not been given full previous knowledge. But negotiation must always be confidential. Very often, these days, negotiations are hampered or even frustrated by leakages to the press. Breaches of confidence are always news.

A further democratic myth is that of egalitarianism. Every country, however small its power, however restricted its resources, is regarded as the "equal" of every other country. Important decisions are taken, not owing to the strength of those who support those decisions, but according to the voices of the weak.

The Soviet Union, moreover, while itself destroying the freedom of several formerly independent countries, has managed to create the myth that it is the champion of the oppressed in their struggle against "colonialism." Preferring as it does ideal to actual truth, it manages to persuade the once subject races of the world that Communism is bound to become the universal religion of the future and that under Communism they will be able to divest themselves of their former inferior status and become the rulers of their section of the world. Thus, for the present at least, Communism is identified with nationalism, and nationalism with ambition. The wind of change howls like a hurricane across Asia and Africa. Everything associated with the past is represented as iniquitous, everything that looks to the future is colored with glamor and glory. The West is associated with the past; the East with the future. It might be said, therefore, and has often been said, that the West is fighting a losing battle. This is a fallacious proposition. If we can avoid committing arrant mistakes—such as the mistake of Suez and the mistake of Cuba—we can maintain a defensive position for the next 50 years. Meanwhile the massive front of the Communist world may have started to dis-

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integrate. The Marxist view of society and of the inevitability of history assumes that the masses can be conditioned to believe eternally in the same creed. That is a misconception of human nature; always there will be heretics and the more they are repressed the more ardent and convinced they become. The West in the end will be rescued by the heretics of the East.

II

I was reading recently an interesting book called "The Ugly American" in which the failure of the West to stem Communist infiltration into Southeast Asia is ascribed to the old-fashioned conception of diplomacy which prevails in Washington. Whereas the Soviet authorities concentrate on winning the support of the masses, the Americans are said to be concerned mainly with winning the support of the governing classes. A symptom of this difference of approach is that, whereas American diplomatists seldom can speak any language other than their own, Soviet diplomatists are chosen because of their familiarity with the language and dialects of the countries to which they are sent.

This is a specious contention. Governments, even in new or backward countries, are composed of the more educated people who, in Southeast Asia, are usually able to speak English or French. Such people take pride in their linguistic attainments and would be hurt if addressed in their native language by foreign diplomatists. Even as in the old days M. Isvolsky, the Tsarist Foreign Minister, would have been outraged if addressed in Russian by a foreign ambassador, so also in Saigon today would the foreign minister expect to be addressed in French. In theory, of course, it appears illogical that the American ambassador at Oslo should be unable to speak or even read Norwegian. Yet in practice those with whom he negotiates can all speak English and he has on his staff translators who provide him daily with an accurate summary of the Norwegian newspapers.

A diplomatist, moreover, should not concentrate solely on conditions in the country to which he is accredited. He must at the same time be aware of conditions and opinions in his own country. Really to know the language, traditions, prejudices and inhibitions of a country such as Laos, for example, entails years of study and long residence. A man by such methods may learn a great deal about Laotian opinion but in the process he gets out of touch with opinion in his own home country. He is apt to "go

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native" and his judgment may be warped by purely local sentiments. It may be that the Russians, with their uniform policy of destroying the influence of capitalism everywhere and by any means, can afford to send agents into every Laotian village to persuade the headmen of the philanthropy of the Soviet creed. It may be that by the "cell" method they are able to create disturbances, organize riots and demonstrations, and even overturn governments. Yet in the end their methods may land them in an illogical situation. They may find that in preaching self-government they lose control of the governments they have themselves created. An ambitious politician may be glad to have been brought to power by a students' demonstration; but he will see to it that no students' demonstrations recur.

Although policy should be directed and controlled by the ambassador himself, and although it does not matter much if the ambassador cannot himself speak a difficult local language, it is essential that he be aided and advised by a staff of permanent officials who have lived for long in the country, have studied the local traditions and character, and are acquainted with the background and temperament of those having local influence. Such a staff of experts exists in all well-founded embassies. In the British Foreign Service there existed in the old days the Levant Consular Service and the Chinese Consular Service, which provided the embassies with a pool of experts from which they could draw their advisers. These men were honest patriots; there is no need to suppose, as the authors of "The Ugly American" imply, that they had all gone so native as to become spies. On the other hand, to know everything about a foreign country requires at the very least a lifetime of experience. And if a man spends his whole life in any given community he is bound to develop affections and prejudices which distort his evidence. It is difficult to conceive of a person so circumstanced who would be so objective as to be immune to all subjective impulses. My own experience of such local experts is that they become either so gullible as to believe whatever they are told, or so suspicious as to doubt the veracity of even the most honest. If ambassadors were required to become experts, then surely great confusion would arise.

So strongly is this danger anticipated by the British Foreign Office that it is their habit, when a man has been too long in the Far East, to appoint him somewhere in Latin America. Such mutations are often resented by the official himself and cause

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surprise to the public. "How odd," people exclaim, "to send to Montevideo a man who has lived for years in Indonesia! How like the Foreign Office!" It is not so odd or irrational as all that. The business of a diplomatist is to represent his own government in a foreign country; if he lives too long in a foreign country, he may lose touch with his own home opinion and his representative value will be diminished. Expert knowledge is essential to judgment; but such knowledge can be obtained from experts whose business it is to advise and inform, not to judge or decide.

III

A second aspect of American diplomacy as criticized, and indeed ridiculed, in "The Ugly American" is the social aspect. The authors of this engaging book imply that American officials abroad are not democratic enough.

I admit that all Foreign Services possess their cocktail side. In the days of the old diplomacy, when foreign affairs were a class specialty, the social element was assuredly important. In Tsarist Russia, for instance, or in Vienna, where the top ranks of society did in fact exercise a great influence over ministers and cabinets, it was highly important for an ambassador and his staff to be socially acceptable. The French Embassy, for instance, some of whose members were deficient in social polish, found itself at a disadvantage in snobbish posts such as St. Petersburg or Vienna when in contact with the local society. The leaders of these societies regarded themselves as the cream of European aristocracy and did not enjoy mingling with people whom they regarded as bourgeois in their origins and manners. Stupid though they may have been, they yet were people of influence in governmental circles and thus it was essential that they should be entertained and consoled. Now that these aristocracies have either been eliminated or have lost all political influence, this necessity no longer exists. Why, if this be not so, should ambassadors be provided with large houses and an entertainment account? Yet whom are they supposed to entertain?

These questions are more pertinent than they seem. In totalitarian countries the names of those who visit foreign embassies are reported to the police. Those whose ambitions or livelihood are dependent on the favor of their superiors do not wish to fall into disfavor by frequenting foreign embassies. Therefore the operative people hesitate to attend embassy parties, or if they

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do so, arrive in a gang, so that they can all watch each other. Conversely, the ambassador, being anxious to cultivate the good will of those in power, is afraid of seeing too much of the Opposition. In Tsarist Russia, for instance, an ambassador could not ask the liberal leaders to dinner without risking the displeasure of the Court. In free countries this danger does not occur and the members of the government neither know nor care who dines or lunches at the French, Russian or German Embassies. It may arise, however, especially in totalitarian countries, that only unimportant people go to the embassy parties and that these parties tend to degenerate into stagnant pools in which the same old carp circle round and round gazing at each other with lacklustre eyes. Yet the theory persists that a great country should possess a great embassy, that the greatness of that embassy can be assessed by the size of its entertainment; and thus the dreary old round continues to persist, whether those who are entertained are influential or not. Diplomatic parties are invariably dull parties, since they lack spontaneity. Ambassadors, I suggest, would be well advised to invite important people to small parties of five or six, and to satisfy the multitude by large occasional receptions to which numbers of people can boast of having been asked.

Should the junior members of the staff confine themselves to the accepted circle of embassy guests or should they go out into the wilds? It may require deep devotion to his profession, or a passionate interest in the works of Ibsen, to persuade a young man at an embassy in Oslo to mix with Norwegian society. My own advice to the junior diplomatist is not to confine himself lazily to the easy circle of his own embassy but to cultivate the society of journalists both foreign and native. It is from them that he will derive useful advice and commentary. When I look back on the years before Hitler that I spent in the British Embassy at Berlin, I am grateful for the hours I devoted to talking to journalists in the Adlon Bar. I learned more from them than I did from any other form of social relations. Had I spent an equal amount of time discussing the future with trade-union leaders or factory workers, I should have derived false impressions. Nobody could then have foreseen that the trade-union movement with its elaborate organization could have been swept aside by Hitler's rhetoric in the course of a few days. It was the journalists of the Adlon Bar who first warned me of the coming of the Nazi movement. Diplomatic field work often misleads.

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While I contend, therefore, that an ambassador and his senior officials need not, and indeed ought not, to be too closely identified with the country to which they are accredited, and while I agree that the social or representative aspect of diplomacy needs to be reëxamined and possibly revalued, I assert that the old principle that the art of negotiation depends on reliability and confidence is an eternal principle, however much one's antagonists may profit by temporary tricks. I have frequently written that good diplomacy is akin to sound banking and depends on credit. Even if your opponent scores a trick or two by sharp practice, you should yourself abide by the rules of the game. I remember once, when appointed to the Middle East, asking my father, who had had great experience of the problem, by what means one could ascertain what went on at the back of the oriental mind. "Never worry about that," he answered. "There may be nothing at the back of his mind. Concentrate on making quite sure that he is left in no doubt as to what is at the back of *your* mind." That was good advice. The twists and turning of an oriental mentality constitute a labyrinth which it is useless to penetrate or explore; let the straight and simple lines remain on your side of the argument; however much you may try, you will never be able to weave a pattern as intricate as theirs. There will always be an area of deception into which the Westerner will hesitate to enter; it would be like playing poker with a man a hundred times richer than oneself; it is advisable therefore for the Westerner to stick always to truth, in the expenditure of which he possesses ample reserves. His actions will in any case be misrepresented; if they be based on demonstrable truth, then the misrepresentation will be apparent even to the least educated.

IV

It is often said, again, that with the development of communications the role and function of an ambassador have been much diminished and that the diplomatist today has been reduced to the status of a clerk at the end of the telephone line. In the first place, the telephone is a dangerous little instrument through which to convey information or to transmit instructions. One of the most important assets of sound diplomacy is precision; the telephone (as was demonstrated by the U-2 incident) is an imprecise instrument, and liable to create misunderstanding.

Moreover, a moment's reflection should convince people that

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the gibe about "a clerk at the end of the telephone" is an empty gibe. It may be true that it is no longer possible for an ambassador at some distant post to create situations that may lead either to his repudiation or recall, or else to war. That is a great gain. It may be true that the independence of his action may be curtailed, and rightly curtailed, by the fact that his own chief in London or Washington can reach him on the telephone or, if the worst comes to the worst, can descend upon him in an airplane. But the fact remains, and will always remain, that the man on the spot is in a key position and that no action should be taken at headquarters without his advice being sought. No large business undertaking, no newspaper, would be represented in a foreign capital by a man whose stature was no higher than that of a clerk at the end of a telephone. It is the business of a representative abroad to study local conditions; to assess the areas of local susceptibility; to cultivate the acquaintance of local politicians, and thus to be in a position to advise his own minister how far he can go and how far he can trust those with whom he is negotiating. In offering such advice he will rely on the information furnished him by his own experts, upon his personal contacts with local politicians, upon a careful study of the local press, and upon exchanges of views and information with his diplomatic colleagues and resident press correspondents. Again and again have I heard the slogan that ambassadors today have ceased to count. I do not hear a similar statement applied to the local representatives of large firms or newspapers. Yet the position is identical. You do not send abroad a clerk to represent you; you send a man in whose intelligence, initiative and integrity you place full confidence. The only difference today is that things move with great celerity. There is less time for reflection.

Another element of change is the use made today in international negotiation of the weapon of propaganda. In the old days when foreign affairs were recognized to be a specialized study and when their conduct was left to the experts, the element of propaganda scarcely entered into consideration. Today it is sometimes preponderant. It is a dangerous weapon, being all too apt to backfire or recoil. It is one which our antagonists, by concentrating on the shadows of the past and by indicating the sunshine of a Communist future, can employ with great effect. There is, moreover, always an element in propaganda which is exaggerated and untrue; the West finds such assaults more difficult than does the

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East. Yet here again truth will prevail in the end. Our attitude toward propaganda must always remain a defensive attitude; we must content ourselves with being scrupulously careful not to present our antagonists with propaganda weapons against us. It is admittedly unfortunate that in the propaganda war the East appears to win all the battles all the time. Owing to a series of small successes, of accidental triumphs, they build up an aggregate impression of invincibility and inevitability. This is the impression which they desire to convey and we desire to avoid. It is a difficult task but not one that can be accomplished by telling untruths. The Communists are convinced that there is a "glorious lie," or a "mass untruth," which "becomes true" since it serves the cause of Communism. Yet the saying of Abraham Lincoln remains true: you can't fool all the people all of the time. The misfortune is that one can fool a large number of people for sufficient time for great damage to be done. I admit that the introduction of the propaganda element has greatly complicated the task of Western diplomacy. It is easy enough to convince uneducated people that they are being exploited or suffering humiliations and oppression. It is more difficult to preach to them the rewards of freedom. People who have been convinced that their rights have been disregarded will be glad to throw stones at windows or to overturn motorcars; the doctrine of individual liberty inspires no such acts of passion. We are at a disadvantage when it comes to applying propaganda to the have-nots. Dollars are not always enough; and the fact that our doctrine appeals more to the privileged classes is a fact which cannot be exploited or even avowed.

The principle of egalitarianism has altered the balance of diplomatic power. Even within my own lifetime the affairs of the world were dominated by the eight great powers, whose strength, when it came to a conflict, was overwhelming. The British Government, for instance, could change the whole balance of the Eastern Question by dispatching three frigates to Besika Bay. Today action on the part of the great powers could, even if they were united, be blocked by the votes of the small powers. The Security Council of the United Nations was intended to be a sort of cabinet of action. Its decisions are negatived, however, by the veto of the Soviet Union, a veto which to date has been exercised 95 times. Thus the power of decision has been to all intents and purposes transferred to the Assembly, in which a majority

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of the 99 nations represented can block all action. This majority, while not invariably adhering to the Russian line, is at least united in hostility to anything that savors of the old colonialism. Thus power has been transferred into the hands of those who lack strength, and a situation has been created which is dominated by uncertainty. Uncertainty and the unpredictable are dangerous elements in any international situation. It is impossible to conduct sound banking when there exists no stability of exchange.

V

The former theory of the balance of power, the device of the Concert of Europe, has, since the First World War, been replaced by international tribunals, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. It was not foreseen by those who drafted the Charter at San Francisco 15 years ago that the principle of one-state-one-vote might in the end prove irrational. Today the votes of the 99 sovereign states in the Assembly bear no relation to the amount of power they can exercise or the degree of responsibility they can assume. The strength of the United Nations is subject to so many variables that the exercise of its authority is unpredictable. Valuable as the tribunal ought to be in arranging for the pacific settlement of disputes, the incidence of its authority is too uncertain to give its decisions the inevitability of public law. The veto has paralyzed the Executive and the voting system may paralyze the Assembly. The major decisions in this world are taken by those who possess power and are prepared to exercise it. The substitution of consent, or votes, for force has given the United Nations a certain unreality which hampers its authority.

The principle of one-man-one-vote is conditional on the existence of the rule of law. But there is no international rule of law, only a few accepted conventions; thus it is fallacious to suppose that peace can be preserved by votes. The fact that the world is obliged to rely for peace on an organization that so obviously lacks realism, if not reality, is a major misfortune. I do not blame those who 15 years ago drafted the Charter. In many ways it is an honest and competent document. Yet the gap which has been created between reality and unreality constitutes a serious menace. Would it be better to admit that the future of the world depends upon the force that can be brought to bear by the U.S.S.R. and the United States? I fear that I am unable to recommend anything other than this stark reality.

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The pessimism implicit in such a conclusion does not mean that I believe international diplomacy has no part to play or that the nations of the world are entirely dependent upon what may be willed or decided in Moscow or in Washington. It means that the nations of the world, and especially of the Western world, should avoid separating practice from principle, as was done at the time of Suez and Cuba, and should avoid placing themselves in the wrong. There does exist such a thing as international morality. Its boundaries are not visibly defined nor its frontiers demarcated; yet we all know where it is. If other countries transgress these frontiers, we at least should respect them. *Aliis licet: tibi non licet.* That is to say, what is right for others is not right for us. That should be our motto; by that we shall in the end prevail.

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AFRICAN PROBLEMS AND THE COLD WAR

By Sylvanus E. Olympio

SINCE we achieved our independence, several distinguished foreigners have visited our young Republic, and among the many questions they have asked have been those concerning our approach to Pan Africanism, our views on policies intended to keep Africa free of the restrictive forces of the cold war, and the measures we would suggest to implement our policy of neutrality. In the lines which follow we will endeavor to answer these significant questions.

There can be little doubt that there is a present need for coöperation among the newly independent African states, that a working arrangement, at least on a regional basis, is overdue. Unfortunately the situation inherited from the colonial powers, while making plain the necessity for such agreement, has tended to hinder it. Within each nation there are serious discontinuities arising from the existence of different ethnic groups, language differences, disparities in ideological orientation and basic economic conceptions. At the same time national boundaries were artificially drawn to meet external political requirements. Today we find that tribes are split in two, cities are divided and people of the same language and cultural traditions are separated into two and sometimes three different nations.

To resolve this last issue, so prominent in the minds of many African leaders, Pan Africanism has been put forward as an all-embracing remedy. (Some people call the same idea African Unity.) Apart from the proposition that few real-life problems are so simple that they possess only one solution, no two African states can agree on a single interpretation of the terms. To discuss the common heritage and institutions of Ghana, the Belgian Congo and Ethiopia is clearly unrealistic. More important, however, are the character and complexity of the problems facing us at home. To speak of African Unity in the face of existing economic and social disunity is to avoid the central task to which we are committed—the earliest possible economic and social betterment of our people. This task has as one important aspect the unification of disparate socio-economic groups toward common economic goals. Accomplishment of this objective in turn requires

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much honest work on the part of African leaders and their people. It requires also collective leadership, for through collective leadership the multiple interests of the African people can best be expressed.

In their struggle against the colonial powers the new African states, arbitrary and unrealistic as their original boundaries may have been, managed at last to mobilize the will of their citizens toward the attainment of national independence. Achieved at great sacrifice, such a reward is not to be cast away lightly; nor should the national will, once unified, be diluted by the formation of nebulous political units. Even if tribal, ethnic and linguistic loyalties begin to reassert themselves—and this is less likely to be true with the present trends of development in Africa —there is little to support the theory that intranational groupings would be more effectively represented by a supranational political organization than by a national one. In fact, the reverse seems quite evident. Furthermore, few serious governments would be willing to relinquish their hard-won seats in international councils, seats which permit them to be heard and which grant them the moral security provided by access to world opinion.

It should be added that existing governmental units are in an administrative sense workable and that it would be a grave mistake to undercut at this early date the frail but growing roots which sustain them. In our present stage of development it is necessary for us to build both workable administrative organizations and responsive political mechanisms to transmit the interests and needs of our people to their leaders. Thus we must retain the principle of national sovereignty already enshrined in the struggle of African states for their independence.

This alone, however, is not enough to strengthen the ties between us. We suggest as an alternative to Pan Africanism the homely word coöperation, knowing that in building a house one starts with a foundation, not a roof. It is our opinion that an active policy of coöperation in good faith will bring the African people the most beneficial results. Such a policy does not begin in over-all political amalgamation but rather in freely given agreement concerning matters of economics and commerce. In this realm urgent action is required, and in this realm coöperation will be most acceptable to the parties concerned.

By breaking up Africa into economic and commercial compartments the colonial powers did their greatest harm. The effect

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of their policy has been the economic isolation of peoples who live side by side, in some flagrant instances within a few miles of each other, while directing the flow of resources to the metropolitan countries. For example, although I can call Paris from my office telephone here in Lomé, I cannot place a call to Lagos in West Africa only 250 miles away. Again, while it takes a short time to send an airmail letter to Paris, it takes several days for the same letter to reach Accra, a mere 120 miles away. Other problems are more serious. Trade is the most effective method of creating good will among nations, but in Africa trade barriers are legion. Railroads rarely connect at international boundaries, and where they do, differences in gauges necessitate transloading. Highways have been constructed from the coast inland, but very few connect at economic centers of trade. The productive central regions of Togo, Dahomey and Ghana are as remote from each other as if they were on separate continents. These are the problems which we must tackle first. Then we will be on the way to true African Unity.

Fortunately some concrete action has already been taken which leads in the desired direction. The Monrovia Conference last spring opened the way to international coöperation while preserving the national sovereignty of African states. It was laid down at this conference that all the countries of Africa should work together irrespective of their size, ideology, system of government or economic structure. No state, however powerful or large, should interfere in the internal affairs of others; territorial boundaries must be respected. These are wise rules of conduct and if pursued should strengthen our will to coöperate.

In the economic sphere, the 20 states pledged that coöperation should take the form of reductions in trade and monetary restrictions and the development of international transportation and communication networks. It was further proposed that a study be made of problems relating to the creation of a customs union among the African states. Finally, the conference pledged its members to further cultural, scientific and technical coöperation through the exchange of experts and the establishment of permanent committees. To these principles and to the method of agreement which occasioned their approval the Republic of Togo has heartily subscribed.

Before turning from the subject of Pan Africanism, American readers might well consider the struggle of their own country's

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founding fathers in deciding between the principles of state sovereignty, confederation or federation, and the strong economic, cultural and geographic forces which eventually caused federation to prevail. In the case of African governments, political leaders emerged from within indigenous cultures, and many of their constituents maintain even today diverse and separate traditions, tracing their customs to ancestors who lived at the dawn of history. To these people their land is their fathers' land and their country the country of their forebears. To them even the national government is but an arbitrary and incomprehensible authority. It will be many years before a higher power will be able to maintain a really acceptable authority over these traditional peoples. In the meantime their lawful governments must tackle the problems at hand—education, the introduction of better health and living conditions, and increased productivity in agriculture and industry.

II

The newly independent African states are now beginning to have an impact on world affairs. Their presence in the great councils of the United Nations is bringing international publicity to their views and preoccupations. Because of this new-found status, the two world blocs generally referred to as East and West are making efforts to attract or keep the African states in their spheres of influence. This struggle of the power blocs is leading to the introduction of the cold war into Africa, which until recently has succeeded in keeping out of it.

Our duty in this matter is clear. We cannot afford to be involved in the cold war with all its consequences. The African states are at the lowest stage of economic growth and should wisely devote all their energies and resources to the development of their peoples. To make a success of this task we are largely dependent upon the capital and technicians which only more advanced nations can supply. It is understandable that some of these nations wish to be assured that the African states will employ their assistance to the best advantage, but this must be resolved through practical planning, not political domination.

Our dependence upon external assistance carries with it certain dangers which the African states must recognize if they are to prevent further cold-war intrusions. It is by now a commonplace to refer to Africa as the land of rising expectations. The danger

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of which I speak is that certain African leaders will encourage these expectations too far, that they will overestimate their capacity to transform our traditional economies into modern industrial states. Let there be no mistake in my meaning. This is a job which can and will be done, but it must be done with careful attention to our needs and a realistic appraisal of the capital that will be available to meet them. The African leader who seriously overestimates his country's capacity for growth will soon find that he is forced to rely on foreign aid to maintain his political position, and it will be then that the temptation to turn to one or the other power bloc will be greatest. The political leader who promises his people a new highway network or a hundred new schools may find that he has promised too much, that he will at best be voted, and at worst forced, out of office unless he can fulfill his promises. At that moment he may well revert to the dangerous policy of making external political commitments, and this policy may be multiplied by its effects upon neighboring states; for these, anxious to preserve their sovereignty, may turn to the other power bloc.

African leaders must also beware of pushing their peoples too far. The mechanism of national government is new, and our people must be taught its meaning before they will accept its dictums. Those leaders who propose to finance their projects by broad and heavy taxation should consider whether their people are yet ready to accept it, whether preliminary programs of education with moderate increases in living standards are not more meaningful at this stage than vast programs of public works. The leader who rules with a heavy hand, assuming that his desires are the desires of his people, will eventually be forced to take drastic measures of repression to safeguard his power. Then again stability will be endangered and peaceful government threatened.

To counter these difficulties we must first assess the resources of our countries, then estimate the capital which will be made available to us from abroad. In this manner African leaders will not find themselves forced to make the choice between unwanted foreign commitment and domestic instability. For their part, the developed nations must never forget that until very recently the African states were subjected to colonial rule, a rule which did severe harm to their institutions. We have struggled for many years to attain the privilege of self-government and are wary of any association which may suggest a new bondage.

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Thus we have chosen to be neutral in all issues concerning world blocs. As a practical matter Togo's size and geographic location also dictate a policy of neutrality. This policy has implications which extend beyond East-West differences. For one thing it signifies plainly that in her relations with former colonial powers Togo shall negotiate as an independent, sovereign nation, that ties of the past are not to be construed as ties for the present or future, that choice of preferences will be made by Togolese representatives on the basis of agreements which will most benefit our people's development. For another, it signifies our desire to remain clear of all groups which seem designed to perpetuate divisions on racial, linguistic or ideological grounds. In Africa today there are signs that some states are regrouping to form African blocs. In this connection there has been much talk about the Yaounde Group, the Brazzaville Group and the Casablanca Group. This is to be regretted because these new moves can only make much-needed coöperation more difficult if not impossible. We think, as noted above, that agreement among freely associated sovereign states can do much to halt this deplorable segmentation.

Concerning bilateral and multilateral aid, I believe that specific types of assistance are more effectively suited to specific sources of aid and that it is our responsibility to match our needs with the external agency or government most capable of meeting them. This policy requires that development projects in our country be evaluated on the basis of their expected social and economic impact and not on the political position of the donor or creditor nation. If the wealthy nations of the world are sincere in their desire to develop the natural and human resources of the African states, they must approach this task pragmatically and be willing to do the job at hand rather than digress into political manœuvring. In the long run there is little doubt that effective developmental policy will help the cause of peace and stable democratic government. The European and American powers who promise to see progress in Africa should thus accept the desires of African states to remain neutral. Their offers of help should be without strings. Otherwise the African continent will soon be divided into the familiar East and West groupings with a resulting intensification in the cold war.

The wealthy nations of the world must also regard our determined efforts with respect. We know that we can improve the

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living conditions and productivity of our countries, and we are certain that with help we can do it more rapidly than was done in the past. The gains made in method and knowledge over recent decades in the social and productive sciences are not to be wasted. Modern technology and planning techniques must be applied flexibly and with the conviction that obstacles can and will be overcome. Experts arriving in our countries should not expect that plans will be as neatly executed as they have been in their home countries, that the last refinement in information will be available. Too many foreign experts forget this; too many fear what seems to them to be impossible. The technical expert assigned to work in an African state is rightly an agent of change. He must be willing to innovate, and he must bring with him the will to work.

III

We should consider, finally, the United Nations organization and the role we are to play in it. I may say that from our viewpoint this has been a cornerstone of foreign policy since independence. The United Nations has much to offer the newly independent countries, and they in turn can accomplish a great deal through active and responsible participation in the organization. The Republic of Togo is particularly aware of the advantages to be gained from such participation because of our history of association with the United Nations through the Trusteeship Council.

Today the United Nations can be of particular assistance in the administration of foreign aid. We are not opposed to bilateral agreements, but in our opinion more aid should be channeled through the international organization. This would solve the problem of how to grant technical and financial aid without strings and would demonstrate to the African states the good faith of donor and creditor nations. It would also reduce the very real temptation of the African states to play off the big powers one against the other, a temptation which can easily develop from unrealistic planning or irresponsible leadership. Lastly, it might help to solve a problem which is increasing in magnitude with the growth in new foreign aid programs and the revision of old ones—that is, the coördination by the donor nations of the destinations, kinds and amounts of assistance to be offered. Presently there is needless and costly duplication in the administra-

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tion of these programs, and the multiplicity of agencies, restrictions and delays makes it difficult for recipient nations to allocate rationally the assistance granted.

In spite of its shortcomings, the United Nations can and should play an important role in this period of transition while the economies of the African states are progressing from colonial dependence to self-sufficiency. It can be used as an effective instrument to prevent wars between states and in some instances civil wars within them. The United Nations should strive to instill in these young countries the ideals of its Charter, then guarantee their territorial integrity. If this guarantee is forthcoming, the new nations will be free to devote a major part of their resources to economic and social development and will tend in time to reduce their dependence on external aid. In this respect I feel certain that most new African states would welcome a strong and effective United Nations. Such strength can endure only as long as member states respect the principles of the Charter and refrain from using the organization as an instrument for securing political power. The machinery of the United Nations is essentially democratic, and herein lies its value to the less powerful nations of the world: the assurance that their expectations, desires and fears can be brought to the attention of world opinion.

The Congo operation should be regarded as a useful experience which, far from weakening the United Nations, has made it more mature. It should also indicate to any leaders striving for the political unity of Africa the difficulties lying in their path. Indeed, no African leader can afford to neglect the lessons which have been taught by this chapter in the history of our continent.

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FAITH IN THE SUMMIT

Some British Attitudes

By O. Harries

IN JULY 1958, when for a time a summit conference seemed imminent, James Reston of *The New York Times* explained why the conference would be held in spite of American misgivings. "The truth is," he wrote, "that President Eisenhower has agreed to attend what he and his principal advisers profoundly and unanimously believe to be the wrong meeting at the wrong time and place on the wrong subject. The explanation is equally simple. It is that British public and parliamentary opinion forced the President's reluctant acquiescence, just as pressure from the British Labor Party was the decisive factor in arranging the last summit meeting with Premier Khrushchev in July 1955, at Geneva."

Whether or not Mr. Reston was right in attributing so much influence to British opinion, it is certainly true that during the last decade British politicians and the British press have been more enthusiastic supporters of summit conferences than have those of any other Western country; and there is no reason for doubting that this enthusiasm reflected the prevailing public opinion in Britain. After Winston Churchill first proposed a "parley at the summit" in an election speech in February 1950, and more particularly after his speech in the House of Commons on May 11, 1953, calling for an informal and private "conference on the highest level," support for summit conferences and faith in them as a means of resolving the tensions of the cold war increased rapidly.

The initiative in working for such conferences came from a few Conservative leaders and from a Left which was substantially united on this issue. The Conservative rank and file did not show the same enthusiasm, and it was noticeable that in the debate following Mr. Churchill's speech in 1953 most of the backbench Conservative speakers virtually ignored that part of his speech proposing a summit conference and preferred to take up other themes. But whether or not they continued to have private doubts and reservations, by the late 1950s there was little public opposition in Britain to the holding of summit conferences. Some

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were more hopeful than others about the outcome; there was some disagreement as to the conditions which should be fulfilled before a meeting was held; but there was very little outright opposition to, or fundamental criticism of, summit conferences as such. No one was prepared, as Ernest Bevin had been in 1950, to dismiss the idea of a summit conference as a "stunt proposal" which could not possibly solve the problems of the cold war. As *The Observer* reflected, just after a breakdown of the Paris meeting in May 1960, "The efficacy of a Summit meeting to produce better relations between Russia and America had become an article of popular faith."

I want to bring out here two aspects of this faith and to examine some of the arguments used to justify it.

II

It has often been asserted that there is nothing new about summit conferences, and the great conferences of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have been pointed to as proof of this. But while the fact that these earlier conferences took place establishes that there is nothing new about meetings of heads of states and governments as such, it does not establish that there is nothing novel about summit conferences as they are now conceived; and in one very important respect these summit conferences do seem different from earlier meetings. For whereas previously such meetings have been regarded as part of the normal process of diplomacy, now, increasingly, they seem to be regarded as a substitute for it. Indeed, one of the arguments used most frequently in support of summit conferences is that traditional diplomacy is hopelessly outdated and inadequate and that we need a "diplomatic revolution" to come to terms with the "nuclear revolution" which is supposed to have changed the nature of international politics in the most radical way. Faith in summit conferences is very often a corollary of a loss of faith in conventional diplomacy.

It is interesting that this loss of faith seems to be most evident in a people which traditionally takes pride in its mastery of the skills of classical diplomacy. In Britain, suggestions that the holding of a conference should be made conditional on the success of preliminary meetings, that its purpose should be to give final form and dramatic force to agreements reached by conventional negotiations, or that detailed agenda should be agreed on before a meeting is fixed are likely to be dismissed as obstructionist.

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Indeed any insistence at all on careful preparation and the weighing up of difficulties may meet the same fate. The mood is conveyed by a passage from Clement Davies' response to Churchill's proposal in 1953: "... this is not the moment to enter into details, to stress this or that matter, to call attention to difficulties which may arise in one country or another. How will that help? ... This is not the right way to bring about what we all desire—a meeting which will bring about peace."[1] And again by a *Daily Herald* editorial five years later (July 25, 1958): "When—and where—are we going to have those Summit talks? Why do we have to suffer this stumbling and mumbling, and silly suggestions that talks need more than a week—maybe weeks—to arrange?"

From the point of view of the supporters of summit conferences the rejection of preliminary negotiations makes sense, since it is the supposed impossibility of successful negotiations of the usual kind which is considered to make the holding of summit conferences necessary. But it is an attitude which makes it seriously misleading to assert that there is nothing new about summit conferences, that they are meetings of a traditional kind.

Another interesting aspect of this faith in summit conferences is that there often seems to be implicit in it both an acceptance of the supremacy and autonomy of politics as an activity, and the notion that the leaders are free agents who can manipulate the course of political life at will. The name "summit" is itself suggestive in this respect, conveying as it does a sense of Olympian elevation, a rising above the struggle to a plane from which events can be seen disinterestedly and as a whole rather than partially and with bias. (The contrast between the pettiness and selfishness of politics at the ground level and the nobility and purity of the summit is a recurring theme in English political cartoons.) The general nature of the demand for summits as expressed by their more extreme and optimistic supporters—a demand that the leaders shall meet and personally break a deadlock created, on any interpretation, by profound historical processes—clearly implies the omnipotence of political leaders and their freedom from the forces which condition and determine the behavior of ordinary men. Bertrand Russell writes an Open Letter to Eisenhower and Khrushchev[2] asking them to meet and adopt policies which he thinks desirable, and he begins by addressing

[1] *Hansard*, v. 515, p. 1975.
[2] *New Statesman*, Nov. 23, 1957.

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them as "Most Potent Sirs," the context making it clear that no irony is intended. Aneurin Bevan says that "the sooner we have the summit conference the better, so that the authors of the play may be there as well,"[3] the implication being that the substance of international politics is something determined by a few political leaders. Clement Davies says that "what is obviously wanted is for the big statesmen, the really big men who have the fate of humanity in their hands, to come together."[4] Discussing those who were to attend the conference of May 1960, *The Observer* says (May 15, 1960), "two of them are masters of the world in a sense that no two men before them have ever been."

Here is the "great man" theory of history in a pretty crude form and supported ardently by many whose political philosophy denies it. Many of the left-leaning advocates of summit conferences in fact seem to be schizophrenic in their attitude toward the political leaders of the world, believing both that collectively they might perform the miracle of transforming the international scene and that individually they are of very inferior calibre indeed. The point can be made by reference to the cartoons of Vicky of the *New Statesman,* widely regarded as a serious and even profound commentator on world politics. Even allowing for the exaggerations necessitated by his craft, it is clear that Vicky's opinion of the world's statesmen is a low one. Yet he believes passionately in a summit—a summit which seems to exist apart from those who would go to it. Somehow, by some unexplained alchemy, it seems that individual stupidity would give way to collective wisdom once these men met.

Perhaps because of the almost unanimous opinion in Britain that summit meetings are desirable, most statements on the subject seem to be concerned more with discussing how such meetings can be brought about and what should be talked about when they do occur than with establishing the case for them. However, several lines of justification do emerge and some of them throw an interesting light on the way in which international politics are thought of in Britain.

One of the most popular is summed up in a phrase coined by Mr. Churchill (though hardly a Churchillian phrase), "Jaw, jaw, is better than war, war"—or by one of its variants such as, "Nobody gets shot talking" (*Daily Herald* editorial, July 21,

[3] *Hansard,* v. 608, p. 1382.
[4] *Hansard,* v. 515, p. 1975.

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1958). It is possible to agree with these statements (indeed it is difficult not to agree with them) while recognizing that they do not constitute any kind of an argument for holding summit conferences. Talking at the summit may be better than war, but then so is talking at the foothills and not talking at all and all sorts of other alternatives. Statements such as these would amount to an argument only if talking at the summit and war were the only two possible alternatives. As this is clearly not the case, the relevant question is not whether a summit conference is better than fighting a war but whether it is better than the other alternatives to fighting a war. And this can be answered only by considering each alternative in the light of the existing situation and goals. It is also relevant that in some circumstances certain kinds of talking (say, the Munich kind) represent not an alternative to war but a prelude to it, making war more rather than less probable.

Of the same calibre is the "no-stone-unturned, no-avenue-unexplored" line which usually takes the form: "The world is in a dreadful mess and disaster stares us in the face; in such a situation we should be prepared to try anything. Why not the summit?" And usually the rider is added or implied: "In any case we have nothing to lose." The weaknesses here are many. First, this is a line which could be used to advocate *any* course of action since it says not "we should have a summit meeting because it will have this or that desirable consequence," but "we should have a summit meeting because you never know, something might come of it." It makes no attempt to say why a summit should be thought desirable but takes the stand that it is desirable until shown to be otherwise. While making the line intellectually worthless, this probably increases its effectiveness as propaganda since it throws the onus of proof on those who oppose summit conferences or are skeptical about them.

Secondly, the fact (which is indisputable) that things are grim and that utter catastrophe is a possibility does not justify doing *anything;* it only justifies doing those things which are likely to make things less grim and catastrophe less probable.

Thirdly, the rider—"in any case we have nothing to lose"—is simply false if it means that things cannot get any worse (since it is the possibility of things getting worse which is supposed to make a summit meeting necessary), and highly debatable if it means that the holding of a summit meeting cannot itself make

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them worse. This was the view taken by Mr. Churchill in 1950: "It is not easy to see how things could be worsened by a parley at the Summit if such a thing were possible."

Whether or not a summit meeting can make things worse depends on the circumstances in which it is held. For example, if, before a meeting is held, great expectations concerning the possibility of "relaxing tension" are aroused (as they are likely to be in the interest of building support for the government's policy), then when the meeting is held a choice may well have to be faced between, on the one hand, accepting a deadlock and disappointing those expectations—with possibly serious effects both on morale and on confidence in the government—and, on the other hand, accepting an unfavorable compromise in order to avoid deadlock and to achieve the expected relaxation.

III

The two arguments just considered are important only because they are popular; otherwise they could not be taken seriously. A more serious argument, and one with some very respectable backing, is based on the premise that the cold war conflicts are very largely the results of misunderstandings among the leaders. In particular, it is often said that the Soviet leaders do not understand the West, that they are blinded by their ideology or by their history, and that they think, wrongly, that Western leaders are intent on war (or alternatively that they doubt, wrongly, the West's determination and ability to defend itself); and it is also said that meetings between leaders (and exchanges of visits) can play a substantial part in destroying these illusions and misconceptions.

It is of course possible to accept the first proposition while rejecting the second, as George Kennan did in his 1957 Reith Lectures. In those lectures he gave influential support to the view that the Communist leaders misunderstood the West, although he dismissed the idea that summit conferences could do much to remove this misunderstanding. For many, however, there is clearly a close connection between the two propositions and they move easily from the assumption that there is misunderstanding to advocating visits and meetings as a means of removing it. Thus Mr. Attlee, taking up the Churchill proposal in May 1953: "What we want to get is understanding, by us of them and by them of us. It would be a great thing if we could get personal

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relations which would dissipate some of the Soviet mythology about Britain."[5] An editorial in *The Times* (London, August 5, 1959) discussing Mr. Khrushchev's proposed visit to the United States recognized that "it has always been argued that one of the foremost advantages of a visit by Khrushchev would be to convince him of the enormous strength and resilience of the United States."

The conclusion that the Soviet leaders misunderstand the West can be arrived at in a number of ways. One way is by studying, and taking at their face value, Soviet statements about the West, and if it is objected that only the naïve and those predisposed, because of an ideological or emotional attachment to the Soviet Union, to believe such statements would make this the test, it is worth remembering that these two groups are far from negligible either in numbers or in influence. Another way is by speculating about the psychological effects of certain modes of thought and action characteristic of Communism, as Mr. Kennan does when he considers the effects of the prolonged lying and "habitual carelessness about the truth" indulged in by the Soviet leaders. The objection to Mr. Kennan's view seems to me to be that he assumes that the intellectual corruption which accompanies indiscriminate and arbitrary lying will also accompany lying of the most discriminate and systematic kind, lying which is, moreover, always subjected to an objective test in terms of whether or not it serves the interests of the Party. Mr. Kennan obscures this by accusing the Soviet leaders of "carelessness" about the truth. This is surely the wrong word; the Soviet leaders are certainly unscrupulous about the truth, but they are anything but careless in the way they suppress and distort it. As the Kennan argument rests on the effects which are supposed to follow from carelessness about the truth, this distinction is vital.

Another argument used to establish the fact that the Soviet high command is misinformed about the West is based on certain views of totalitarian bureaucracy. Merle Fainsod states this line, without subscribing to it:

> The tendency to embrace data that confirm established predilections while rejecting the unpalatable facts that offend one's preconceptions is a weakness from which no one is wholly free. Totalitarian societies appear to be particularly susceptible to such manipulation. Every dictatorship has a

[5] *Hansard*, v. 515, p. 1063.

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tendency to breed sycophancy and to discourage independence in its bureaucratic hierarchy. When the pronouncements of the dictator are sacred and unchallengeable, the words which subordinates throw back at him tend to flatter his whims rather than to challenge his analyses. No dictatorial regime can entirely escape the distortion of this echo effect.[6]

In considering this view two points are important. First, while enough empirical evidence may one day be available to substantiate it, at present it seems to be based on a general theory of totalitarian bureaucracy rather than on known facts about the Soviet system. While such theories are interesting and suggestive, the number of totalitarian bureaucracies which have existed to date is surely too small for conclusive generalization. Secondly, as Mr. Fainsod points out, the Soviet leaders themselves take steps to safeguard the integrity of their sources of information by having "a variety of intelligence agencies [which] function side by side with no point of coördination short of the Kremlin itself." How effective these safeguards are is not known, but then neither is the extent of the distortion they are meant to counter. While there is certainly some distortion as information moves up through the hierarchy—as there is in every government—it seems to me that too little is known about its nature and extent to conclude on this ground alone that the Soviet leaders are seriously misinformed about the West.

The strongest argument for accepting the misunderstanding thesis is that the nature of Communist theory is such that anyone who believes it *must* have a distorted picture of the world because the theory is a wrong or confused one. If this is accepted, however, it can still be questioned whether their belief in the theory misleads the Soviet leaders in the way implied when it is maintained that it is their misconceptions about the West which are largely responsible for the cold war. What I think is meant when this is maintained is that (a) anyone who accepts the Communist view of history must accept as a fact—indeed as the central fact of international politics—the unremitting conflict between Communism and capitalism, between, that is, the Soviet Union and the West; (b) the Soviet leaders therefore believe that the governments of the West are unavoidably their enemies; and (c) this belief is a mistaken one. Again, Mr. Fainsod expresses this view: "Perhaps the greatest single source of distortion derives from the enemy image which is deeply embedded in Marx-

[6] Merle Fainsod, "How Russia Is Ruled." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 283.

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ist-Leninist patterns of thought. The politics of Communism is built around the concept of the implacable adversary who has to be overwhelmed and destroyed lest he in turn annihilate Communism."[7] That this enemy image exists and is central to Communist thinking about Western democracies must be accepted. But to what extent does it result in distortion? Are not the leaders of a totalitarian régime which is committed to achieving world domination and to the destruction of all non-Communist political systems right in thinking that other governments are their actual or potential enemies? Is it not one of the least controversial generalizations that can be made about power politics that he who pursues goals which are incompatible with my continued existence and who in the pursuit of those goals is determined to destroy me is, once I realize these facts, regarded by me as my enemy?

As long as direct evidence as to how the Soviet leaders view the West is inconclusive, a crucial test of their comprehension is whether in their dealings with the West these leaders behave as if they did not understand it; and it seems to me that they do not. It is not merely that, in the face of a mobilized West, Communism has made great gains in the last decade; nor is it only that, by general agreement, the Soviet leaders have seized and held the political initiative. I do not wish to argue that there is a simple relationship between success and understanding. What is more significant is the policies and methods by which these successes have been achieved. Taken together, the Soviet's "coexistence" and "peace" campaigns, the skillful alteration of tough and relaxed approaches, the use of personal visits and the success of the campaign for a summit conference itself, to mention but a few examples, seem to imply a very considerable understanding of the motives, fears, hopes, rivalries and illusions operating in the West. In the face of such evidence any claim that the Soviet leaders do not understand the West should be approached very warily and the onus of proof should rest on those who put it forward.[8]

[7] *Ibid,* p. 284.

[8] There is another reason for caution. As E. H. Carr showed in "The Twenty Years Crisis," the liberal belief in a fundamental harmony of interest still permeates the English view of international politics and it is characteristic of those who believe in such a harmony that they attempt to explain, or to explain away, conflicts of interest in terms of ignorance and misunderstanding. It is over 30 years since Carr wrote, but I see no reason for holding that belief in a harmony of interest has weakened in the meantime; indeed the existence of nuclear weapons may well have strengthened it.

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Someone who accepts misunderstanding or ignorance as one of the main causes of the cold war is more likely to believe in the efficacy of summit meetings as a means of bringing the cold war to an end than is someone who explains it in terms of real conflicts of interest arising out of ideological factors and power politics. But even then it is not self-evident that meetings between leaders are an effective way of removing misunderstanding. The vanity of men may make them believe that they can understand their fellows by looking them in the eye and clasping their hands, but there is ample evidence that meetings can breed and feed misunderstanding as well as understanding; one has only to think of the procession of British politicians, many of great experience, who visited Hitler and Mussolini and drew the wrong conclusions.[9] It could well be argued that if understanding is the aim the more impersonal the proceedings, the more that the irrelevant factors such as charm, demeanor and skill in debate are excluded, the better the chance of success.

IV

Another reason which has frequently been given for holding summit meetings is that there is "no use talking to anyone in Russia except Mr. Khrushchev." This view received wide support in the foreign policy debate in the House of Commons in July 1959,[10] both from backbenchers and from the Prime Minister. When Mr. Macmillan came to give his reasons for wanting a meeting, the first reason he gave was: ". . . because I think that certain decisions can be taken only by a meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and it may be that the Berlin question is one."[11] Mr. J. J. Mendelson, discussing the opposition of Mr. Adenauer and others to a meeting, said: "They do not wish any serious negotiations to take place. Therefore, they are against a Summit Conference, because it is generally agreed that there can be serious negotiations only at that level." Mr. Paul Williams extended this argument by claiming that no one below the heads of government had negotiating power on *either* side. "There was a time when

[9] Another startling example of the conclusions drawn from appearances and behavior was provided by *The People*, a Sunday paper with a circulation of several millions, commenting on Mr. Mikoyan's visit to the United States in 1959: "[He has] done a splendid job, not for Russia, but for peace. It will simply not be possible for Foster Dulles to make the Americans shiver any longer with his stories about the grizzly Russian bear."

[10] *Hansard*, vol. 608, p. 1382 *et seq.*

[11] Mr. Macmillan's second, and only other, reason was simply that such a meeting, if conducted privately, "would be of great value in itself." His attempt to enlarge on this did not really succeed in making his meaning clear. *Ibid*, p. 1494.

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Foreign Secretaries going to international conferences had some power and influence. This is not so today. This may or may not be regrettable, but that it is a fact is not open to doubt"—a strange view in the light of the recent careers of John Foster Dulles and Sir Anthony Eden as foreign secretaries. As applied to the conduct of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, however, the argument has more plausibility. Mr. Khrushchev is a dictator; power in the Soviet Union is extremely centralized; control over diplomatic representatives is tight. It might seem, then, that there is much to be said for negotiating directly with the one man who can take serious decisions, who has some freedom of manœuvre.

But these facts are themselves two-edged and it can be argued that it does not really make much difference, in terms of effective negotiations, at what level discussions take place. For if centralization of power and tight discipline characterize Soviet diplomacy, and if during negotiations Soviet diplomats report back fully to their leaders and are carefully instructed by them, then it would seem that dealing with subordinates is very much like dealing with Mr. Khrushchev himself. As long as communication is good between the ventriloquist and his dummy it matters little which is spoken to: the former can exercise his initiative and his freedom of manœuvre equally well in either case. In fact, whoever the Western leaders are ostensibly negotiating with, in reality they are always negotiating with Mr. Khrushchev; and if negotiations with the Soviet Union prove unproductive, it is not because the wrong people are being negotiated with but because it is the Soviet Government's policy (or Mr. Khrushchev's policy) not to reach agreement. I think that this argument is substantially sound and that the belief that direct negotiations with Mr. Khrushchev might produce substantial changes in Soviet policy is mistaken. Why, after all, should he be less wedded to the policy which he himself formulates than are his subordinates? There are undoubtedly some differences between negotiating with a dictator and with his subordinates, but it is not at all clear that they are such as to make a successful outcome more likely when it is the leader who negotiates. Indeed, among these differences must be counted the fact that when he is directly engaged the issue of personal prestige and the possibility of using the occasion for propaganda rather than for serious negotiations loom much larger than they do otherwise.

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There is another aspect to this justification of summit conferences. Even if it is true that Mr. Khrushchev is the only man worth talking to on the Communist side, it does not follow that only the President in the case of the United States or the Prime Minister in the case of Britain can really represent their particular countries. Neither democratic theory nor recent practice in Western countries supports the view that foreign secretaries and other senior diplomats cannot be responsible negotiators. Why, then, is it assumed that because Mr. Khrushchev must take part in order for the negotiations to be serious, Mr. Macmillan and President Kennedy must also take part? Presumably because it is believed that they are the only persons with whom Mr. Khrushchev will negotiate. This may well be the case; but if it is, and if it is considered to be a sufficient reason for having summit meetings, it is well to be clear as to the extent to which the modes of action characteristic of Communism are shaping the modes of action of Western countries.[12] In order to make serious negotiations possible the latter have, then, to concentrate initiative and power in the hands of one man in very much the same way as they are concentrated in the Soviet Union, and the division of functions characteristic of Western political systems has to be largely abandoned. These changes may or may not be considered worthwhile, but in any final summing up of the advantages and disadvantages of summit conferences they should certainly be considered.

V

I have already mentioned the widely held view that the technological and military developments of the last 20 years have so changed the nature of international politics that we need a "diplomatic revolution" to come to terms with this "nuclear revolution." It is maintained that conventional diplomacy can no longer cope with the complexity of the issues; that too much is at stake to leave things to the diplomats; that their conventions and niceties are unsuited to modern conditions; that it is necessary to create machinery to cut through the protocol and prevarications of the old system. This view gains much of its support from the fact that the record of diplomacy in the last three decades has

[12] Writing in this journal last year, Mr. Dean Rusk made a similar point, pertinently asking, "Is there point in allowing the Soviet Union to set the style of international negotiation at the cost of disrupting the established political arrangements of other nations?" (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1960, p. 367.)

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been singularly unimpressive and that many of the old methods and conventions clearly do not work as well as they used to.

What seems to me doubtful is that all this has much to do with "the nuclear age." Much more important is that throughout this period some of the most powerful members of international society have been totalitarian states. These states have rejected not only many of the procedures of the old diplomacy but also the assumptions on which it was based. Their aim has been to destroy the state system and to bring diplomacy to an end. Their presence has meant that there have been in international society two groups of states whose conceptions of the nature and purpose of diplomacy are different, and it is this fact (made worse by our failure to recognize it) more than any other which accounts for the difficulties and failures of modern diplomacy. It is a fact which, it may well be argued, makes necessary the adoption of new assumptions and the development of new techniques. But accepting this, it amounts only to a general case for change and not to a justification of any particular kind of change or innovation; the case for summit conferences still has to be made. And the attitude of totalitarian states to well-publicized conferences —their tendency to exploit them for propaganda purposes and to use them as occasions for appealing to peoples over the heads of their governments—does not suggest that summit conferences are the answer to the problems created by the presence of totalitarian states in international politics.

There may be grounds other than these for believing that summit conferences provide a real means of ending or alleviating the conflicts of the cold war. But, as far as I can discover, these are the ones put forward most frequently, at least in Britain. What is striking about them is that they seem to provide an extremely flimsy structure to bear the weight of the ardent and widespread faith in summit conferences. Their weakness suggests that faith in such conferences is not the outcome of rational calculation but rather an irrational reaction to the strain of living in a divided world, the pressure of totalitarian propaganda and the possibility of war.

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THE NEW LEFT IN FRANCE

By Victor A. Velen

THE saying that France has "the stupidest right in the world" was demonstrated again by the Algiers coup of April 1961. What the quartet of generals hoped to achieve that might or could have been durable is difficult to imagine. The French right is still nourished largely on the philosophy of Charles Maurras and the *Action Française;* and in recent years it has moved progressively toward fascism, a political development closely linked to phenomena of decay and obsolescence inherent in the social structure of France. This was expressed in laconic fashion by the former Catholic premier, Georges Bidault, when he said, "Tout se dégrade; je me sens devenir fasciste"—"Everything is debased; I feel myself becoming a fascist."

As some elements of the center parties and the army have joined the right, elements of the non-Communist left have been moving from an independent position promised under the leadership of Mendès-France in 1954 into closer ideological alignment with the Soviet bloc. Ignoring the lessons of past history in general and of Soviet history in particular, the left, too, clings to outdated concepts of imperialism and nourishes illusions about social evils in the West.

For the time being it is clear that the rightist threat to democracy in France is still acute. To assess the French scene only in these terms, however, would be shortsighted. For it is equally clear that the success of a fascist coup, or even prolonged disorder, civil strife and general political instability, would in the long run exclusively benefit the Communists.

Now that the right-wing Algerian extremists appear to a large extent out-manœuvred and disarmed by the de Gaulle government, attention has been turning to the ultras of the left, a small but highly articulate group of intellectuals, writers, artists, students and professional people, many of whom adhere to the intricate left-of-Communist thinking of Jean-Paul Sartre. Calling itself the New Left, this group gained momentum, in particular among students, as the war in Algeria dragged on. Its sympathizers include the 121 signers of the Manifesto of Insubmission in the summer of 1960, upholding the right of French youth to refuse military service in Algeria. A number of its activists, led

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by Francis Jeanson, an old friend and former collaborator of Sartre, served as contacts for agents of the *Front de Libération National* operating in France. Their turbulent trial in September 1960 for "carrying the valises" of the F.L.N. became an open forum for denunciation of the war and a rallying ground for leading left intellectuals. At the time of the trial, Sartre sent an open telegram of sympathy to the defendants, saying that he, too, would have carried the F.L.N.'s valises, for its supporters represented the only true left remaining in France.

The Jeanson trial and the Manifesto of Insubmission gave the New Left focus. But its origins go back to the early 1950s. An effort was made then by left-wing intellectuals and Communist Party dissidents to form a movement adopting Tito's Jugoslavia as its ideological partner. For a short time this group also included Sartre, before his positive reëvaluation of Communism in 1952. This was the germination period of the New Left. Its early search for allegiances to a socialist ideal was enheartened by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech at the Twentieth Party Congress and the subsequent thaw, but received a rude jolt from the Hungarian revolution. The brutal suppression of the revolution shocked and dismayed the intellectual left in France as elsewhere, and among those who recoiled were Sartre (for a time), Claude Roy, Roger Vailland and many others.

Alienation from the Communist Party, however, was short-lived. Two developments served to resuscitate better relations. One was undoubtedly the fact that the Communist Party after Hungary had lost little of its political support; its cadres and militants had been kept in line, with only slight initial setbacks in the ranks of the trade unions. This demonstrated that the Party in France was tough enough to withstand the destruction of the image of Stalin and a reversal of its basic dogma—identification with the aims of the proletariat (of Hungary and Poland). The phase of re-stabilization was crowned by the spectacular Soviet success in putting the first earth satellite into orbit, thus proving the superiority of Soviet science over American science (and hence of Soviet society over American society). The homeless left-winger in France was impressed.

Logically enough, the reappraisal had to be basic. The decade following the war had washed away all illusions of the 1930s. The image of Soviet Russia as the paradise of the workers gave way. A new, tough idea adjusted to the reality of the Soviet

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Union emerged. It was not perhaps what the left in the West wanted, but it seemed to be the only way of solving the social problems of the world. (To speak in Sartrian allegory, the devil being the only progressive and successful politician, one was, perforce, obliged to support the devil.)

The other factor serving to bolster the position of the Communist Party was the collapse of the alliance between the Socialists and the Mendès-France Radicals after Socialist Premier Guy Mollet capitulated to pressure from Algerian right-wing extremists in February 1956. When Mollet then abandoned efforts to reach a peaceful solution and his Resident General in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, intensified the war, the Socialist Party, governed by the Mollet wing, was hopelessly compromised in the eyes of its own left wing and of the independent left. Mendès-France, who two years earlier might have become the central figure in a rejuvenation of the non-Communist left, was not only out of the government but of his own party as well. After the fall of the Mollet government in the autumn of 1957, the Algerian war entered a critical phase, in which its repercussions were increasingly manifest in metropolitan French politics. The *immobilisme* of the governments that followed Mollet, their policy of letting the Algerian and other problems rot, destroyed political confidence in the center. Finally, the May 1958 coup, which brought in de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic, effectively eliminated the Socialists and Radicals from the political scene.

The fear of a fascist takeover has since continued to shadow political developments in France, and it became the final spur to the formation of the New Left. Dissident left-wing elements (former members of the Communist and Socialist Parties, followers of Mendès-France and Trotskyites) rallied to the new Socialist splinter party, the *Parti Socialiste Unifié* (P.S.U.), formed in 1959 with a program advocating immediate peace in Algeria, resistance to fascism in France and opposition to the politics of personal power (de Gaulle). An alliance with the Communist Party —that is, "the people"—was in their opinion the primary condition for effective action. Non-coöperation with the C.P., they thought, would weaken the working class and isolate the P.S.U., reducing it to a weak sectarian role. A wide area of basic agreement with Communist aims existed; in P.S.U. eyes a new *Front Populaire* became a possibility.

Rapprochement with the Communists was hampered at the

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outset, however, by the different view the Communist Party took of de Gaulle and the Algerian war. When, for instance, an immediate general strike was proposed by members of the independent left, joined by lower echelons of the C.G.T. (the Communist trade-union organization) and the Communist Party, in an effort to forestall if not prevent the advent of the Fifth Republic, the Party hierarchy torpedoed the action. At the time, it appeared that the Soviet Union did not look with disfavor on the de Gaulle government, believing that it would steer France into a neutralist course, thus eventually destroying NATO.

The Soviet attitude and that of the French Communist Party changed only when it became evident that de Gaulle would not break with West Germany, nor, despite difficulties, pull out of NATO. The New Left had to bide its time until the Communist Party had radically altered its attitude toward de Gaulle and had begun in earnest to mobilize its machinery against his government and the war in Algeria. Previously, the Communists had given no support to the F.L.N., and offered only lukewarm opposition to the Algerian war. In the last year, the respective positions of the P.S.U. and the C.P. have become close enough to make a degree of coöperation possible.

II

The views of the New Left are voiced by two weeklies, *France-Observateur* and *Express*. *France-Observateur,* which was founded in 1950 by Claude Bourdet, a former editor of the independent leftist *Combat,* originally advocated a left-wing neutralist third force. It maintained this strictly neutralist line in the first three issues, then adopted its present fundamentally anti-Western, pro-Soviet attitude. When the P.S.U. was created in 1959, *France-Observateur* became its official mouthpiece. But in casting about for guiding principles the P.S.U. actually adopted the existing *France-Observateur* line rather than setting an editorial policy of its own. As a party paper, however, *France-Observateur* has frequently been obliged to steer an uneasy course in concrete political situations when the position of the P.S.U. collides with that of the Communist Party.

The history of *Express* is quite different. Originally created in 1954 in order to support the policies of Mendès-France, it started as a genuinely independent democratic paper. Its swing over to its present anti-Western, New Left line occurred much later, after

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Mendès-France was out of active politics. Simultaneously, the influence of Albert Camus, at one time a regular contributor, was being supplanted by that of Sartre. *Express* began to change after the May 1958 coup. In the months after the Jeanson trial and the Manifesto of Insubmission, *Express* (and *France-Observateur*) began openly to back the F.L.N., in accordance with Sartre's and Jeanson's thesis that it represented the only active, progressive political force in France. Today, *Express* does not diverge in essentials from the Communist point of view in international affairs, carefully eschewing anything that might sound offensive to or even vaguely critical of East-bloc countries. Not hampered by an obligation to reflect the P.S.U. line, it is more outspoken than *France-Observateur*.

Another important New Left publication is *Temps Modernes,* Sartre's own literary and theoretical bimonthly review. It frequently influences the ideological line taken up on a more popular basis by *France-Observateur* and *Express*.

On all issues of the cold war the New Left press has in essence espoused the Soviet view, while claiming that its attitude is that of an objective bystander. It tends to write around a point, but the import is clear. Soviet good intention is imputed; the inability to achieve peaceful coexistence is laid to American intransigence and basically imperialist aims. The key to the success of East-West negotiations, the New Left press argues, lies in whether the United States will accept Soviet demands, and thus reduce international tension. The failure of the American government to live up to the New Left's vision of world problems has provoked considerable acrimony toward the Kennedy Administration, and the emergence of neo-McCarthyism and fascism is predicted.

The leaders and adherents of the New Left represent a variety of political persuasions and frequently pursue diametrically opposed political aims, sometimes carrying their conflicting arguments into the same issue of *Express*. In general, three tendencies are manifest. One is dominated by the political philosophy of Sartre. Sartre first became politically active in 1947 when he founded, together with Albert Camus and David Rousset, the *Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire* (R.D.R.). The group broke up primarily over the stand it should take after the revelation in 1949 of the existence of concentration camps in the Soviet Union. Sartre refused to participate in the campaign of denunciation that followed and embarked on a separate line as a

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Soviet apologist. Later, in a lengthy article in *Temps Modernes* (July 1952), he expounded a theory for unconditional support of the Communist Party. "In order to pass judgment on the Communist Party, which would be a political act," he stated, "no less [a judge] is needed than the Communist Party itself."

Camus and Sartre, originally friends although not fellow existentialists as is commonly believed, broke finally in 1952 over the publication of Camus' philosophical study, "L'Homme Révolté." In the ensuing bitter debate Camus emerged as the defender of the individual in society, while Sartre argued that the Soviet socialist experiment was moving with the trend of history. Proof of its historicity lay in its ultimate efficiency and the fact that there was no workers' movement outside of the Communist Party. In other words, its efficiency and monopoly position testified to the moral nature of its action.

Although Sartre rejects Marxist philosophy, he favors Communist Party action and aims, because they are enlisted to create a new society and to do away with the old. The position of Sartre's group is to the left of the P.S.U. and equally left of the Communist Party. It has been described by one of Sartre's critics, Professor Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as "ultra-Bolshevism."

The second group, around Claude Bourdet and Gilles Martinet, editors of *France-Observateur,* is largely concerned with building a political formation similar to the Nenni party in Italy while it was still allied with the Communists. (Bourdet himself was an Under-Secretary of State in the Popular Front government in 1938.)

The third group, a small minority by comparison with the two others, is composed of people genuinely interested in making the P.S.U. an instrument of a renovated Socialist Party independent of the Communist Party. They advocate a fresh approach to problems of social and economic change in society. This became evident during the campaign preceding the referendum on de Gaulle's Algerian policy and at the P.S.U. congress in March 1961. Georges Suffert, a spokesman for this third group, took issue with the P.S.U. leadership in the pages of *France-Observateur* (January 12, 1961): "The Communist Party remains for a certain number of members of the left a pole of reference, and one separates oneself from it with some trepidation. . . . An important number of members of the P.S.U., for example, live in an unreal world. They nourish a nostalgia for a reconciled, uni-

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fied workers' party, a pure and tough Communism, which would at the same time be friendly to and independent of the Soviet Union. However much this party is [in reality] negated, the dream persists."

III

On world issues the position of these three groups is basically the same. The Kennedy Administration was initially hailed in the belief that it would usher in a new Rooseveltian period of understanding and collaboration with the Soviet Union. Disillusion set in promptly, however, when Kennedy retained the C.I.A. and it was accentuated by Kennedy's tough tone toward Cuba.

The New Left's political philosophy is lucidly revealed by its faith in the Castro revolution, a faith that inspired Sartre's reportorial pilgrimage to Cuba in the summer of 1960 (for the big Paris daily *France-Soir*) and that of Françoise Sagan (for *Express*). Their subsequent articles extolled the Cuban new look; Sartre's ran in 17 consecutive installments. Castro, the New Left argues, was forced into the ranks of the Communist-bloc countries against his will and initial intention, in order to save the revolution from being strangled by American imperialism. (Interestingly enough, the course taken by the Cuban revolution reflects Sartre's theories on the use of Communist aims and methods, divorced from classical Marxist philosophy.) The outcry after the rebel invasion of Cuba was unanimous. It was said that the progressive nature of the Castro régime, its influence in the American hemisphere and its inherent promise of solving Latin American social problems had proved intolerable to American imperialist interests. The invasion was interpreted as an attempt to restore the reactionary pre-Castro status quo.

"Castro is not a Communist," Sartre wrote (*Express*, April 20, 1961). "He wants the independence and the sovereignty of his country. He has to be understood on the basis of the experience we have had with all countries of the third world. We know quite well that when an underdeveloped country appeals to the U.S.S.R. (as Lumumba did at a given time), it is because the West is in the process of making independence impossible. That we have already seen. . . ."

When it was no longer possible to maintain candidly that Castro and his régime were not Communist, the New Left readily accepted this fact. As Major Ernesto Guevara explained to *Ex-*

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press correspondent K. S. Karol (May 18, 1961): ". . . every revolution inevitably carries in itself a part of Stalinism. This is not to be imputed to the revolution itself, but to the reactions it provokes in the capitalist countries. . . ."

The New Left looks upon West Germany as the primary factor in perpetuating the cold war. The real economic miracle, *Express* writer Michel Bosquet states, is taking place in East Germany where the new socialist man is being forged. And a reporter for *Express,* assigned to interview West German soldiers on manœuvres in France, registered surprise and chagrin that she found them convinced democrats.

With regard to the emergent African nations, Bosquet defines Guinea, the U.A.R., Ghana, Mali and Morocco as "the dynamic countries of Africa." In the same way that some Westerners view all anti-colonial or socialist movements as potentially or actually Communist, the New Left organs label Communist-inspired and supported movements neutralist, or describe them as national liberation movements in the tradition of the particular country (Castro, Touré, Pathet-Lao). When the country in question declares its identity with the Soviet bloc, the assertion is made that if it is now Communist, it has been pushed that far by the attitude of the West, and particularly of the United States.

The attitude of the New Left toward the Soviet Union was summed up by Alfred Sauvy, Director of the French Institute for Demography, in a cursory review of recent history in *France-Observateur* (October 27, 1960):

> In the disturbed atmosphere [of Russia] attempts at deviation are made and shocking trials take place; the West is outraged, without for a moment considering that a great part of the responsibility rests with it. . . . The 1941–1945 war did not improve matters, since these people [the Russians] were invaded by European bands from Finland to Rumania, and one must not forget the Spanish and French legions which, although weak, were symbolic. . . . Finally, in 1945, at a time when a new start could have been made, the atom bomb was exploded and was naturally viewed as a direct threat on the part of capitalism bent on destroying socialism.

A familiar technique of presenting international news, practiced especially by Bosquet of *Express,* is to interview a spokesman for one side of a problem, the Eastern or "neutralist" side, and then present his views as an objective analysis of the situation. The tone of a detached observer is rarely abandoned, whether the person interviewed is Souvanna Phouma or an unidentified Communist labor leader or an unidentified Eastern-bloc diplomat.

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IV

In the realm of domestic politics, where the overriding question has been the Algerian war, the New Left suspected all along that de Gaulle's Algerian policy was basically no more than a tacit, undercover collaboration with the Algerian extremists and the military to promote the army's aims by means palatable to the French public. That de Gaulle was genuinely interested in terminating the war and in negotiating with the F.L.N. was never seriously considered. His gradualist, cautious injection of the idea of Algerian independence, following a negotiated peace, was interpreted as merely a means of protracting the war. Referring to the initial negotiations between the French Government and the F.L.N., which broke down at Melun in the summer of 1960, Gilles Martinet observed (*France-Observateur,* October 6, 1960): "The de Gaulle of Melun was no discovery to us. We knew he would do everything in his power to avoid the start of real negotiations and to impose his own 'liberal' solution of the Algerian problem." As the date of the referendum on de Gaulle's Algerian policy approached, Claude Bourdet editorialized (*France-Observateur,* December 22, 1960): "In fact, negotiation has never been less near. Perhaps after January 8 [date of the referendum], he [de Gaulle] will initiate some new comedy in order to prolong the respite which the referendum will give him, and also to try to deflect onto the F.L.N. the failure that is anticipated."

Prior to the Algiers coup of April 1961, both papers of the New Left devoted much space to an analysis of the danger of further attempts by the army to seize power in alliance with the Algerian extremists, and to bring about a rightist government headed by Soustelle, Salan or Bidault. Yet the possibility of such a fascist coup was curiously discounted in discussions of de Gaulle's eventual departure from politics. The danger, said Sartre (*Express,* January 4, 1961), is "not that de Gaulle leaves, but that he stays."

The attitude of the New Left toward the referendum on the question of self-determination for Algeria was equally ambiguous. Originally, the P.S.U. urged all left parties and trade unions to vote with a blank white ballot, thus differentiating their vote from the "No" vote of the right-wing extremists. When the Communist Party refused to accept this proposal and instructed its members to vote "No," the P.S.U. fell in line with the Communist

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directive "in order not to be isolated from the working class."

The possibility of a rightist coup in the event that the referendum was defeated by a "No" vote was publicly rejected. Privately, however, it was entertained and even welcomed. Sartre explained the collusion of the "No" votes of right and left as follows: "The preoccupation with 'not wanting to mix the votes with those of the ultras' seems to me to be totally anti-democratic. The interplay of democracy itself demands that governments should be overthrown in the assemblies through the votes of both oppositions. This coalition has always existed. Why should it be refused today? I will go further: the No of the ultras is a valid No. It is valid because it means that de Gaulle's policies are no good." Sartre discarded the danger of a fascist coup, arguing that the Americans would intervene to prevent it, and concluded, "It is even to be hoped that they [the Americans] don't juggle away our chances for a genuine democracy." (*Express,* January 4, 1961).

More revealing is the observation of François Mauriac, who for a time conducted a lonely fight on the back page of *Express* against the fellow-traveling tendency of the New Left:

> In the minds of the men of the left who vote No, the final victory remains tied to a more or less protracted time of tribulation in which a government controlled by the army would complete the catastrophe. . . . Let us speak frankly: there are only two types of men of the left. Those who hate the Communists, who dread them like death, those who are with Guy Mollet and Gaston Deferre, will vote Yes. All the others who vote No desire, without admitting it, a popular front; the majority of them no longer doubt that the road leading to it goes via Soustelle, or Bidault, if not Pinay. . . . (*Express,* January 4, 1961.)

This argument corresponds to the reasoning of the German Communist Party in June 1930 when it voted with the Nazis in the *Roter Volksentscheid* (Red Plebiscite) to unseat the Prussian Social Democratic government of Prime Minister Braun. This cleared the way to power for the Nazis in Germany. The Communists understood the consequences of their vote, but considered that a Nazi government would necessarily be transitory and would soon be supplanted by a Communist revolution. This is the thinking that prevailed also in the French Communist Party when it expelled two important members from its Central Committee, Laurent Casanova and Marcel Servin, because they favored a policy of conditional support of de Gaulle in view of the importance of achieving peace in Algeria. The Communist Party,

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seconded by the P.S.U., adopted a policy aimed at aggravating the situation, assuming that it (the C.P.) would become the eventual beneficiary of an unpopular coup, borne to power by the tommy guns of the paratroopers.

V

During the summer of 1960 a gradual shift occurred among intellectuals and students in France from the demand for peace in Algeria and direct political negotiations to all-out support of the F.L.N. One event which gave impetus to this movement was a parley between the National Union of French Students and the F.L.N. student organization (*Union Générale des Etudiants Musulmans d'Algérie*) in Switzerland. Following this contact, a majority of the French student organization was won over to solidarity with the F.L.N., a stand that was solidified by the government's subsequent attempt to curb the organization's activities by such measures as cutting its subsidies. A more serious development was the breakup and arrest of the "Réseau Jeanson," whose members had been acting as contacts for F.L.N. agents in France. Justifying their action, Jeanson wrote to Sartre: "The great mistake of the left is to give out the slogan 'Peace' and to refuse what this slogan implies politically: solidarity with the F.L.N." The left, he said, was impotent because it had not established earlier an organizational liaison with the F.L.N. It had lost its sense of action. This had to be restored to it by setting an example of unity of action with the F.L.N.

The trial in September 1960 of the "Réseau Jeanson" turned into a public review of the long (by then six-years-old) and tragic Algerian war. Discontent over the ambiguities of the war, the revelation of tortures used by the French Army in interrogating captured rebels, and the conspiracies of fascist officers burgeoned sharply into the open. Public apathy gave way at last to public indignation and disgust. Most of Jeanson's followers were present at the trial; some, however, including Jeanson himself, were tried in absentia. The maximum sentence handed down to the chief defendants was ten years' imprisonment.

In the summer preceding the trial the New Left became the main activator in the movement of insubmission. This movement started among students of draft age and later won the support of many of their professors. It culminated in the Manifesto of Insubmission, an open appeal to French youth to desert from the

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army in order to forego military service in Algeria. The text of the Manifesto was suppressed and no copies are now available. However, the names of 121 signers (later over 200) were published in *Temps Modernes*.[1] Most of them were motivated by genuine feelings of revolt against the misery and excesses of the war.

Impressed by the audacity of Jeanson and guided by the arguments and moral authority of Sartre, the forces of discontent in the autumn of 1960 swelled the ranks of the New Left. For a while it also appeared as though a popular front coalition with the Communists might be attempted. The chance for unified action with the Communists was offered by the student demonstrators of October 27. The Union of French Students and the Federation of National Education, together with the P.S.U., the Socialist trade unions (C.G.T.-F.O.), the Christian trade unions (C.F.T.C.) and a number of lesser organizations, called a protest meeting for this date at the Place de la Bastille to press the demand for peace in Algeria. The Communist Party was approached to join the action—which would have insured its success. The rank and file of the Party and of the Communist trade unions approved, but two days before the event the Party directorate refused to participate, using the pretext that its counsel had been by-passed in the printing of leaflets, and referring to the risks involved in participating in a forbidden meeting. (The meeting had in the meantime been authorized, although transferred to the Palais de la Mutualité in the heart of the student quarter, thus limiting its mass character.)

The P.S.U. was dismayed at the Communist turnabout. Its lengthy inquiry into and analysis of the C.P.'s refusal to join the action revealed that the Party considered this type of demonstration "bourgeois" (as it had also viewed the Manifesto of Insubmission—"A Communist doesn't desert from a bourgeois army. He works to transform an imperialist war into a social revolution.") Furthermore, the Party opposed joining an action it had not itself initiated. This was a turning point at which the

[1] Issues of August–September and October–November 1960. Among the signers were: writers Daniel Guérin, Simone de Beauvoir, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Alfred Rosmer, Claude Roy, Jean-Paul Sartre, Vercors, Nathalie Sarraute, Claude Simon, Françoise Sagan, Charles Vildrac, André Schwartz-Bart and André Breton; the philosopher François Wahl; Jean Baby, professor at the Paris Institut des Sciences Politiques; Laurent Schwartz, head of the Mathematics Department at the Sorbonne (along with many other university professors); actors Alain Cuny, Danièle Delorme and Simone Signoret; cartoonist Siné; artists Robert Lapoujade and Tristan Tzara; and scientist Gustave Monod.

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P.S.U. and the New Left lost the opportunity to become an independent political force with a mass base; for rather than create their own policy, they had made coöperation with the Communists the condition for action.

The military coup in Algiers on April 22, 1961, took everyone by surprise, including the New Left, despite the fact that it had been so long expected. The rapid disintegration of the rebellion was even more surprising. Four days did not allow the New Left time to elaborate a specific policy other than to appeal for mass action, a general strike, and to exhort the government to arm the people to resist a possible landing.

"Arming the people," a perennial battle cry of the extreme and the New Left, eventually would involve arming the industrial plants, where the Communists are firmly entrenched, through their own organizations and through the Communist-dominated C.G.T. The other trade unions, the Catholic C.F.T.C. and the Socialist C.G.T.-F.O., are much weaker, and together do not match the strength of the C.G.T. Being democratic organizations, their structure is loose and not designed for conversion into military formations in case of civil war, as are the Communist organizations. In the final analysis, "arming the people" would place de Gaulle, and the French Republic, in a position of dependence on armed Communist units.

VI

The intellectual left in France is regarded abroad as limited in influence to the confines of the Latin Quarter and to a small group of Byzantine philosophers with Sartre at its head. This is not so, if one judges only from its political activities and their repercussions in the last year. Both *Express* and *France-Observateur* are widely read by French intellectuals and in some measure reflect their views. Nor are the left-leaning students to be discounted, since they represent a large proportion of the future professional men and women of France—its doctors, writers, artists and teachers. Many students have joined the P.S.U. because there is no other party to which a young liberal intellectual feels he can respectably adhere.[2]

[2] The real electoral strength of the P.S.U. is as yet unknown, as there has been no national election since its founding. The party claims 25,000 militants. During the last local elections (June 19, 1961) it received 5 to 6 percent of the vote and registered slight losses as compared with previous partial elections. In some areas, mainly in Paris and its environs, it has become a serious competitor of the Socialist Party.

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The turgid thinking of the New Left and its inability to discard relics of Marxist dogma are demonstrated by its disposition to disregard the last 40 years of history and to ignore the structural changes which have resulted in enormous gains for the working class in Western society. With the untimely death of Camus, the movement lost its most lucid and its only humanitarian thinker. His influence, great in the field of letters, was constructive in politics where he was a lonely exponent of clarity and morality.

In this respect Italy is more fortunate. It has Ignazio Silone and Alberto Moravia, and the difference is felt in the intellectual climate of Italy. In the course of a visit to France, Silone was invited by *Express* to air his political views. His chastening comments (*Express,* February 9, 1961) were obviously aimed at the French left:

> The vexatious indulgence which some leftist intellectuals feel toward the "socialist" power has assumed the form of real covenants. The intellectuals assure an historic consecration to power, and in return they receive diplomas to enter the priesthood for the communion of the masses. This type of covenanted relationship has been put to a test twice during the great Stalinist trials and after Budapest.
>
> One could have hoped that the experience had served some purpose. But in recent times some of our friends have indulged in a type of tourism which prepares them for bitter disillusionment. We can declare our solidarity with all struggles for liberation without necessarily becoming the chaplains of those who pretend that they monopolize these struggles and who already make evident that they have all the necessary qualities for becoming the tyrants of tomorrow.

The popularity of the New Left in France among intellectuals and students has been due very largely to its opposition to the war in Algeria. As it became apparent that de Gaulle would negotiate with the F.L.N. and that a chance for a peaceful solution might exist, the movement was obliged to re-orient its main propaganda effort. An editorial in *France-Observateur* (February 23, 1961) reflects this: "Our fundamental opposition to the government does not imply that we have thought it incapable of making peace. . . . It is the duty of the government to make peace, not of the opposition. . . . The day when negotiations start will be the first victory of the left."

Whether or not one agrees with de Gaulle's government, his concept of power, his national policies, few would contest the fact that he has been the one force barring the way to fascism in France. None the less, up to the time of the Algiers coup, and after it failed, the New Left concentrated its attack on de Gaulle,

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in the evident hope of forcing him out of office. Its leaders could have had no doubt of the consequences should this have happened. As Hitler proved to be the "icebreaker" for Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe, so the French right-wing extremists could perform the same service in Western Europe.

The P.S.U. aims ultimately to form a "French Socialist Republic," but as yet the term has not been clearly defined. The party's intention is to go beyond (but presumably not outside of) a new popular front. At the party congress in March 1961 it asserted that the Gaullist state must be opposed by "an over-all strategy, aimed at the establishment of a socialist power, constituting a new type of state."

Commenting on the program, *Express* concluded (March 30, 1961): "The battle in the offing will no longer be a struggle between electoral organizations for a few months of parliamentary supremacy. This kind of fencing with corked foils, which was typical of the Third and Fourth Republics, this flux and reflux of moderates and reformists, belongs to the past. This time it will be a total war for the conquest of the state. Everyone should prepare for it and choose his camp."

Whether the term "French Socialist Republic" means a new type of socialist state or of a people's democracy in the familiar Communist form is left open. Whatever the theoretical intentions may be, however, the ratio of forces between the P.S.U. and the C.P. would determine the new state's eventual character. The final result of collaboration with the C.P. could hardly be in doubt. The question is whether the rank and file of the New Left are ready to work for aims that could mean the establishment of a Soviet-style dictatorship in France—a régime, that is, diametrically opposed to what a genuine Left must aspire to create.

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THE FRENCH ARMY IN TROUBLE

By Walter Kerr

ONE morning early this summer a young French officer of the 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment was asked why he had not participated, as had the rest of the unit, in the rebellion last April when strong elements of the French Army joined five retired generals in an abortive attempt to seize power in Algeria. "Because," he snapped, "I did not have the honor to be asked to join."

There you have an idea of the way the French Army has been closing ranks ever since the nerve-racking days last spring that shook it as it has never been shaken since it fell apart before a superior German force in 1940. For the officer was not speaking casually but in reply to a prosecutor's question at the trial of his superior, Major Elie Denoix de Saint-Marc, who had been taken to Paris to face military justice for his part in the uprising. The young officer was polite; he was firm, he was defiant, as were many other officers who testified in the post-rebellion trials that began in late May and ran into August. Other military witnesses, whether or not in the moment of crisis they had remained loyal to the state, were equally polite, equally firm, and, though not defiant, in almost every instance were sympathetic to the defense.

What kind of an army is this where the loyal and the disloyal stand shoulder to shoulder? Is it just closing ranks for its own protection, for its own survival, in the hope it can iron out its differences, in the conviction it can restore to the fold the sheep that have wandered? Or are there more dangerous implications here? Are the wandering sheep enticing the loyal?

During the trials that ended recently, long or short prison terms were handed down to General Louis Nicot, acting commander-in-chief of the entire French Air Force at the time of the plot; to General Pierre Bigot, commander of the air force in Algeria; to retired General Maurice Challe who led the rebellion; to retired General André Zeller, a distinguished name in French military circles; and to a number of colonels, majors, captains and lieutenants, among them some of the finest combat men in the army. What have we seen and heard in the course of these trials?

We have seen a state that could not prepare its case properly

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because there was lack of coöperation on the part of loyal and disloyal officers alike.

We have seen loyal officers who, after the insurrection, resigned their commissions or their commands in protest at the manner in which the purge of the disloyal was conducted; they considered it exceedingly severe.

We have seen some loyal officers decline to testify for the prosecution, and others who, though they put in an appearance in court, talked and acted more like witnesses for the defense.

We have heard General Gambiez, the loyal commander-in-chief in Algeria at the time of the revolt, plead for the acquittal of disloyal officers who caused his arrest: "Rendez-moi mes enfants"—"Give me back my children."

We have heard five officers accused of having arrested a loyal officer and heard the loyal officer refuse to say whether in fact he was arrested, as the government contended, or just accompanied to another village under escort, as the defense insisted.

In short, we have witnessed a series of extraordinary trials that may well cause us to wonder whether, under the circumstances, we have any right to use words like loyal and disloyal, except in a limited sense; and what we hear outside of the courtroom in conversation with senior officers who remained faithful to General de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic does little to dispel the doubt from our minds. During the rebellion, after the rebellion, before General Challe's trial and after his conviction, one heard the same remark from the loyal and the disloyal: "J'ai beaucoup d'estime pour le général Challe"— "I hold General Challe in high esteem." This of an outstanding soldier who, because he disagreed with de Gaulle's policy for Algeria, retired from active service, flew secretly from France to North Africa, seized the over-all command he once had held and won over to his banner of revolt a large part of the strategic reserve, which was formed of professional soldiers, the élite of the army. This of a senior officer who had permitted the arrest of top military and civilian officials who opposed him. But this, too, of a man who, rather than allow blood to be spilled, had surrendered himself to military justice. He got 15 years.

All in all, it is a weird, complicated story that can be explained only by the fact that, although most Frenchmen question General Challe's judgment and his right to act as he did, few question his patriotism or the patriotism of those who followed him. Certainly the prosecutors did not. They introduced no evi-

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dence tending to prove that the rebellious officers had any intention of marching on metropolitan France, of unseating de Gaulle and destroying the Fifth Republic. However skeptical some of the prosecutors may have been, they were compelled to accept the protestations of all defendants that their only objective was to seize power in Algeria so they could win the war by military means over the Moslem National Liberation Front, the F.L.N. On occasion, they even asked for lesser prison terms than the government wished; often they submitted in writing a demand for long sentences, then orally, in obedience to the dictates of their own consciences, declared they believed such sentences excessive. The military courts agreed.

There were, of course, other mitigating factors besides the motives insisted upon by the defendants. They had never fired a shot or ordered a shot to be fired. They had served long wartime years in Indochina and Algeria. They had been promoted and decorated repeatedly for bravery.

Take the case of Major Elie Denoix de Saint-Marc, acting commander of the 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment. He was 39 years old when he went on trial. He had been 20 years in the army, 15 of them with the Foreign Legion. At 21 he had been arrested by the Gestapo for wartime resistance and sent to the concentration camp at Buchenwald. He stood before the tribunal in full dress uniform, with white gloves, with decorations he had won in France, Indochina and Algeria, wearing the green beret of a Foreign Legion paratrooper. His story was brief: In the early years, the army's mission was clear—to defeat the enemy in Algeria, to maintain the integrity of the territory and to promote social justice and social equality. In the process of carrying out this mission, thousands of soldiers died and "tens of thousands" of Moslems sought the army's protection from F.L.N. terrorists and guerrilla bands. Then, one day the army was told it had a new mission, that Algeria might have to be evacuated. "We cried," he said. He recalled Indochina and pledges to the native population—"The army will protect you; the army will remain." He recalled the day the army moved out, contrary to its pledged word and the word of the French government of the period, leaving behind loyal Indochinese to the mercy of Vietminh rebels. He could not let the same thing happen in Algeria where once again the army had sworn it would not abandon friendly Moslems, where once again the government in Paris had pledged its word.

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"You can ask anything of a soldier," he cried out, "even his life; but you cannot ask him to deny himself, to contradict himself, to lie, to cheat, to perjure himself. I would rather die before a firing squad in the ditch at Vincennes."

Another officer who had led his troops into Algiers on the night the Challe rebellion broke out was Battalion Commander Guy Robin. His father was born in Algeria; his grandfather was born there. He stood before the court wearing the red beret of a French paratrooper. "I had to choose," he said, "between the two imperatives of my profession—between discipline and honor. I chose honor." He joined Challe and captured the Palais d'Été, home of the French Delegate General, Jean Morin. There was no firing; "We went in with arms slung over our shoulders." He admitted everything; he denied nothing. He held his head high. "When on another day, out of uniform, barred from the army, I stand before my children [he has eight], I will be able to give them nothing to assure their material future, but I will be able to pass on to them my honor; it is unsullied."

As these officers talk we begin to have an understanding of the forces that divide the French Army and of the more powerful forces that draw it together; we begin to see why so many officers who remained faithful to the Fifth Republic respect and sympathize with those who did not.

II

Essentially, we are dealing here not with one army but with three armies, separated by background, experience and temperament. There is, first of all, the *traditional army*—the army of military families, of St. Cyr graduates, of staff officers, the army that for generations has been loyal to the state whatever the state or however much it may have disagreed with the state—the army which by and large was loyal even to Pétain in the wartime years when General de Gaulle was calling France to a higher loyalty. These officers, with many notable exceptions, come from the higher income brackets of society; you will find them in positions of command, in the upper echelons of military organization.

Second, there is what is known as the *technical army,* a different type of officer, a different type of man. Generally speaking, he is an engineer or a soldier concerned with the less conventional aspects of modern warfare. He is a student; he comes most likely from a middle-class family.

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Finally, there is the *militant army*, composed of more than half the professional officer corps. He is a first-class combat soldier, a company or battalion commander, perhaps a regimental commander, with a background something like that of Major de Saint-Marc—out of nothing, into the wartime resistance movement, a born leader of men, a battlefield commission, years of combat in Indochina and Algeria. He is a fighter, an activist. His fundamental loyalty was not to the Fourth Republic nor is it to the Fifth, but to his own concept of France and of what France ought to be. A combat man, he has a combat man's distrust of staff officers and his own idea of how modern war should be waged. Let others talk of men, money and munitions, of atomic and thermonuclear bombs; he believes in psychological warfare, in revolutionary warfare where nothing can be accomplished by military means until the army has won support of the civilian population. The Challe plot was planned and in large measure carried out by the most active officers in the militant army.

To be sure, the lines between these three armies are not firmly drawn. There were St. Cyr graduates like Challe himself and General Bigot in the April insurrection; there are St. Cyr graduates in the militant army as there are men in high staff and command positions who came out of the *maquis* and for many years led combat men into battle. But to describe how three armies exist in one helps to explain the different kinds of men we are dealing with and suggests the nature of the struggle that goes on within this force where all wear the uniform of a soldier of France.

So much for the forces that divide them. Now for the forces that draw them together. The most powerful among them is the conviction that, regardless of differences of opinion and experience, the unity of the army must be preserved, that whatever the provocation the army must never fire on the army; for only the army stands between France and revolutionary Communism. It is for this reason that during the four-day rebellion only one man was killed, and his death was listed officially as accidental. It is for this reason that those who remained loyal to the state refrained from carrying out orders from Paris which directed every officer, every man, to put down the uprising by force of arms if necessary. It is for this reason that the loyal did not testify against the disloyal. A second force that draws them together is the common conviction that it was the army, the army united, that brought down the Fourth Republic, because it was

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planning to abandon Algeria as it had abandoned Indochina; that it was the army, the whole army, that put de Gaulle into power in the belief that the Fifth Republic would fight on to military victory; finally, that de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic have betrayed the trust the army placed in them. A third cohesive force is the feeling that somehow the army is cut off from de Gaulle and the civilian population in metropolitan France, that metropolitan France let it down in Indochina and is now letting it down in Algeria.

Why this feeling that General de Gaulle is betraying Algeria, betraying the army? It is not entirely because he preaches self-determination, speaks of an Algerian Algeria and negotiates with the F.L.N. There are two additional reasons. One is that de Gaulle revealed his Algerian policy piece by piece over the years. In 1958 he appointed Challe commander-in-chief and for 16 months waged offensive war against the F.L.N. wherever he could find it. In 1959, with the F.L.N. broken and largely concentrated in Tunisia and Morocco, he proposed self-determination. In 1960 he went further to propose an Algerian Algeria, independence for Algeria, an Algerian republic. "My men," says Colonel Guiraud, commander of the 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment who was absent on leave at the time of the uprising, "did not know what they were fighting for any more; they were ready to die but they were torn apart by the thought that they might not be able to honor the oath they took to stay and win."

The second major reason the army thought de Gaulle was betraying it is as follows: One day last March secret orders went out from Paris saying that preparations were to be made for a unilateral cease-fire. It was explained that when negotiations with the F.L.N. opened at Evian, France would urge an end to the fighting by both sides, but that if this were refused, France would stop fighting anyway. At least this is the way the army understood it. General Bigot, air force commander in Algeria, says he asked General Olié, commander-in-chief of the French General Staff, how far de Gaulle intended to go at Evian and that Olié replied he did not know. "I will tell you this, then," he told Olié, "if you think I am going to welcome Ferhat Abbas at one of my airfields, you had better get yourself another man." It was Bigot who sent the plane from Algeria to bring Challe from France.

De Gaulle, of course, did nothing like what the activists feared

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he planned to do; nor can it be demonstrated, after the subsequent talks with the F.L.N. at Lugrin, that he has any intention of settling the Algerian conflict to the complete satisfaction of the F.L.N. or of permitting the destruction of the European population in Algeria and the Moslems who are loyal to France. To begin with, the unilateral cease-fire which went into effect on the eve of the Evian talks did not mean the army was no longer at war. The army still mans the eastern barrage on the Tunisian frontier and the western barrage on the Moroccan border; it retaliates when attacked. The army still hunts down F.L.N. guerrilla forces whenever they strike on Algerian territory. The only thing it does not do is to seek out guerrillas before they strike; otherwise there is no change from the state of affairs that existed before the unilateral cease-fire. In the second place, there is strong reason to believe, despite what army activists may think, that de Gaulle has no idea of turning over Algeria to the F.L.N. He is a shrewd politician who faces an extraordinarily difficult political problem; and he keeps his own counsel. There is, however, a pattern in what he has said and done since he came to power in 1958, obscure though it may have appeared to be at times: a military offensive against the F.L.N. in the first year, followed by hopes for an independent Algeria, mingled with toughness in negotiation at Melun, at Evian and at Lugrin. At no time has he ever exposed every card in his hand; in no single speech, on no one occasion, has he told the whole story. He may have done so in private, for his most intimate associates say that what upset him the most about the April rebellion was that Challe was a participant and that Challe knew, if no one else knew, precisely where de Gaulle was going and how he intended to get there. "Knowing that," one of de Gaulle's closest collaborators says, "how could Challe possibly have believed de Gaulle would betray Algeria, would betray the army?"

What he told Challe we do not know; but what he told the army as a whole, what he told European and Moslem Algerians, we do know; and it was not enough. As a consequence, the gulf between himself and the army widened, as the gulf widened between the army and homeland civilians who had not fought in Algeria, who had taken no oath to remain there, who in fact were quite ready to accept an Algerian Algeria run by the F.L.N. or anyone else. This fear, this gulf, conditioned the army; it led to the April revolt, which the army as a whole could understand even if it

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hesitated to join or thoroughly disapproved. Those who disapproved did so for many reasons: some out of personal loyalty to General de Gaulle, others because they thought it had not been properly planned, a number of them because of objections to the use of the Foreign Legion in what should have been strictly a French affair, and many because they believed the aim was to upset the Fifth Republic, as Paris claimed, rather than just to win in Algeria, as Challe insisted.

III

The short life of the uprising need not convince us that with its collapse the entire cancer has been exposed and subsequently removed. The problem remains of an army that thinks for itself, of an army that is not entirely an instrument of the state, of an army disturbed in mind and body. But we may believe that the problem is recognized on all sides and that slow, painful steps are being taken to solve it.

On the government side, four steps were taken. First, it was recognized that there could be no massive purge without destroying the army, which the state sought to preserve. For this reason there were no death sentences, except those passed in absentia on three retired generals—Salan, Jouhaud and Gardy—and five colonels. These eight men are still in flight and for them the death sentences are more of a warning than anything else; for, when caught, they still have the right to trial. It was also in order to prevent a massive purge that the army, through military courts, was permitted to judge most of the disloyal officers; and the sentences the military courts passed were exceedingly light. So were the sentences of the special high court, except perhaps in the case of Major de Saint-Marc; almost the entire Paris press considered that he should not have received ten years in prison while other officers of similar rank were let off with suspended sentences. A major step taken by the government in its effort to handle the army was the transfer to France of one parachute division and the announcement of plans for the transfer of three more. The thought here was to give the army another mission, to take its mind off Algeria, to remind it of the Berlin crisis and the role it will have to play in anything that may develop in Europe. A third major step was to adopt a tough attitude in negotiation with the F.L.N. at Lugrin. And a fourth, however unintentional it may have been, was de Gaulle's reaction to Tunisia's efforts to

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force France out of Bizerte before it is ready (one is tempted to say *able*) to go. The speed and the massiveness of his response were welcomed by the army, the navy and the air force. A display of weakness might well have led to the military coup d'état or civil war that French observers talk so much about.

And what is the army itself doing to meet its problems? It is difficult to say. It has accepted the limited purge ordered by the government. It has agreed to return four divisions to France. It has obeyed the so-called unilateral cease-fire. Still, a gulf remains between the state and the army, a gulf which perhaps only time can narrow. Decolonization, however necessary and desirable, is a difficult, frustrating, often demoralizing process for an army that is trained for other missions. It is especially frustrating for the French Army in view of the collapse of 1940, the withdrawal from Indochina, and the six-year fight to save for France an Algeria that has been a part of the empire for 130 years—that is to say, since Andrew Jackson was President of the United States. Finally, the April rebellion has left deep scars; and one scar remains from a wound that was scarcely apparent at the time.

It concerns the relationship between the "contingent"—the drafted men doing their years of military service—and the professional army. After the uprising collapsed, it was said, often wrongly, that one reason for failure was the refusal of the "contingent" to rally to Challe's banner against de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic. The "contingent" did not rally, nor was it asked to rally; and the incidents where it played any role whatsoever were few and far between. Nevertheless, since April the "contingent" has acquired a personality, a sense of its individuality; it believes in large measure that the fact it did not rally against de Gaulle means more than it really does. This myth is significant. For even though the "contingent" actually did little in April, its current belief that it did much must stand as a constant warning to the officer corps that another time the drafted men may act as the civilian population at home would want them to act.

Whatever we may say of it, however, this army is not a beaten army. It is in trouble, in serious trouble, but it has some of the finest combat regiments in the world today and it believes in itself. Only time will show what else it believes in.

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TURKEY: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PARTIES

By Nuri Eren

WHEN the Turkish Armed Forces dissolved Parliament and took over the government on May 27, 1960, the Turkish Republic suffered its first violent crisis in its 38 years of existence. Both in Turkey and abroad there was widespread concern that this spelled the end of popular government for a long while to come. Now, after a year and a half of military rule, Turkey is reverting to normal democratic processes. In the interim some attempts were made to perpetuate military government, but overwhelming public resistance nipped them in the bud. In a referendum on July 9 the Turkish people voted themselves a new constitution and on October 29 the Second Republic will be officially baptized. But neither the Turks nor the world should be deluded into complacency. The crisis is not over. True, the first hurdle has been overcome, but the Republic is burdened with many problems and the road ahead is steep and bumpy.

Already there is a serious rift in public opinion. Its significance is deeper than was seen in the referendum of July 9, when out of the 82.9 percent of the electorate which participated 38.3 percent voted against the constitution. That was a sizeable minority. However, the referendum was identified with the interim government and its deflationary policies which had resulted in a grave economic crisis. Unemployment was widespread; 50 percent of the country's industrial capacity was idle. There was a crisis in confidence because of new tax laws, vindictive discrimination against former supporters of the ousted Democrats, the decimation of the élite in the army and bureaucracy, and irresponsible haranguing against conscientious dissidents. Under these circumstances the favorable majority was considerable.

If in 1923 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had offered his constitution for popular approval, it is doubtful that he could have obtained a majority as great. But at that time the country was united behind a definite goal and it had a leader in whom it reposed complete trust. There were few, if any, effective voices among the intelligentsia aiming to divert the people from their set objectives or alter their instinctive response to Ataturk's leadership. Today there is no charted future course, the intelligentsia speaks with many voices, and the people are stirred with contra-

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dictory urges; nor is there any trusted leadership that, like Ataturk's, can lift the vision of the people beyond the circumference of daily politics and imbue them with a sense of national purpose.

The constitution itself, the result of protracted debate among various factions, reflects this confusion. On the one hand it attempts to guarantee political rights to the individual; on the other, it limits his economic opportunities in favor of the state. Is Turkey to be a democracy centered on the individual or a state in which the individual's rights and indeed his existence are submerged in the preponderant collective rights of the community? Will the fruits of enterprise, imagination, drive and capital be available to those who earn and possess them or will they be subject to confiscation by the state for redistribution to those who do not have them? Will social justice mean equality of opportunity or state-imposed social and economic equality—thus stretching political egalitarianism, the essence of Western democracy, into economic egalitarianism, the road to state socialism? Can a wide range of political liberties be preserved under an economic system that accepts an indefinite degree of intervention by the state?

The nature of the political, social and economic questions confronting the Second Republic has been aggravated by the fact that they are incorporated into the constitution. For the most part they are graver than the problems that faced the infant Republic in 1923. If they are to be solved it can be done only by purposeful political leadership in an unconfused intellectual atmosphere. Viewing the Turkish scene one questions whether such leadership exists today, and the deeper one looks the more one feels that, even if it did, it probably could not exert itself as effectively as it did in the past.

II

The political parties themselves reflect the confusion in national purpose. None of them speaks with a clear voice. Their appeals hardly rise above the exigencies of the day or respond to the conscience of the country as a whole. Of the four in the arena, the Republican People's Party is the oldest and most cohesive. The Democrat Party was dissolved following the Coup in May 1960, leaving the Republicans as the best organized and strongest group. The latter had been tested in power as rulers of the country from 1923 to 1950. They initiated the two-party system in Turkey

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and they have the credit for carrying on a valiant struggle against abuses of the democratic system. Under disadvantageous conditions they had pulled 39 percent of the votes in the elections of 1957 as against 42 percent for the incumbent Democrats.

But some of these assets are outweighed by the fact that the party evokes very divisive responses. The Turks are deeply committed to legitimism, more loosely defined as orderly processes of government. Even under the most arbitrary of the Sultans there was an established framework within which the government operated and the common people always knew where they stood. The Republic strengthened this sense of continuity in the establishment. The new generation under Ataturk grew up accepting rule by law as the natural order of things. Even the Menderes Democrats recognized the depth of this feeling, and tried to retain the semblance of constitutionalism while directing their most extreme efforts against democratic processes. For this reason, the Coup, although essentially an attempt to reinstate real legality in government, received only grudging acceptance. The long interim period between the forcible deposition of the Democrats and the new elections reduced even this partial acceptance. The attempts of the ousted Democrats to identify the Republicans with the Coup have therefore fallen on increasingly sympathetic ears, even though the Republicans have been known as legitimists.

In 1950 the Democrats came to power at a time when Turkey was breaking loose from her age-old agricultural stagnation. Road building, irrigation and other social developments were going ahead. Although the exaggerated hopes thus awakened were dashed by rampant inflation, the Democrats remained associated in the public mind with expanding business opportunity. The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, suffered a fate like that of the Republicans in the United States in being associated with economic hardship. Now, when the requirements of the national economy call for the restriction of credit and the stabilization of prices, with a resultant deflation of earnings, people in search of a scapegoat blame the Republicans.

Not only the rural population but also the urban middle class, which supported the Republicans prior to the Coup, is having second thoughts. New income and property taxes introduced by the interim government have had an adverse effect on business. The government also aroused discontent by a law requesting busi-

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nessmen to report their total assets, including household goods and their wives' jewelry. The Republicans were the only political group capable of raising objections, but they kept silent while the crisis deepened. This raised doubts in the business community concerning their economic philosophy. People began to ask if there was to be a revival of the former anti-business policy of the Republican Party. Gradually the fear developed among the middle class that if the Republicans came to power the economic freedom they had enjoyed in the last ten years would be curtailed.

Even so the Republicans stand the best chance in the elections. During their decade in opposition they have not been idle. They have developed alternate policies for the country and are presenting the electorate with an elaborate program. But they continue to burden themselves with the welfarist notions of an étatist economy and will have difficulty in overcoming the psychological reservations which sections of the public entertain concerning them.

Of the three other large parties in the Turkish political arena today the Nation Party is the oldest but appears the least effective. Before the Revolution it was the third largest party and in the election of 1957 polled 8 percent of the votes. After the Democrat Party was dissolved the Nation Party expected to inherit its adherents. It failed to do so, however, and remained confined to a few localities. Since it is regarded as reactionary and anti-secularist, this failure reflects a healthy aspect of the Turkish political scene in that, even though the rural areas may be susceptible to religious demagoguery, no party can become dominant without the support of the secularist and modernist urban middle class. However, in case of a close vote between the major parties, the Nation Party can become nationally significant, for it could swing power one way or the other.

Two new parties have emerged as heirs to the Democrats: the New Turkey Party and the Justice Party. Of these the Justice Party admits its connection more outspokenly. Even its name was taken to imply that justice must be done to the defunct Democrat Party and it promptly won many of that party's adherents. It was the only party that was unwilling to come out in favor of the constitution at the referendum for fear it would imply an indirect condemnation of the Democrats. They have some support among provincial organizations but lack a nationally recognized leadership. They are devoid of serious ideas and princi-

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ples, offering blind opposition to the Republicans and instinctive allegiance to the Democrats.

The right of the Justice Party to pose as inheritor to the Democrats is contested by the New Turkey Party, born at the same time. But unlike the Justice Party, it came into being in response to a need for an intellectual alternative to the Republican Party. Its support is mainly in the cities, among those that condemned the policies of the Menderes régime but remained faithful to the original liberal precepts of his party. It has a good chance of winning over middle-class voters who are having their doubts about the Republicans. In the rural areas it competes with the Justice Party for Democratic votes, but so far the two have avoided open conflict and there are strong pressures for a merger. In any event, coöperation in the election seems sure, for only in that way can they offer any real competition to the Republicans.

The principal weakness of these two parties is in their leadership. The leader of the Justice Party is General Ragip Gumuspala, commander of the Eastern Army under Menderes—in other words, one of the top five military figures in the country. He joined the revolutionaries but was retired from the army shortly after the Coup. He is recognized as well intentioned but has failed to demonstrate any qualities of popular leadership and his many contradictory public statements have not helped to gain him national approval. But even if he had cut a more commanding figure, his past connections with the army would still have counted against him. In their present mood the Turkish people do not look favorably on military figures in civilian affairs. In a merger between the two parties he could well be the first casualty.

As for the New Turkey Party, the impression of divided counsels made by its top executive is not good either. Some of the leaders openly espouse socialistic policies reminiscent of the étatist inclination of the Republicans. Their present chief, Ekrem Alican, was for several months the Finance Minister of the interim government and remains tainted with some of the unpopular acts of that period. Although he is a forceful character, he is not known to the masses and must still establish himself as a national personality. In Turkey, where the father image in politics is of importance, maturity and experience are recognized only after long and arduous years in public life. To become a nationally accepted figure overnight is impossible. In the same party, Fahrettin Kerim Gokay has a better chance of becoming

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a national leader. A professor of neurology, razor-sharp and cocky, he has proven himself a past-master in handling the public. In his long years as governor of Istanbul he won the admiration even of his enemies for keeping out of trouble. He was tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal and acquitted. He is ambitious, and has been shrewd enough never to deny his desire to achieve the presidency. Today the idea does not look impossible. In a contest for power Gokay could very well snatch the leadership, and under him the party would have a better chance for national success than under any other. Even so, his effectiveness in the country as a whole remains to be proven.

The Republican Party, on the other hand, is endowed with a number of leaders tested both in office and in opposition. The Secretary-General, Ismail Rüstü Aksal, served in the 1940s as Finance Minister and won a reputation as a sound administrator. He is able and stolid. He has shown himself a good committee chairman but has failed so far to impress the country as a strong leader.

His predecessor in the office, Kasim Gülek, stands out next to former President Inönü as the most effective public figure in Turkey today. He salvaged the party from the throes of utter defeat in 1950 and by keeping the torch of opposition aflame through many arduous years of groundwork on the provincial and borough level he rebuilt it to its present stature. Able, aggressive, erudite, a graduate of several world-renowned universities, fluent in English, French and German, he is by far the most internationally oriented of the Turkish leaders. But in spite of all his qualities, he suffers from the fact that, like other leaders everywhere, the intelligentsia cannot forgive a member of their group who is on easy terms with the common people.

Ismet Inönü remains the main pillar of the Republican Party. He continues to give it purpose and direction and is, in fact, the only person in the country capable of rallying the nation behind him in a time of crisis. Prime Minister under Ataturk, and his successor as President, white-haired but still vigorous, he personifies the elder statesman and is the perfect father image. But despite these great advantages he will need to make almost superhuman efforts in order to succeed in overcoming the prevalent partisan spirit in the country, eliminate the strong divisive tendencies and infuse the nation as a whole with the common purpose it badly needs.

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III

Such are the parties and their leaders as the Turkish people go to the polls to vote for a new government. With an outstanding leader, a more cohesive organization and an historic inheritance, the Republicans have the edge over the others. But the people do not see the issue as an outright choice between alternatives offered by the various parties but as a conflict between past grudges and present grievances. The Republicans are held responsible for all the sins of the military régime. If they had resisted its unpopular measures they would not have had this burden, but they refrained from doing so in order not to interfere with the transition back to normal. There is no doubt that their moderation was helpful in this respect. And, indeed, a return to normal political conditions, that is, the return of a legally constituted and popularly elected government, is the first prerequisite for Turkey today. The error is in thinking of this as the only necessity. There is a general tendency to consider the crisis as political only. People are led to believe that once a new constitution is enacted every problem will resolve itself smoothly. This, however, is far from the truth. Indeed, the political phase of the crisis is the least grave and already has been resolved by the adoption of a constitution which provides guarantees for political freedom. This was the purpose for which the Coup was undertaken. If there is an issue on which the Turkish people are united, it is the establishment of parliamentary democracy. Turkey's ailments are other and graver.

Like other underdeveloped countries, Turkey finds herself in economic difficulties. She has broken away from static agriculture into expansive industrialization. She has increased the exploitation of her natural resources. Her gross national product has grown from 1.4 billion Turkish Liras in 1950 to 19.6 billion in 1960. However, her population has been increasing at an average annual rate of 2.9 percent and this has lowered the per-capita growth in the gross product to 4.1 percent. Thus, development has scarcely been able to keep pace with the growing needs of the people. In addition to receiving $1.3 billion in foreign economic aid in the last 12 years, Turkey has burdened herself with $1.1 billion of foreign debt. Out of her own resources she can pay for only 80 percent of the imports she needs. On top of this she has contracted to repay the debt at the rate of $100,000,000 a year. To meet the growing needs of her growing population and to keep up

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the minimum 3 percent growth in national income, she must invest annually at the rate of 18 percent of the national income. According to the best estimates only 4 percent of this can come from outside sources. The rest must be saved from domestic consumption and directed into productive investment.

This is not impossible. Already 8 percent of the national income is directed to development. As sturdy a people as the Turks, accustomed to tightening their belts, should be able to squeeze out an additional 6 percent of the national income and direct it into the growth process. But in their present mood are they ready for such a sacrifice? Roused from their old inertia and accustomed for the last ten years to enjoying economic well-being, rich and poor, farmer and urbanite, all clamor for more and more of the amenities of modern life. Inflation and economic and political uncertainty have shaken their faith in the future. They are in a mood to let tomorrow take care of itself.

The task of the intelligentsia and of the political leadership is to tell the people that their economic position is grave. But they, too, have extravagant aspirations out of proportion to the country's economic potential. The new constitution obligates the state to undertake every conceivable social welfare measure. The proportion of national income devoted to social welfare has been boosted to such heights that even a highly developed industrialized country would find difficulty in providing for it.

Now it is not harmful to set high standards when it leads people to make extra efforts to realize them. But this is not the case in Turkey today. Increased production is Turkey's need. But instead of aiming to put the country's energies into a concerted production effort, the nation's leaders have emphasized the concept of social justice at the expense of the entrepreneurial spirit, with the result that accumulated capital is being drained away. As in many underdeveloped countries, this has severely affected economic progress. Turkey already has the base for a takeoff into a modern industrial society. The infrastructure is there—the roads, the ports, the power, even some of the heavy industry. Present, also, are the technical skill and the entrepreneurial experience. All that is needed is a scale of values that recognizes material achievement as a proper goal and will not prohibit the capital and energies of individuals from flowing into industry. Only a few months ago a well-known industrialist put into operation a new plant producing an altogether new product in the

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country. Instead of proudly publicizing the event he tried to keep it unnoticed, for it might arouse envy and invite government interference.

Another factor inhibiting progress is the tendency to accept the idea that the solution of the economic problem is to spread state-financed social benefits. As each section of the public—workers, farmers, civil servants—strives to get a larger share of a pie that remains constant, the struggle between them sharpens. Gradually the cohesion so essential to the success of a national industrial effort is disrupted. The bureaucrat looks upon the businessman as a thief. The farmer considers that the merchant cheats him. The employee thinks his employer profiteers on his toil. Thus an economic problem is subverted into a social ailment.

Economic problems that assume a social character deepen vertically and in the case of Turkey may, if not attended to, impair the basic stability of Turkish society and even affect the nation's political orientation. There are signs that without realizing it Turkey may drift into social strife. First of all, the intelligentsia do not seem to be conscious of the danger, and indeed are themselves guilty of increasing it. Secondly, the pre-election atmosphere lends itself perfectly to tactics of diversion. Under the new constitution, the elections are to be conducted under principles of proportional representation. Since the referendum indicates that none of the parties has a clear mandate, there is a danger that they will try to outstrip each other in promoting welfare measures and raising popular aspirations without regard to financial costs, with the result that well-balanced economic growth will be inhibited.

IV

However, the picture may be brighter than it looks. Beneath the surface healthy forces are operating to put the country onto a balanced course. Thus the discussions in the Constituent Assembly provide a hopeful sign. The constitution as submitted by the University of Istanbul was an extremely socialistic document which went so far as to omit mention of the right to hold property; it referred only to the right to acquire property. The Constituent Assembly altered this and similar shortcomings, thus proving that the central theme of Turkish life—namely, the worth and significance of individual effort in economic growth—was not to be discarded. The Assembly's action also proved that

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the bureaucracy and the universities no longer monopolize Turkish intellectual life, and that the entrepreneurial class in banking and industry was gaining in influence.

Deliberations in the Constituent Assembly also revealed that various political leaders are aware of the real issues. Many of the Republican leaders, who made their living in business during their years in opposition, know at first hand how in an interventionist society the government can use its economic power for partisan political ends. Leaders like Ismet Inönü, Kasim Gülek, Rüstü Aksal and others try to counteract the exaggerated aspirations and social claims encouraged by the lower leadership.

On balance, then, the Second Republic has a fair chance of avoiding destructive actions and achieving a balanced progress. The requirements are that the people shall regain a sense of cohesion and national purpose and that to this end they shall receive proper encouragement from the top.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD POLITICS

By John W. Holmes

ABOUT a decade ago a Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs created a furor on both sides of the border by saying that "the days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbors are, I think, over." Nourished for years, as we all had been, on post-prandial pap about the unfortified frontier and the capacity of North American good will to mellow away all differences, Americans and Canadians were unduly shocked. They disregarded the fact that Mr. Pearson had not said relations were deteriorating; he merely said they had become more complex. They had become more complex because they were no longer a simple matter of line-fence disputes over borders and waterways. We had both ceased isolating ourselves from the troubles of the world and, for that reason, we were likely to have differences on a great many more subjects than in the past. Mr. Pearson aimed to persuade people on both sides of the border to adopt an adult attitude to our relations, to abandon the persistent North American illusion that good will without understanding was adequate and that problems could be smiled away in intercommunity singing, to recognize that any two countries in close proximity were bound to go on having disputes and differences and that the mark of intelligence was not to pretend they did not exist but to approach them tolerantly, judiciously, and unemotionally—and, in a sense, to take them for granted.

The truth of Mr. Pearson's prediction has been demonstrated by the history of the past ten years. The sense of partnership and common purpose between the United States and Canada is, I think, stronger than it ever was. Nevertheless, we argue about a lot more things than we used to because there are many more things to argue about. Our most acute differences are as likely to be about distant places—China, Cuba or Laos—as about tariffs and waterways. There is, in fact, an edge to these arguments about faraway places which make them more of a threat to good relations than are our traditional controversies. Perhaps we have come to take for granted disputes about trade, farm surpluses and drainage canals, recognizing that a state of litigation between neighbors is normal and perpetual. When a question of common

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policies toward the rest of the world is involved, however, the perspective is confused. On the one side there are complaints about "disloyalty" and on the other side grumblings about "arrogance."

This aspect of United States-Canadian relations is so perplexing that a vocal minority in Canada want to rupture the partnership and launch into neutrality. Although the neutralists are primarily moved by an aversion to recent United States foreign policy, the appeal of their formula lies also in that it seems to many Canadians a simple solution to an unbearably complex question. The question is how, as a small power, to be an ally of a much larger power with whose fortunes we are deeply involved but whose policies we cannot control. Faced, as the United States is, with a multitude of international problems of the utmost severity, this problem of a lesser power manipulating its hand alongside a great power may seem trivial. Nevertheless it is crucial for Canadians and important for the United States because Canada is only one among many allies in comparable positions.

In some ways, the policy of a lesser power is more complicated than that of a great power, even though its reverberations are more limited. As members of the United Nations we are obliged to take positions on disputes without restriction. We are involved in the consequences of all international issues from Berlin to Quemoy. We must figure out responsible policies even though they are less decisive. And we have the additional procedural problem of how to raise our voices to some effect. To sit back and let our large friends make all decisions would be tidy but impossible for a spirited people; we have perversely refused to concede that great powers have a monopoly on wisdom. So we must persuade our large friends to listen to us—either in single argument or by combining with other lesser powers in NATO, the Commonwealth or in the United Nations. We can, if necessary, dissent and go our own sour way or we can end up in some kind of association in which our share in the formulation of policy has inevitably been modest and for which our enthusiasm is therefore restrained.

The way in which United States-Canadian relations can be bruised by differences on an international issue has been unpleasantly revealed recently over the question of Cuba. Most Canadians welcomed the Castro revolution but were increasingly dismayed by the course that revolution took. Inevitably, Cana-

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dian feelings have been less strong than those of the United States because we have not been directly attacked by Castro and our economic interests in Cuba have received more reasonable treatment. Furthermore, a small country, somewhat concerned itself with the overweening economic power of the United States, has a certain sympathy with aspects of Castroism. All middle and small countries, I am afraid, have a kind of permanent grudge against large countries, and this conditions even when it does not determine their policies. Canadians, nevertheless, are committed to the defense of democracy and have no desire to abet the introduction of Communism into the Americas.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that countries can be united in a common purpose but differ over tactics. It is, in fact, differences over tactics rather than ultimate ends which have been and will undoubtedly continue to be the cause of dispute between our two countries. When the United States Government decided to impose an embargo on trade with Cuba and break diplomatic relations, the Canadian Government did not follow suit. The reason was not that Canada wanted to give aid and comfort to an enemy of the United States but that we thought an embargo an unwise tactic which would not achieve its object, a view shared by most of the United States' allies. If NATO or any other association in which we participate had agreed to impose an embargo, then we would have been under an obligation to conform, whether we approved or not. There was no such agreement, however; there was merely a unilateral decision of the United States Government.

Unfortunately, this rational position of the Canadian Government, rationally accepted by the authorities in Washington, was distorted by the kind of misunderstandings which inevitably accompany issues in which feelings are deeply involved—uncompromising resentment of Castro on one side and a mettlesome concern for independence on the other. A Cuban trade mission arrived in Canada at an awkward moment, and statements were made by Cubans and Canadians that lent themselves to misinterpretation. Out of them grew an unwarranted story about plans for vastly expanded Cuban-Canadian trade. These were picked up by editors in the United States, and Canada was denounced for exploiting a neighbor's disadvantage and for softness on Communism. These charges were greeted with resentment by Canadians and a field day was had by those who are ever at

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the ready to find evidence of undue American interference in Canadian foreign policy. This controversy did not predispose Canadians to an objective and tolerant view of the more important issues involved in the invasion of Cuba in April or the tactful pressure on Canada by President Kennedy in May to join the Organization of American States. And by raising doubts in American minds about Canadian objectivity over Cuba it has limited the chance for Canada to be of some service in easing Caribbean tension.

This tempest illustrates the dangers which lie in a failure to comprehend the difficulties inherent in our relationship. Because our relationship is so close and because to the superficial eye we are so much alike, the anger aroused when we differ is embittered by a sense of betrayal. The fact that we worship at the same supermarkets leads to unwarranted conclusions about the identity of our political lives. Our social habits are similar, but our histories are different. Because our histories differ, we are bound to differ in our attitudes to other countries and in our approach to international issues. For example, we in Canada solved our relations with Europe and the internal relations between our two communities without a revolution and without a civil war. This fact does not make us more virtuous, but it has had its effect on our political temperament. Variations in our political temperament show up constantly in our approaches to foreign policy. National generalizations are always hazardous, but it is, to some extent at least, true to say that Canadians are, more so than Americans, disposed to compromise, disinclined to see issues in black and white, reluctant and skeptical crusaders, disposed by the lessons of their own history to accept and live with problems and to dissolve them rather than solve them at a stroke. What looks to Canadians like sophisticated diplomacy can seem to Americans like naïveté or lack of moral courage. To us, American policy has often seemed rigid and inflexible, but we for our part must guard against making a fetish of flexibility and compromise. These temperamental differences have been apparent in our approaches to major international issues from Laos to Lebanon, from China to Cuba, and they are likely to continue. They need not prevent us from working together as allies provided we make allowances for these differences in tactic—and provided we avoid irrational rows like that over Cuba.

I do not suggest that the answer is to be found only in greater

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tolerance by Americans of the independence of Canadian foreign policy. It would be better if the understanding of the Canadian position shown by most informed Americans and by officials of the State Department could spread wider. The basic problem, however, rests with Canadians to work out a satisfactory concept of our role in the world.

We are still confused ourselves—inevitably, perhaps, because the problem is difficult. We are too much concerned with world problems to relax into the happy escape of satellitism. We are too deeply engaged in the struggle against totalitarianism to find a way out in neutrality. We have learned from the role we have played in the Suez crisis, in supervising the truces in Indochina and in the settlement of disputes in the United Nations that we have a unique contribution to make to international causes which justifies insistence on maintaining our independence in foreign policy.

What we have to do is find a reasonably consistent philosophy for working in harmony with a neighbor, ally and partner on a basis of mutual independence in which equality is not possible. The heart of the dilemma is that although man for man Canadians and Americans have equal rights to a voice in the world, there is no denying the predominant role of the United States as a country. It is no contribution to reason to make rhetorical statements about our being free and equal partners in the common cause, because we are not. The role of the United States is a decisive role, the role of Canada is supplementary. We have the right to seek to influence American policy and to reject American policy if we do not agree with it. We have to bear in mind, however, that preservation of the military and diplomatic strength of the United States is a Canadian national interest. This can mean that for Canadian nationalist reasons we sometimes support American positions even when we think they are unwise—on China, for example. In this respect, however, we are not unique. Our propinquity does not necessarily make our position different from that of more distant allies of the United States.

In some ways, propinquity has given Canada more freedom of action than other allies because we have been less dependent on American aid. There have been occasions when Canada differed with the United States in the United Nations and elsewhere, although more timorous allies hesitated to do so lest they forfeit United States good will and risk thereby the American commit-

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ment to supply and defend them. (Whether or not this fear was justified, it existed.) Canada was fortunately never obliged to accept economic aid from the United States, and Canadian soil is so important to the defense of the United States that we have not been inclined to worry about its losing interest in our fate. We have, of course, a permanent interest in avoiding foreign policies which would unduly irritate Congress—not because we fear anything so crude as sanctions on their part but because there are many issues which come before them, mainly economic, on which we hope they will take a generous view of the Canadian interest.

II

We shall approach this question more discriminatingly if we think in terms of our each having a unique role in world affairs, one the role of a great power and the other the role of a middle power. We see this question out of focus when we think too much in terms of a bilateral relationship rather than in terms of our being independent actors on a crowded world scene. Although Canadians may be vigilant about the presumptions of great powers, we do not for the most part deny their special rights—even their rights of veto properly exercised. We must always be conscious, furthermore, of the awful responsibilities they bear.

The role of middle powers is less well understood—even by the middle powers themselves. The term "middle power" has come into current use, and it is ill-defined. It is ill-defined because the middle powers are by their diplomacy in process of putting meaning into the term. There is a deliberate ambiguity in the word "middle." At first it was used to describe countries which, by reason of their resources or military power or population, were not to be considered among the great powers but which had positions in the world clearly different from that of the small and powerless. Such middle powers were Sweden, Brazil, India, Australia, Canada. These middle powers often found themselves involved in mediatory exercises, and as a consequence the emphasis has shifted to the other connotation of "middle." The word suggests not only middling in size but also a place in the middle of a conflict between the disputants, an intermediary, one not too closely attached to any bloc, and capable of intercession. As the emphasis in international security action has shifted from military force to diplomacy, the emphasis on physical and human re-

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sources has diminished. Now we find among the most effective middle powers very small countries like Ireland and Tunisia.

Canada is a middle power in both senses. We became so not by deliberate policy but because the circumstances of the international balance of power fashioned the role for us. During the past decade there has been a cold war which was also a nuclear stalemate. Fear among the great powers of each other's capacity to destroy the world (or a large part of it) has provided a rough kind of stability in the world. The great powers have held the ring. Within this ring there have been many quarrels—in Indonesia, Palestine, Kashmir, Indochina, Congo—dangerous disputes which would flare into perilous threats to peace if the great powers became involved. Ironically, this balance of terror has provided an opportunity for diplomacy to work. To settle or at least stabilize these conflicts, there has been a process of almost constant negotiation. Fighting has been stopped, and a kind of rough justice patched up which is not ideal but is better than the arbitrament of nuclear war. The lurking threat of forceful intervention by the great powers has been a powerful element in this diplomacy of adjustment. So also have the principles of the United Nations Charter. These principles are subject to erratic interpretation and their application has been highly political, but nevertheless there has been growing an international conscience which prescribes the bounds within which a settlement must be found. In this diplomacy the middle powers have had an important role to play. The great powers held the ring, but someone had to jump in and act as referee. The great powers, although the pressure they exert in the treatment of disputes is far from negligible, have in recent years been automatically excluded from the role of referee, only lesser powers being considered sufficiently disinterested to act as mediators, truce supervisors or patrollers of the peace.

Let me cite some of the ways in which Canada has been thrust into this role and gained experience in it. It is a role the fundamental nature of which has persisted although governments have changed in Ottawa.

In the late 1940s Canadians found themselves playing a useful role in the center of the Palestine and Indonesian disputes. We had no commitments to the Arabs or Israelis, the Dutch or the Indonesians, and no vested interests in these areas. We had no history in those parts of the world either, and the people had had no

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chance to learn to dislike or fear us. We were, therefore, useful go-betweens. In the Korean War we could not play a mediatory part because we took our place with the United Nations fighting forces. However, when it came to the negotiations for a truce and the disposal of prisoners, and in subsequent issues involving the United States and China, there was a role we could play. Canada did not have diplomatic relations with Peking because the Korean War broke out before our intention to recognize the Peking government had been carried out. We did, however, have very close Commonwealth relations with India, the only non-Communist country able at that time to have any dialogue with the Chinese. Relations between the United States and India were, in the early and mid-fifties, far from cordial. Canada was on occasion able to act as interpreter between Delhi and Washington in order to keep some chain of understanding and communication between Washington and Peking. I do not want to oversimplify or to exaggerate that role because many countries were involved in the frantic diplomacy made necessary by the fact that the two antagonists could not talk to each other. There was, however, at least one occasion on which a message which persuaded the Chinese to be careful passed from Washington to Ottawa to Delhi to Peking—in such a way, of course, that everyone involved in the chain could deny that any such thing was intended. During that period Canadians acquired a reputation for promoting feasible accommodations which strengthened our diplomatic hand and also landed us after 1954 with some arduous international chores.

It may seem to be implied in what I have said about the role of a middle power that we consider ourselves neutral, able to talk to either side in the cold war because we make no choice between them. There is, in fact, a body of opinion in Canada which argues that we should rid ourselves of our NATO and NORAD ties so that we might be more truly neutral to carry on this efficacious kind of diplomacy. It is, however, excessively logical to see things in this way. No country can properly be called neutralist, because although it can be neutral on some issues it cannot be neutral on all. Canada, a member of NATO, has never pretended to be neutral in the main issues with the U.S.S.R. or China. We can, however, be impartial in most of the confused disputes which reach the United Nations and we can refuse to judge them in strictly cold-war terms. Few of the disputes I have mentioned involve a direct conflict of the Communist power against the United States

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and its allies. They are for the most part paradoxical issues rising out of the transition from the old imperial order to the new. What is required is not neutrality so much as objectivity, a willingness to hear both sides and to see the issues in perspective.

If a country is to establish a reputation qualifying it to perform the duties of a middle power it must demonstrate that it is objective enough and strong-minded enough to differ, if necessary, with its great-power allies. Canada has had to make clear, over Indochina and other matters, that it was prepared to disagree with the United States and, over Suez, that it was prepared to disagree with the United Kingdom and France. It has diverged on other issues as well, but it has remained firmly attached to NATO and no one has had sound reason to doubt what side it was on in a showdown.

In 1954 Canada became involved in one of the more arduous aspects of middle-power diplomacy. When the Geneva Conference of that year concluded truce agreements for the states of Indochina it was essential to have commissions to see that the terms were respected. The states chosen to man these teams were India, Poland and Canada—an embryonic and by no means entirely unsuccessful troika. Since that time, Canadian military and diplomatic officers have been on duty in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, and Canada has been directly engaged in the diplomacy of that distant part of the world. As the United States did not sign the Geneva Agreements and, until President Kennedy's recent statement on Laos, had never wholeheartedly accepted the spirit of those agreements, Canada found itself obliged to pursue courses with which the policy of the United States was not in strict harmony. We were both seeking the same end, to keep Indochina tranquil and free, but we were doing so by different methods. The strain on our good relations over Indochina has been kept more on the diplomatic than the public level, which is as it should be. In recent months our attitudes on Indochina have come much closer together and an important cause of difference has been diminished.

The obligations of a middle power extend both to our military and diplomatic activities. Provision of truce or observation forces for Indochina, for Palestine and Lebanon and now the Congo have become a major priority for the Canadian services. In 1956 Canada took the lead in proposing the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force at the time of the Suez crisis,

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a Canadian general was placed in charge of it, and Canada has supplied one of the largest contingents. In this case we had to make clear that we were not acting as agents of the British. As in the case of our differences with the United States over Indochina, we did not consider that we were impairing essential British or Western interests in the Middle East; we were exercising our right, however, to make our own interpretation of how those interests would best be served.

In 1958 we supplied officers for the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, a commitment which also required a certain element of detachment from United States and British thinking about Lebanon at that time. The next request Canada received for a contribution to peace-keeping forces was for the Congo in July 1960. Because of the preference for non-white forces, we might have escaped an invitation altogether. We were asked to contribute only because our kind of assistance was indispensable. Some middle power had to be involved which could supply communications personnel and air force maintenance. Among those middle powers which habitually contribute to these peace-keeping exercises, only a few such as India, Sweden and Canada are normally able to provide the necessary technical base. The selection of middle powers to act in disputes is, of course, on an ad hoc basis. None of us would be accepted as impartial and disinterested in all circumstances.

These mediatory roles are a source of satisfaction to a country like Canada because we feel that we have been performing services to the cause of peace and order for which we are peculiarly fitted. It is a role which great powers cannot play, but which it is in the interest of the great powers that someone should play. There is a danger, of course, that middle powers will drift into attitudes of moral superiority over the great powers. This division of function between great and middle powers is a result of the complex balance of forces in the world. If we deny that greater virtue and wisdom go along with greater power, we might also avoid the sentimental illusion that innocence and high-mindedness are qualities of the weak. Some Canadian orators are in the habit of descanting upon the love felt for Canada by the masses of Asia and Africa because those masses know we have no imperialist designs upon them. It is hardly proof of our higher ethics that a people who have never been able to digest a tenth of the land they own have refrained from coveting territory or resources on far-

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flung continents. These masses accept us as disinterested to a large extent because they never heard of us before. Canadians have acquired a reputation for fair-mindedness which we should preserve because it is our most valuable diplomatic asset. We must, however, preserve it not only by our objectivity in dealing with disputants but also by being fair-minded to the great powers.

There is a constant temptation on a middle power to stand up to a large power not to prove a valid point but to prove its virility. This is not a very profitable game because the posture impresses neither great nor lesser powers. The solid way to establish a sound middle-power position is to contribute sound solutions. Furthermore, if we in Canada want to influence the policy of the United States the least promising way to make that attempt is by public criticism. Fortunately for us, the way is open to intervene at the policy-making stage because of the constant exchange of views and intentions which takes place between our two governments. Allies should always try to sort out their differences by diplomacy in private. A great power is much more likely to alter its policy to accommodate the views of a lesser power if it is not expected to back down, under pressure, from a position it has already made public. Because Canadian views on almost all international subjects are constantly being made known to Washington through diplomatic channels, and vice versa, and because these views are not exchanged in open speeches, the general public is largely unaware that there is any consultation at all. Consequently the Canadian public is inclined to think that its government too docilely does what the United States wants. No one in the State Department, nagged by the Canadian Embassy daily, suffers from that illusion. The shrill complaints heard from Canada about the way in which the United States has dictated Canadian policies on China or Cuba or disarmament are based to some extent on incomplete comprehension of the way in which international relations are conducted.

Canadians and Americans might avoid misunderstanding and recrimination if we would recognize that we are partners in a common cause but we are not twin brothers. Because of the differences in our size, our roles in the world are likewise different. They are not, however, inimical; they are complementary. If it were not for the strength with forbearance of the greater powers —some of them at least—we middle powers would have no room for manœuvre. On the other hand, if it were not for the middle

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powers, international diplomacy would be unbearably inflexible, and the brush fires which could have ignited forests would probably never have been extinguished. Canadians must not think of themselves as more peace-loving than Americans because they wield no wicked rockets but keep the peace in far-off places without artillery. On the other hand, Americans must not think of Canadians as slack in the faith or muddled neutralists because they often serve best by negotiating both with saints and sinners. We each have useful roles to play, and diversity can be as important as unity for good diplomacy.

III

There is perhaps too much indiscriminate praise of unity by writers, speakers and, above all, the drafters of communiqués. We ought not, of course, to allow our antagonists deliberately to split us in order that they can thereby accomplish some specific economic or military end. To imply, however, that the way to do the Communists in is for all the so-called "free nations" to band together in enforced agreement on all issues displays ignorance of the nature of the international game. The Communists have not gained anything in particular because the British had observers in Peking when the United States had not. It has always seemed to me (as one who was present throughout the Geneva Conference of 1954) that the Western powers were able to strike a remarkably good bargain over Indochina, considering that the Communists had been winning the war hands down, and that this was achieved to some extent because the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom were miles apart. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that one of the reasons the Communists backed down was that they were worried by the threats of American intervention. However, American intervention with nuclear weapons would by itself have had disastrous consequences. Fortunately, Sir Anthony Eden was at Geneva prepared to talk with Chou En-lai. The result was that the Communists were induced to arrest their conquest, and two-thirds of Indochina was given a chance to be spared from Communism. Canada, likewise, had a role to play in this settlement which it could not have performed if it had been closely identified with the policies of either the United States or France.

The kind of unity which is forced beyond a steadfast acceptance of a common purpose and essential military collaboration to

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imposed uniformity of tactics is not even desirable in principle. It is the variations in the attitudes of Western countries on China or Angola or Laos which have saved us from isolation as a minority bloc in the United Nations. Such diversity on issues in which diversity is advisable does not prevent us from being firmly united on issues such as the right of access to Berlin where a common stand may be essential. If we in NATO would recognize that "NATO unity" applies to fundamental purposes and must be limited in its application, we would avoid much of the bitterness and frustration which paralyze our will. We long ago gave up chasing after the phantom of a unified policy in the Commonwealth and concentrated on seeking to understand and make allowances for each others' policies instead. The Commonwealth, although it has had its own kind of troubles, has been healthier for this realism. The consequence in NATO of the fixation about unity has been a neurosis of failure instead of the confidence which should have been inspired by quite reasonable success. If we would talk less about unity and more about understanding, we would show more sense and maturity.

It is by no means Americans only, but all of us—the European members of NATO in particular—who have come to exalt unity as an end in itself—like love and charity. Unity is, of course, not a state to be deliberately avoided—although one shudders to think of the consequences if NATO had been unified in support of some of the actions of its members in the past decade. It is an end to be pursued rather with discrimination, both as to the object and the company. Diversity, however, is one of those particular values of Western civilization we seek to preserve against totalitarian unity. Diversity can also be a good principle of diplomacy —pursued also with discrimination, of course. It is particularly applicable in the relations between large and small powers like the United States and Canada. We in the West can have very good teams provided we don't expect all our players to be up on the forward line shooting on goal from the same angle.

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HOW DEEP THE SPLIT IN WEST AFRICA?

By David Williams

THE recent division of West Africa into what often appear to be two quite unreconcilable groups of independent states has seemed to justify the worst fears of those who have held that personal rivalries and cold-war issues would destroy African hopes for unity of outlook and action. Today the "Casablanca" group, with Ghana and Guinea among its most active members, and the larger, looser association of "Monrovia" countries, with Nigeria in the lead, do indeed appear to be at odds. Yet curiously, on some of the most important issues, their viewpoint is very much the same. For example, almost on the same day, in July, experts of the Casablanca group, meeting in Conakry, and experts of the Monrovia group, meeting in nearby Dakar, announced plans for economic coöperation which were startlingly similar.

The Conakry meeting recommended ending customs barriers between the Casablanca countries over a five-year period beginning January 1, 1962, and ending quota systems and preferential treatment on the same date. It also proposed creation of a Council of African Economic Unity (C.U.E.A.) and an African Economic Development Bank. These will be further discussed at Tangier in November, and formation of a joint air and shipping line will be taken up at a later conference.

The meeting at Dakar was called to examine in detail the list of subjects agreed on at Monrovia in May. The discussions were so detailed that they even included the possibility of a common form of driving test. An African development bank was considered, with the objective, among others, of encouraging foreign investors. In the end the conferees did not go as far as the Casablanca group had done at Conakry: it recommended promotion of trade between African countries by regional customs unions and the progressive establishment of common external tariffs, harmonization of development policies, including investment codes and conventions, an investment and guarantee fund, exchange of economic information, and harmonization of economic research. It is apparently intended that coöperation should even go as far as to include common policies on prices paid to farmers for export crops—a measure designed to discourage smuggling.

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The Casablanca countries now include Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Mali, the U.A.R. and the Algerian provisional government; Libya was present at the meeting last January which gave the group its name but appears to have dropped out, and instead met with the Monrovia governments represented at Dakar. The Monrovia group of states, of which Nigeria is the most important, include all other independent African states except the Sudan and the former Belgian Congo; Ethiopia, strongly represented at the Monrovia meeting last May, sent nobody to Dakar.

The Dakar conference's recommendations cover the whole field of coöperation: a network of roads, a joint shipping company, amalgamation of existing airways, joint educational schemes and institutions, standardization of medical practices, definition of minimum qualifications, and the establishment of veterinary training institutions. Even when the Casablanca states have not made identical recommendations, there is nothing they need reject. Virtually all independent Africa is, therefore, committed to detailed schemes of coöperation.

Why, then, if the thinking of these countries is so similar in the important economic field, are there two groups? They even make the same assumptions about the possibility of increasing intra-African trade, though that now represents only some 1 percent of the external trade of African countries.

There is, it is true, a theoretical difference of approach. To the Casablanca states, and particularly to Ghana, Guinea and Mali, political coöperation is the important thing; the rest, they think, will follow. The Monrovia states consider that coöperation in practical matters comes first; political unity should follow, but may never reach the point of integration. But is there any reason why this difference of approach should preclude coöperation, say, in improving telecommunications?

In any case, relations between individual states in the two groups are often close and cordial. M. Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast, will visit Mali and Guinea in November, and the President of the Ivory Coast National Assembly has declared that there are no political differences between Mali and his country. Nigeria and Ghana speak with a common voice on more things than is generally realized. Almost immediately after the Monrovia conference, where the Voltaic Republic was strongly represented, President Yameogo was entertained in Accra by Dr. Nkrumah, and as a result of their discussions during

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an exchange of visits, the frontier between their countries was ceremoniously demolished by the two leaders, who declared that henceforth movement between them would be entirely free.

Yet the division in West Africa cannot be overlooked. On occasion, bitter words have been exchanged. Is this, however, a fundamental split, which will govern in future the relations among the 27 independent African states, and their relations with the world?

II

To understand the present position it is necessary to go back to the independence of Ghana in 1957. The excitement with which that event was greeted all over the world is difficult to remember now. We know today that it was only the beginning of a movement toward independence throughout the continent, but it did not really seem so then. Independence was scarcely discussed in French Africa; the date of Nigerian independence was not fixed; Sierra Leone's independence seemed very far away; for Tanganyika and Kenya it seemed even further. When Ghana became independent, she seemed to be not only a pioneer but, to a large extent, to be isolated in her independence. This has had a very important effect on Dr. Nkrumah and his colleagues. Dr. Nkrumah has always been a Pan-Africanist, but the fact that Ghana became independent at a time when independence was exceptional in Africa meant that he always attached very great importance to independence for other countries. If Ghana had become independent only recently, after most Africans were already self-governing, independence for other countries would not have become such an important issue in the thinking of Ghana's leaders. But as it is, some of them find it difficult to appreciate fully that independence is not any longer an issue over the greater part of the continent.

If one looks at the Ghana White Paper on the Republican constitution, it can be seen that in the government's view there no longer exist, for practical purposes, any internal politics; the job is to get on with modernizing the country and with preparing it to play its proper role in international affairs. The energies of politicians are released for external affairs. The constitution even allows Ghana to surrender sovereignty to a union of African states and territories—a provision that is probably unique. It also allows peoples outside Ghana to join Ghana "in an integrated state."

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The constitution, in short, makes it plain that the Ghana Government's political interest is now largely in external affairs, and this produces a much more militant approach than that of a country, like Nigeria, later come to independence and still largely occupied with internal affairs, or the Ivory Coast, which became independent not as the result of a popular campaign but through almost personal negotiations between its leaders and President de Gaulle.

From a very early stage, Dr. Nkrumah, a Secretary of the Manchester Pan-African Congress of 1946, has sought to further the organization of a united Africa. The first conference of independent African states was held in Accra in April 1958, to be followed by the first All-African People's Conference—a gathering of political parties—in the same capital later in the year. Both conferences were successful from Dr. Nkrumah's point of view, as they brought to Accra a more representative African gathering than any seen before. There were, nevertheless, signs of what is, in the last analysis, the real obstacle to West African unity—an obstacle which the fluid and to some extent arbitrary groupings of Casablanca and Monrovia partly conceal. That obstacle is simply the British and French heritages that divide the West African countries. Without this, the natural and inevitable personal and political incompatibilities which develop between rulers of new states could not have the same adverse effect on the growth of African unity.

There is a rather sad example of the significance of this division. Last February a plebiscite was conducted to decide the future of the British Cameroons. In remoter parts of the Northern Cameroons it was extremely difficult to explain to people what the plebiscite was about, and some political parties, having failed, decided that all that the voters could be asked was: "Faranza or Ingresa?"—that is, "Do you want to join France or England?" To these people the newly independent countries of Cameroun or Nigeria meant little; British and French rule, however, they knew.

Dr. Nkrumah fully recognizes, and is naturally resentful of, this division. He has protested on more than one occasion against the attempt to describe Africa in terms of French-speaking and English-speaking. That is one reason why to him the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union—whatever its practical content—and his agreement with the Voltaic Republic seem so important. They

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represent a break-through into former French Africa, showing that the linguistic and cultural division can be overcome.

But are Mali and Guinea merely the exceptions that prove the rule? There are 12 other countries of the former French West and Equatorial African Empire, and small and poor though they are, from Dr. Nkrumah's point of view they represent a formidable obstacle to Pan-Africanism—not because they are in theory opposed to Pan-Africa but because their links with France remain so strong.

III

It must be emphasized that it is not the internal political systems of the new French-speaking states which define their relations with Ghana or any other African territory. They present no uniform pattern, democratic or non-democratic. The Ivory Coast, for example, is really a one-party state; in the Niger Republic, also, one party holds all the seats in the legislature; Senegal, which is pervaded by a highly democratic spirit and where politics are very sophisticated, still has virtually a one-party legislature. But Togo, although its President, M. Olympio, is a towering figure in such a small country, has three parties represented in its legislature. The Cameroun Republic, where for years there has persisted an armed uprising of a very bitter and bloody kind, still manages to avoid single-party government. In Dahomey, parties have tottered in and out of government almost at the speed they used to in France.

Thus it is their relationships with France and not their internal régimes which differentiate these countries from the other independent African nations. Nobody would now confidently define the French Community, except, perhaps, in terms of its link to the person of President de Gaulle, a man of immense prestige in much of Africa south of the Sahara. The Community is, in theory, as voluntary an association as the Commonwealth; but no more than the Commonwealth does it exist in the shape of institutions. In recent years so many types of association between French Africa and France have been worked out, tried, abandoned, improved and altered that it is impossible to list them. But all the time these have represented relationships between the African leaders and de Gaulle. Yet the more permanent links—and these are stronger than those between Commonwealth countries and the United Kingdom—have been unaffected, or in some cases

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have been strengthened, by the disappearance of some of the formal institutional links.

The first link is obviously the cultural one, and there is something of a mystery here. Highly educated French-speaking Africans are much more like Frenchmen than highly educated English-speaking Africans are like Englishmen. For example, if you are in a bar in Dakar and people are speaking French behind you, you do not know whether they are Frenchmen or Africans; with very rare exceptions, this is not the case when Africans are speaking English. The cultured French African is typified by the President of Senegal, M. Léopold Senghor. But it is he who invented the concept of *négritude* and the African mystique that goes with it. Yet at the same time he found it entirely consistent to be the leading champion of close cultural association—and even political links—between Africa and France. The cultural links between French-speaking Africans and France seem to be stronger than those between English-speaking Africans and Britain. *Négritude* seems to have far less *political* content for men like M. Senghor than "the African personality" has for Dr. Nkrumah and those in Nigeria who extol this concept.

A more tangible link is the substantial aid France gives to these territories—on a scale far beyond anything the British have dreamed of giving to their former colonies. This French aid still continues and applies even to offsetting recurrent budget deficits —an idea repellent to the United Kingdom Treasury.

Another concrete link is trade. It has always been French custom to bind colonies to the metropole very closely in trade, far more closely than the British have done. In some cases it has been really impracticable to disentangle trade from the existing colonial network when the country becomes independent. In Senegal particularly, the French have for so long subsidized the price of peanuts, while in return receiving preferential treatment for consumer goods, that, independence or no independence, disengagement of the economy of Senegal from that of France seems almost impossible. And while one talks rightly of the importance of the European Common Market to the French African territories associated with it, what matters to them more than preferential treatment in European markets or the development aid received from the Rome Treaty countries is French bulk buying and long-term contracts for their produce. A recent example of such a contract was the one with Mali for peanuts, signed even

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after Mali had given every indication of breaking away from the Community. Here again, in spite of "Commonwealth preferences," the link is much stronger than that between Britain and her former possessions.

Defense in the former French territories is a subject on which it is difficult to get concrete information. But whereas the independence of Ghana or Nigeria did not really create any security problem, because in each case there already existed a local military headquarters and a local army, this situation had no parallel in French Africa; there was only the French Army, and though its racial components might have been similar to those in the British territories, it nevertheless was *French.* Independence came so quickly to the French territories that some have still not created their own local forces. To a large extent, therefore, former French territories depend at the least on French organization for their security arrangements. This is a subject of complaint by Dr. Nkrumah and others, who use it to call in question the reality of their independence.

If links with France are so strong, why, one asks, should Guinea have broken away so completely? But did Guinea mean to break away just as it did? Was it not rather the French who broke away? General de Gaulle's West African record has otherwise been so remarkable as largely to offset the misgivings of French-speaking Africa about his policies elsewhere. But it is difficult to believe that when, in 1958, he gave these territories the opportunity of saying whether or not they wished to belong to the Community, he meant the offer to be taken literally. The only one of them which did take it seriously was Guinea; it voted against the Community, not because any real decision had been reached by the people to that effect but because M. Sékou Touré, so powerfully in command even before independence, wanted them to. Actually it was the French who then broke the links with Guinea. Among other things, all the French officers both of the army and the police disappeared, and President Sékou Touré had to recall from Algeria the senior Guinean officer, then a captain, to become chief of staff. The Guinea Government had no doubt been under the impression that links with France would continue, with the difference that it would not be tied to French international policies. Although Guinea felt herself driven to make arrangements with Eastern Europe, the only newspapers you could buy in Guinea long after independence were from Paris.

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The really extraordinary phenomenon to be noted about the independence of the ex-French colonies—and this includes Guinea and Mali, which since its separation from Senegal has given some indications of breaking away from the French connection—is that it was achieved without any campaign of the kind we had seen in Ghana. For them, independence has never been a popular political issue so much as a matter for negotiation between African and French leaders. In Ghana there was nationalism without a nation; in the ex-French territories they have to build nations without nationalism. For example, President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast has in his time supported almost every kind of association or non-association with France, but this has had no effect on his internal political position. In the ex-French territories, it seems, politics have been personal to a much greater degree than in ex-British territories, where personalities certainly played an important part but always with regard for the popular desire for increased self-government and, ultimately, independence.

There is nothing more exciting than a political "meeting" (the word they use) in Senegal, with Wollof women singing and dancing and the crowds stretching as far as the eye can see. But the issue at such meetings has seldom been freedom or independence; it has been a local or a personal issue, perhaps the price of peanuts. It is dangerous to generalize, especially when one is talking about so many countries and peoples, but broadly speaking the issue of independence in the French-speaking countries has never produced a campaign. The independence of the original Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan was casually announced by General de Gaulle at Saint-Louis, in Senegal, as a result, it seems, of a dinner-party conversation with Mali leaders. It was the first that officials in Paris heard of the project, and did not really seem of first importance either to de Gaulle or to the Mali leaders. Would not things go on much as before?

It is still uncertain whether, when the present generation of leaders disappears, these French-speaking countries will have the necessary national identity to keep social discipline or even to maintain their independence. The very fact that they attained independence without a struggle arouses skepticism in the leaders of Ghana—and in the minds of more Nigerians than is generally realized.

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IV

At the time of the Casablanca meeting, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia were outside any "grouping." Why did these countries join the states closely linked with France (often called the Brazzaville group) in the Monrovia meeting rather than see in the Casablanca group the basis of African unity?

It is tempting to explain this in terms of the rivalry between Ghana and Nigeria. But did Nigeria decline to seek membership in the Casablanca group because of Ghana's prominent position in it? Or was it because her cautious but determined leader, Sir Abubakar Balewa, found the policies of the Casablanca powers on the Congo, for example, too thoroughly "committed" for his taste? Dr. Nkrumah declined to go to the Monrovia conference and seems to have persuaded Guinea and Mali to decline also, even though they had been among its original sponsors. Was this because he disliked something in which Nigeria was taking the lead? Or was it because he believed that the conference had had insufficient preparation, would be attended largely by leaders of the second rank and should, in any case, wait until meetings arranged to work out decisions of the Casablanca conference had made their recommendations?

Certainly, though the meeting took place in Liberia and President Tubman devoted himself wholeheartedly to making it a success, it was Nigeria that was mainly responsible for its being held. There is no doubt that Sir Abubakar expected the Casablanca powers to attend; nor did he regard their leaders with hostility; nor would he have expected them to embrace the majority of the ex-French West African states. The independent states which previously belonged neither to the Casablanca powers nor the Brazzaville group (which now included Sierra Leone) did not accept the invitation of Sir Abubakar and President Tubman because they were anxious to join an "anti-Casablanca" group. Indeed, it probably was not until a short time before the Monrovia conference actually opened that most of the participants realized that the Casablanca countries (and the Sudan, which did not attend because of Mauritania's presence) would not be there. There was no question, therefore, of a new grouping being consciously established at Monrovia to oppose the one formed at Casablanca. And since then Dr. Nkrumah's new relationships with the Voltaic Republic and Dahomey, and the new

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position of Tunisia in relation to France, have softened the apparent rigidity of the division.

While there is considerable difference of approach between the leaders of Nigeria and Ghana on matters such as French policy in Algeria and British membership in the European Common Market, they, along with Sierra Leone, are much closer to each other than Nigeria is to most of her associates in the Monrovia group. Both Ghana and Nigeria maintain close links with Israel, too, in spite of what some of Dr. Nkrumah's Casablanca partners may think of this association. Both Dr. Nkrumah and Sir Abubakar really believe, too, in the value of the Commonwealth relationship, particularly now that South Africa has been expelled, largely through their efforts.

But if we say that there is nothing necessarily permanent in the Casablanca-Monrovia division, do we mean that all independent African states—even those of West Africa—can easily join a single association? Politics apart, simple difficulties of administration and organization will probably make that impossible for a long time. The Casablanca group can be militant in its declarations and policies partly because its numbers are limited. The Monrovia conference produced a number of valuable resolutions, but only at the expense of evading various divisive issues. Nor does there seem to be any immediate hope of overcoming the main division in West Africa, that between the former French and former British territories—this despite whatever success the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union may attain. It is possible to envisage very close relations and common policies on a wide range of matters between Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; but on many of the most urgent external problems facing Africa, it is much more difficult to see a common policy between Dr. Nkrumah and the leaders of those African states which remain closely linked with France. Whatever pressure these may bring to bear on Paris in private, they will not lend themselves to public condemnation of French policies in other parts of Africa.

These are still the very early days of African independence. For the leaders of the new countries, independent responsibility in foreign relations is entirely new. To see in the groupings which have so far arisen among them anything resembling the world division between "East" and "West," or the beginning of a new "scramble for Africa," is to pin old and already shabby labels onto a new continent.

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FAILURE IN KOREA

By Edward W. Wagner

IN South Korea today, 16 years after the United States set out to help instill the art of democratic self-government among its people, we find ourselves in partnership with an openly authoritarian régime. Eight years after the conclusion of a costly and bitter struggle to preserve the infant Republic of Korea against Communist assault from the north the United States faces the possibility that Communism may present the impoverished and police-ridden people of the south with an increasingly attractive alternative. The South Korean military, so carefully nurtured as Asia's finest free-world force, has defied its mentors and destroyed the country's free institutions. Four billion dollars in economic aid has largely healed the wounds of the Korean War and revitalized various industrial, mining and other operations, but it has failed to lift the South Korean economy above bare subsistence levels, has failed even to prevent actual starvation conditions in the countryside. Meanwhile, almost unnoticed, there has been a disturbingly large movement of free people, the Koreans living in Japan, to behind the Iron Curtain.

Until two years ago the magnitude of our failure in Korea was hidden from an indifferent American public by the bland reassurances of U.S. officialdom, by a claque of apologists for the Rhee régime and by the failure of the American press to report fully and frankly on the situation. Since the downfall of the Rhee Government, the recent military coup and the voluntary movement of 70,000 Korean residents of Japan to North Korea, the bleak features of the situation have been writ large for all the world to see. Yet even now, few talk openly in terms of a U.S. failure and fewer still seek to examine its causes.

The facts of the recent crises in Korea have been duly noted in the press, but an assessment of the underlying causes has neither been demanded nor given. When Syngman Rhee was toppled by a wave of popular unrest, culminating many lost years of suffering under a régime of mounting tyranny and futility, the closest thing to a public accounting was President Eisenhower's pronouncement that Rhee was "a great man, a tremendous patriot, and the father of his country. But as Mr. Rhee has grown older, some mistakes have been made." The military coup of May 16

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was a nasty shock and a major embarrassment to the United States, yet the State Department has contented itself with mild reproofs more than balanced off by expressions of faith in Korea's future destiny and in those who guide it. Nor has the Congress demanded to know what went wrong in Korea.

What did go wrong? Why such bitter fruit from 16 years of massive presence in South Korea, a more intimate and costly involvement than the United States has had anywhere since World War II?

A look at our record in South Korea suggests a number of factors underlying the failure there. For one, the United States has followed a policy of drift, shirking the responsibilities thrust upon it first as an occupying power and then as the mainstay of the young Republic of Korea. A case in point is the U.S. Military Government's long delay in enacting vitally needed land reform, on the misguided ground that no solution to the land problem should be imposed on Koreans from without. Another is the failure to have insisted on the thorough reform of the Syngman Rhee régime or to have found a way to bring it to an early end. We had the power to do so, and this was also our obligation, in keeping with our stated objectives in Korea. The argument is made that this would have been "interference" in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. But was not continued economic and military support of the Rhee Government interference? And would it have been worse to be accused of interference years ago than to be faced now with a still more undemocratic régime and a still more desperate economic situation?

Secondly, the twin watchwords of internal stability and militant anti-Communism have blinded us to the overriding necessity of fostering a social order that will repel out of its own strength the Communist effort to subvert it. The political figures endorsed or tolerated by U.S. authorities in Korea have been those whose anti-Communist protestations were the loudest. It seems not to have mattered that in almost every case these men are political anachronisms, less concerned with changing traditional Korean society than in becoming its new élite. The uprisings in Taegu in 1946 and on Cheju in 1948 should have warned us of the need to redress legitimate popular grievances; instead, they were crushed with savage police brutality. The strong national police force built by the U.S. Military Government in the interest of combating Communist subversion (and with a Korean compo-

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nent of the hated Japanese gendarmerie as its nucleus) became the prime reliance of the Rhee régime. Today the Korean military junta employs a still more untrammeled police power to enforce its decrees dissolving all political parties, labor unions and social organizations and permitting the exercise of constitutional rights only "to such extent as is not inconsistent with the fulfillment of the tasks of the [May 16] Revolution."

Finally, the United States has not taken an intelligent approach to the basic problem of seeking an understanding of the land and its people. Seldom, surely, has such a massive presence of one nation in another been accompanied by such massive ignorance. One might excuse the unpreparedness of the United States in 1945, in spite of the fact that we had committed ourselves to a "free and independent" Korea and talked of a lengthy period of trusteeship which would precede Korean independence. In view of the multitude of other American responsibilities it is perhaps understandable that no plans were drawn up nor personnel trained for the occupation of Korea. But though it may be surprising that we had no Korea "experts" in 1945, it is incredible that today, after 16 years of Military Government, the Korean War and large-scale economic and military aid programs, we still have no experts on Korea, not even language experts. No one in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul rates higher than two on the State Department's language proficiency scale of five. Nor, indeed, are such talents to be found outside the government. There is probably not a single American of non-Korean extraction who can speak and read Korean really fluently. Studies of contemporary Korea almost never appear in our academic or intellectual journals, for no one has made this his field of inquiry; and the only history of Korea written by an American in the twentieth century is dated 1907.

II

Regrettably, the present prospect in Korea is no less bleak than the record of the past. The economic problem is the most glaring. South Korea is now the world's fourth most densely populated nation. Nearly 75 percent of the population of 25,000,000 derives its livelihood from the land, only about one-fifth of which is cultivable. The average farm household, which consists of over six members, works just two acres of land; and 40 percent of farm families must subsist on one acre or less. The standard

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remedy of land reform has already been applied, but no form of reallocation of the country's land resources can sufficiently ease the plight of the farmer. Nor are the majority of the urban dwellers any better off. Unemployment is estimated at as high as 25 percent of the labor force. Gross national product in 1960 was less than $2 billion and per capita income well under $100. Electric generating capacity is only one-sixth that of, for example, Mexico and annual output is less than 70 kilowatt hours per capita. The only other source of energy is coal, there being no oil or natural gas. Mineral resources are deficient in several other vital categories. As much as three-fourths of the forest area is either denuded or covered with scrub growth. Exports have averaged a scant $20,000,000 annually as opposed to a volume of imports (exclusive of military items) amounting to $200,000,000 per year. Thus it can easily be seen that there is no possibility of an economic miracle being wrought in South Korea. Judging from the record to date, it will be miracle enough if the economy can be made to grow even a little faster than the burgeoning population.

All this is not to imply that the U.S. economic aid program in South Korea has been a dismal failure; indeed, it has a number of very real achievements to its credit. As already noted, the wounds of the Korean War have largely been healed. Much new plant has been built with American aid and this has helped to overcome the consequences of the division of the country and the severance of the ties that bound the Korean economy to that of Japan. South Korea has begun to produce a number of vital items that hitherto have had to be imported. A start has been made in many other sectors—in modernizing and expanding transportation and communications facilities, in building a modern fishing fleet, in reforestation, in improving agricultural technology, in revitalizing the textile industry, in rationalizing mining operations, in elaborating modern banking and credit systems. Meanwhile, the inflationary spiral has been kept reasonably well in check.

At the same time, it is acknowledged by all that American aid operations in Korea have been marred by faulty planning and waste. Evidence of this is to be seen in the failure to develop an adequate supply of electric power and in the fact that the country is unable either to consume or to export at competitive prices the output of a number of the factories financed with American funds.

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The reasons for these shortcomings must be assessed by experts. And indeed there are indications that the present Administration is revamping foreign aid operations and that this is already having an effect in Seoul. The layman can only urge that the reappraisal of the aid program there be thorough. Greater expertise in the area is badly needed and must be developed.

The most disappointing aspect of the aid program in South Korea is that it has not yet produced a rate of growth adequate to sustain a gradually rising standard of living and that the gains which it has made possible have brought no benefit to the great majority of the South Korean people. In these respects the economic performance in South Korea suffers in comparison with what has happened in North Korea. As will be mentioned in a moment, the conditions for economic growth are more favorable in the north than in the south. This being granted, the fact remains that the Communists' reconstruction effort since the end of the Korean War has met with remarkable success. True, the North Korean authorities publish economic information in a form calculated to impress; but confirmatory evidence from other sources lends credibility to many North Korean claims. In some key areas, such as output of electric power, North Korea has approached the per capita levels of Italy or Japan. Production in all sectors of the economy has surpassed previous totals, in most cases by wide margins, and an unusually rapid pace of economic growth has been attained. The fruits of this advance have been utilized to give the 10,000,000 inhabitants of North Korea a higher standard of living than they have ever known. And as these people have never lived under free institutions as we know them, the harsh features of Communist rule must seem less crucial to them than their material progress.

It is this appeal of a better material life that has led Koreans in Japan to choose to go to North Korea. To be sure, there are special circumstances surrounding this movement. Koreans have had only a minority position in Japan, and this has meant a marginal existence for most of them; they also have had a position there of social inferiority and have been excluded from the rights of Japanese citizenship. Accordingly, Koreans in Japan have been peculiarly susceptible to manipulation by the Communist activists among them, and the task of these has been simplified by the poor advertisement for itself offered by South Korea. Yet all but a fraction of those accepting repatriation to the north originated

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in the south. The choice they have made, therefore, in a very real sense reflects their judgment as to which half of the divided peninsula offers the better hope for the future.

In one vital respect, of course, the North Korean economic achievement has nothing to do with Communism. In the old united Korea the industrial base was mainly in the north. This, together with related factors of population and resources, has favored rapid economic development in North Korea, while the South started with an initial handicap. Nevertheless, the skill and purposefulness of Communist leadership has counted heavily also, as has the sense of individual sharing in a great national undertaking which seems to have been given the North Korean laborer and farmer. The economic effort in South Korea has, in contrast, lacked just these indispensable ingredients. Whatever improvements may be made in the U.S. economic aid program, they will not of themselves lead to sustained economic growth and a wider diffusion of its benefits. These results cannot be expected so long as political power rests in the hands of a leadership that is unwilling or unable to bring the South Korean populace as a whole into full participation in the political, economic and cultural life of their nation.

III

The record of the first months of military rule offers little hope that here at last is the kind of leadership South Korea has been crying for. Technically, the democratic constitution of the Republic of Korea has not been suspended, but in effect it has been abrogated. All executive, legislative and judicial powers are lodged in General Pak Chung-hi's Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Not only the National Assembly but all deliberative bodies, down to the village level, have been disbanded and all elected officials discharged. All manner of association and discussion has either been banned or is carried on under the threat of arbitrary police suppression. Though the initial wave of wholesale arrests has subsided, the public is pointedly reminded of the dangers of dissent by a decree empowering the Supreme Council to "enact special laws in order to punish those who, prior to or after the May 16 Military Revolution, have perpetrated any anti-state or anti-national improper acts or counter-revolutionary activities."

The startling thing about these actions of the military junta

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is not just their extreme character but the speed with which they were put into effect. The political apparatus through which Syngman Rhee governed South Korea for 12 years and his successors for one year more was evidently so shallowly rooted that it could be almost casually destroyed overnight. Outside the military itself there were no influential leaders to woo, no social forces to placate, no economic interests to coddle, no political rivals to fear. The very speed with which the military junta moved reveals the ideological sterility of their May 16 coup. For their harsh measures were neither essential to the seizure of power nor necessary for the achievement of its professed aims of rooting out corruption, improving living conditions and strengthening the country's anti-Communist posture. They gained good will initially by a series of salutary moves to promote public order and morality; but this was quickly dissipated. Korean intellectuals are increasingly restive under the continued repression. The business community has been cowed into a state of anxious inactivity. The economic downtrend continues. Public morale is at a low ebb. Meanwhile, it is safe to assume that other factional groupings among Korean military men are watching in the wings for General Pak to falter.

Viewed in historical perspective, the so-called Military Revolution of May 16, like the upheaval of April 1960, represents little more than a shift of political power from one segment of the traditional ruling élite to another. Generals Chang and Pak are products of essentially the same social mold in which were cast John M. Chang and Syngman Rhee, and there is scant basis for supposing that they are capable of guiding South Korea through the thoroughgoing social revolution it desperately needs. General Pak lacks the personal appeal and ideological conviction of a Nasser, Kassem or Ayub Khan. It may be granted that he and the officers around him have given evidence of dedication, vigor, honesty and discipline, a composite of virtues not found in earlier régimes, and that they have promised to restore a form of constitutional government by mid-1963. At the same time, they believe that the road to "true democracy" lies through a period of police state tutelage. This fallacy is both naïve and perilous.

The shock caused abroad by the latest crisis in Korea has already been dissipated. With General Pak's consolidation of power the assumption seems to be that the current series of troubles has ended. Past experience would indicate that this is unlikely

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and that we should be straining our eyes to discern the dangers ahead. Where is the evidence of our search for a new approach to the Korean problem? Instead of that, we give every indication that we are prepared to go on trying to live with whatever forces thrust themselves up through the turbulence in Seoul, and that we have failed to examine the implications of such a course.

For example, if General Pak should be unseated by opposing elements within the Korean military establishment, will we stand idly by and let events take their course regardless of the consequences? What if the severe repression of individual liberties continues? What if the junta reneges on its promise to relinquish the reins of government, or the sick economy deteriorates still further? Shall we condone a ruthless suppression of popular discontent on the theory that frontline anti-Communism is more effective in the long run than the building of indigenous anti-Communism through the satisfaction of the minimum needs of human existence? Since all of these developments are possible in the months ahead, it seems imperative that the United States strive to achieve a measure of control over the direction of events.

It should not be excluded that the United States work toward an early dissolution of the present military régime. Nor should it be accepted that we do not have either the means or the right to do so. Mr. Bowles has remarked with regard to recent events in Korea that the United States is "not omnipotent;" but neither is it helpless. The primary task of the United States in Korea, as elsewhere in the non-Western world, is to identify itself with the aspirations of the common people. The Communists have successfully done so in North Korea. The Communist threat to South Korea today is the threat of subversion by invidious comparison. In the long run South Koreans will not choose between Washington and Moscow but between Seoul and Pyongyang. For us not to insist on the ordering of South Korean society so as to bring a material betterment in the Korean way of life would be to admit that we do not have the will or the wisdom to compete with Communism in a critical underdeveloped area of the world.

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TIBETANS PLAN FOR TOMORROW

By Ernest A. Gross

THE Thirteenth Dalai Lama, a year prior to his death in 1933, composed a Last Testament in response to petitions by his Ministers for perpetual guidance.[1] It was a legacy of leadership, prescribing a course by which Tibet might avoid international pitfalls which he even then foresaw. The Dalai Lama described his time as one beset by "Five Kinds of Degeneration." Among the worst of calamities, he said, "is the manner of working among the red people" (*i.e.* the Communists). Referring to the ills which had befallen their co-religionists in Mongolia, he warned the Tibetans it "may happen that here, in the center of Tibet, the religion and the secular administration may be attacked both from the outside and from the inside." His Testament continues: "Tibet is happy, and in comfort now; the matter rests in your hands. All civil and military matters should be organized with knowledge; act in harmony; do not pretend to do what you cannot do. . . . High officials, low officials, and peasants must all act in harmony to bring happiness to Tibet. One person alone cannot lift a heavy carpet; several must unite to do so."

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama left a society whose happiness was not so much marred by its forbidding isolation as by social injustice and political fragmentation. Tibetans were driven by sectional and tribal loyalties into semi-autonomous political regions. Religious-secular dichotomy split Tibet into two realms of power. In feudal pattern, vast estates were held by nobility and monastery. The populace was uninformed and apathetic to civic responsibility. Formal education was scarce and where it was available was doctrinally religious, preparing for the eternity of the Buddhist cycle rather than the life of this world. As such it furnished barren ground for cultivating a public service. The political establishment serving the Dalai Lama comprised a charming but untrained gentry, powerful monks and court favorites. Some were by nature able administrators; some were inept and venal.

A chaotic political system tempts the foreign aggressor. Tibet sat uneasy amid the expansionist ambitions of her neighbors.

One element existed to bring some unity to the cleavages of Tibetan life and society: the office of the Dalai Lama. During the period from the seventeenth century, after the reign of the Great Fifth, until the assumption of full powers by the Thirteenth in 1895, the Dalai Lamas had exerted little authority over secular affairs. This was particularly true in regard to Tibet's international relations where a policy of ultramontane isolationism prevailed. The Tibetans asked only to be left alone, and they saw no reason to educate or concern themselves with politics beyond their borders.

In the twentieth century, however, this was no longer possible. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama was forced into exile twice. In 1904, he fled to Mongolia to escape the British punitive expedition led by Colonel Younghusband. Six years later, he went to India to escape the Chinese occupation of his

[1] See "Portrait of the Dalai Lama," by Sir Charles Bell, p. 376–382. (Toronto: Collins, 1946)

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capital. During these periods of exile, the Dalai Lama learned at first hand of the world outside Tibet. In the latter part of his reign, his education in contemporary affairs continued to be sporadic. His principal tutor in politics was Sir Charles Bell, the British Political Representative in Tibet. Sir Charles, in the British colonial tradition, encouraged Tibetans to send a limited number of young men to England for education. Additional small groups, usually of the nobility, were schooled from time to time in the Jesuit College of St. Joseph's at Darjeeling.[2] Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama himself was largely isolated from the main currents of twentieth century political thought.

The political content of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's Testament reveals that he was aware of ills in the Tibetan political system. He himself had contributed to consolidation and unification through a skillful use of secular power, though hampered in this by primitive communication, entrenched local authority and an apathetic citizenry. The Regency which ruled after his death, during the interregnum 1933–1950, made little use of these consolidated powers for social, political or economic reform.

Like his predecessor, the present Dalai Lama, the Fourteenth, has received little formal instruction in contemporary statecraft. He has, nevertheless, a lively curiosity concerning the world's workings and a deep interest in education. A student of languages, he began very early to read such secular works in English and Tibetan as were available in the Potala. In 1950, he took advantage of Heinrich Harrer's fortuitous presence in Lhasa[3] to obtain what tutelage Harrer could furnish in order to supplement his own self-education. Since his formal assumption of power in 1950, at the age of 15, his political education has been speeded by the practical necessity of dealing with masters of politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

When he assumed power the Chinese Communists had already invaded the eastern frontier of Tibet. Within a year, he was ruling his country with a Chinese military overlord. Tibet, moreover, was still disunited; political evils of the old system remained. Despite the obstacles, the Dalai Lama attempted to effect reforms to the limit of his powers.[4]

Beginning in 1952, he sought a basic reform in the redistribution of the large landholdings of the nobility and the monasteries, whose power had been used to maintain a government of privilege. True to his nature and that of his people, the Dalai Lama sought to bring about this change peacefully by using state funds to compensate the owners for their lands. His objective was to redistribute the lands according to the ability of each person to work them. Each time the Dalai Lama made this proposal, the Chinese Communists vetoed it, seeking to impose their own scheme of forced collective action.

The Dalai Lama then set up a special organization within his government to effect such reforms as the Chinese would permit. This organization suggested, and the Dalai Lama approved, a reduction in land taxes and the cancellation of debts and interest charges incurred by farmers for past state

[2] The present Dalai Lama's younger brother, Ngari Rimpoche, is now enrolled at St. Joseph's, which his older brother, Gyalo Thondup, also attended.

[3] Heinrich Harrer, "Seven Years in Tibet." New York: E. P. Dutton, 1954.

[4] *Cf. Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic,* Report to the International Commission of Jurists by the Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet. 1960, p. 314.

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loans for cultivation and other agricultural work. The Dalai Lama authorized this new organization to receive and hear complaints against district and local authorities. He ended the traditional requirement on landowners to provide free transportation to government officials. Wherever the Tibetan Government was free to operate, these new policies prevailed.

By 1958 it had become apparent to all patriotic Tibetans that a pledge given by the Chinese in 1951 to permit self-rule in Tibet was worthless. The Dalai Lama had become a virtual prisoner in the Potala. In view of this, the disorganized resistance which the Khambas had begun some years before in east Tibet finally united in a country-wide organization concentrated in the 15,000-foot-high Lake Trigu area south of Lhasa. Volunteers from all over Tibet who made their way to trusted government leaders in Lhasa were directed to the encampments near Lake Trigu. There, members of the resistance lived by a simple code of elementary democracy, with the slogan "The soldiers are the children, the rest of the population are the parents." Social distinctions were abolished. Twenty-five-man committees, set up in towns held by the rebels, functioned as a government with equal justice and the fullest participation of the people.

Eventually, the rebel training ground produced a set of principles for the future government of a free and independent Tibet. They were identical with those which the Dalai Lama had attempted to put into practice. The resistance leaders, who had found that the chronic disunity stood in the way of any attempt to organize Tibet, wanted equal representation in a new united government for all tribes and geographic areas. This would be a major step toward the development of an all-Tibetan government, rather than one dominated by Lhasa and ignored in the provinces. They asked, too, that state-purchased lands be distributed to the landless and that government posts be filled by persons chosen by merit rather than birth.

When the Dalai Lama passed through the Trigu area in 1959 on his escape to India he met with the resistance leaders, heard their program and gave it his full blessing. At Lhuntse Dzong, still four days from the Indian border, the Dalai Lama inaugurated a new government based on this program. Within a few weeks the area was overrun by the Chinese, however, and the newly founded government was never able to operate. But the movement that centered about Lake Trigu had been a valuable training ground in practical political democracy, and it gave the Dalai Lama a foundation on which to build.

II

Shortly after his arrival in India, the Dalai Lama declared that, if Tibet were to have a future, it would require a government based upon a form and social system different from the old ways. Ideologically, such a government presented no problem to the Dalai Lama for, as he said in a statement at Mussoorie, India, on June 20, 1959, "We, as firm believers in Buddhism, welcome change and progress consistent with the genius of our people and the rich tradition of our country."

To achieve such aims in practice was, however, quite another matter. The resistance was badly scattered and the Chinese Army was in full occupation

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of Tibet. Resistance fighters and refugees who had escaped were in camps separated by hundreds of miles along the Indian and Nepalese borders.

The Dalai Lama himself was a political exile, and as such bound not to abuse the generous hospitality of his Indian hosts. He must now organize and unite the scattered remnants which were all that was left to him of his country, but he must do so without violating the injunction which the Indian Government had issued, in accordance with standard international practice, against his engaging in political activity while living in exile in India. The Dalai Lama was under no illusion that the future was bright or that the prospects were favorable for an early return to Tibet. In his public statements and in his talks with those of his people who came to him he warned that, while the Tibetans must work for the present moment, they must be prepared to think of final triumph in terms of decades and lifetimes. He stressed that the concept of the wheel of life offered the consolation of historical justice, but that all Tibetans must unite to maintain the motion of the wheel.

The Dalai Lama urged his people to organize so as to be ready to take advantage of any situation which might permit them to return as a free people with their own government in their own country. Refugees must use their exile as a period of opportunity to educate themselves for living in the twentieth century. This meant becoming contributing citizens to the life of the Indian state, learning skills, crafts and professions that later would be useful to a Tibet which could never return to its former isolation. Tibetans must learn and be ready to practice techniques of self-government. They must convince the rest of the world that they were an independent people, capable of self-government, who had done their share in vindicating the principle of self-determination and hence were ready for, and worthy of, the support of those who valued that great principle.

III

These were the tasks confronting the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in the first summer of their exile in 1959. Although they did not know their Locke, Mill and Jefferson, and had traditionally accepted an autocratic form of government, Tibetans by nature are a democratic people. Mountain, space and a feeling of closeness to God produce an instinctive sense of equality and regard for human dignity. Self-reliance is a necessity of life in Tibet. These facts of their nature soon became evident in India.

In the autumn of 1959 each refugee camp organized meetings to discuss the problems and hopes of Tibet. The people were encouraged to speak openly about failings of the old Tibetan government and inquire into what was being done by the Dalai Lama and his councilors to formulate policies to meet the present situation. These meetings culminated in the election of 13 persons, three to represent each of the geographical and tribal areas of Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang (central and western Tibet), and one for each of the four major religious groups. These men were to act as a channel between the people and the Dalai Lama. When the Dalai Lama visited Bodh Gaya on the pilgrimage he made in December 1959–January 1960, he met with these representatives, heard their ideas and encouraged them to continue to poll the refugees on the needs and desires which they would like him

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to fulfill. In the summer of 1960 the Dalai Lama asked these representatives to come to Dharmsala to act as the people's councilors to him.

By the autumn of 1960 the Dalai Lama had reorganized and divided responsibilities among the Tibetans living with him at Dharmsala. Tzepon Shakabpa, a former administrative and financial official in Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama's private secretary, Phala, have the responsibility of promoting and maintaining a unified organization among the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama's elder brother, Gyalo Thondup, who had acted as the Tibetan spokesman at the United Nations, continues to represent the Tibetans in their international affairs, aided by Rinchen Sadustshang, a young Khamba educated at St. Joseph's in Darjeeling. Thubten Ninje and Kundeling Dzasa, who were made responsible for implementing the Dalai Lama's pressing interest in the education of the Tibetan youth, are setting up Tibetan schools in India,[5] obtaining foreign scholarships and supervising reforms in the Tibetan language to make it adequate for treating new subjects for which there are at present no words.

The Dalai Lama's religious advisers, Shashur and Choden Da Lama, work on the reform and codification of dogma and practice of the Lamaist religion. They also seek to promote a more general understanding among the Tibetans and the outside world of their religion. They have begun contact with world church leaders and have awakened the sympathetic interest of Pope John XXIII and the Archbishop of Canterbury.

An elementary Civil Service Commission has been established to direct the training of those who might be useful to the Dalai Lama in the future and to insure that those presently qualified are put to the best current use. The investment of funds and the disbursement of the income from the Treasury[6] are supervised by Tibetan financial specialists, while others work on building census files and putting out public information. While these groups are not recognized as a formal government, they constitute political elements needed by the Tibetan people in their present circumstances. They also form the basis for a government for a free Tibet of the future.

The Dalai Lama has divided his time between prayer and meditation and the wordly problems confronting him and his people. He has continued his self-education largely through personal conferences with Indian and other national leaders who visit him, and by a voracious program of reading. His regard for the wisdom of Gandhi has been carried over to Nehru, whose counsel he values and whose democratic leadership he would like to emulate. J. P. Narayan, the Indian agrarian socialist, has been a friend for years, and his advice has frequently been sought. Visitors to Dharmsala have found the Dalai Lama knowledgeable on current international affairs, which he follows

[5] By early 1961 schools had been set up in Dharmsala, Dalhousie, Darjeeling and Mussoorie teaching Tibetan, Hindi and English in addition to the usual primary subjects.

[6] Grossly inflated stories circulated in 1960 regarding the size of the Dalai Lama's personal Treasury. Beginning in 1950, the Dalai Lama had sent overland to Sikkim and India some of the more easily transportable items from the historic storehouse in the Potala, mainly gold bricks. The best estimate of the total wealth now available is not more than $1,500,000. While the Indian Government contributes to the maintenance in modest circumstances of the Dalai Lama and certain of his followers at Dharmsala, the Dalai Lama must spread his relatively small income widely for refugee needs, the establishment and maintenance of schools, etc.

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through the daily newspapers and radio broadcasts. He has continued his study of English and reads eagerly in Western philosophy and political economy.

By travel among the refugees and through the reports of the people's representatives and other Tibetans who come to Dharmsala, the Dalai Lama keeps himself informed about the mood of his people. Scattered and discouraged as they are in exile, the Tibetans nevertheless remain faithful to the Dalai Lama. They need a focus for their loyalty, something which gives them a sense of cohesion, offers some signs of progress, and supports their faith that there is a future for them despite the bleak present.

IV

The process of electing and instructing the people's representatives had created by early 1960 the elements of representative self-government. The Dalai Lama accordingly concluded that it was time to draft a new Constitution for Tibet. On March 10, 1961, therefore, the second anniversary of the Tibetan revolt, the Dalai Lama announced that he was planning to draft a statement of his views for such a constitution, as the first step in the process of preparing a formal document. This statement of principles would be the basis for popular discussions among the Tibetans living outside their country, who would be encouraged to say what they wanted and expected in their constitution. Once these popular views were formulated, the Dalai Lama would meet with the people's representatives and prepare a final set of guiding principles. On the basis of these a popularly elected constituent assembly would draft the implementing document.

In July of this year, the Dalai Lama, his advisers and the people's representatives completed their draft of principles, upon which a constitution might be based. A free Tibet, as they see it, would be built on the following lines:

In the classical tradition of constitutional democracy:

(a) The powers of government should be allocated among an executive branch consisting of the Dalai Lama and his cabinet, a popularly chosen bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary.

(b) These branches of the government should be subject to a system of interacting checks and balances ensuring the continued independence of each within its proper sphere of activity.

In recognition of the unique features of Tibetan political tradition:

(a) While the Dalai Lama would continue as sovereign over Church and State, a major innovation is the suggestion that provision be made for his removal from office in either sphere through the action of representative assemblies.

(b) A Regency, chosen by the legislature, would rule during the interregnum between the Dalai Lama's death and the assumption of power by his successor. The legislature would also have the power to remove the Regency, which would be a further check on what has historically been the most autocratic institution in Tibetan life.

(c) The system of federation would be replaced by a system of regional authorities subject to the authority of central government. To protect the

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provinces from unwarranted encroachment, the right of judicial appeal would be granted in cases where local legislation has been vetoed by officials appointed by the central government.

(d) The Dalai Lama recommends that consideration be given to inserting in the constitution a definition of the respective spheres of secular and religious education. Implicit in this suggestion is a criticism of the old monastic supremacy in education as being inadequate to meet the new situation.

(e) The Dalai Lama recommends a provision for a professional civil service to ensure against revival of traditional nepotism and privilege.

In the economic field, the Dalai Lama urges adoption of a system of voluntary agricultural and handicraft coöperatives for production and marketing. He would keep Tibet predominantly a rural economy, based on his desire to see every man own the land he farms. His emphasis on representative democracy, the encouragement of education and the administration of a mildly socialist state by a corps of professionals would surely have been approved by John Stuart Mill as a Himalayan modification of his ideals of a democratically based political economy.

The Tibetan people in India, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal assembled in August 1961 in their camps, schools and centers to discuss, amend, reject or add to these principles. The Dalai Lama asked them to complete their work in time to circulate the product of their deliberations to the Sixteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly this autumn. Though in exile, the free Tibetans speak for their enslaved countrymen and as custodians of the future of their land. In a decade they have leaped over centuries of outworn political theory and practice. They ask other nations and peoples that have done the same to support their right to determine their own destiny and live out their lives in freedom.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN. By GEORGE F. KENNAN. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1961, 411 p. $5.75.

In this absorbing and eloquent book, based on lectures delivered at Oxford and Harvard, Mr. Kennan reviews with much perception and sensitivity the ragged course of relations between the Soviet Union and the West from 1917 to 1945. While there is much in Western understanding and action to be criticized in the early years, during the inter-war period and during World War II, Mr. Kennan is keenly aware of the intense hostility of the Communist stance which exacerbated all problems. A final chapter, somewhat distinct from the rest, is concerned with present and future prospects in our age of limitless physical destruction.

FREEDOM'S FRONTIER: ATLANTIC UNION NOW. By CLARENCE K. STREIT. New York: Harper, 1961, 318 p. $3.95.

This book contains the central themes of the author's "Union Now," which first appeared in 1939, together with Mr. Streit's more recent reflections on the necessity of Atlantic Union and the means of transcending traditional sovereignties.

AMERICA: TOO YOUNG TO DIE! By MAJOR ALEXANDER P. DE SEVERSKY. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961, 237 p. $4.95.

Major de Seversky points with alarm at our defense strategies and organization, attacks what he takes to be a number of fallacies—including the notion of limited wars and balanced forces—and offers his prescriptions for our survival.

WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE. By PAUL RAMSEY. Durham: Duke University Press, 1961, 331 p. $6.00.

In pursuit of the question "How shall modern war be conducted justly?" the author, a professor of religion at Princeton, considers theories of the "just war," the use of unlimited means, and the nature of rational armament.

MORALITY AND MODERN WARFARE. EDITED BY WILLIAM J. NAGLE. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1960, 168 p. $3.95.

In this symposium a group of Catholic scholars attempts to come to grips with the moral issues involved in the horrors of contemporary warfare.

POSTWAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL. By BERNHARD G. BECHHOEFER. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961, 641 p. $8.75.

The author, who served as senior officer of the Department of State on the armaments control question from 1946 to 1958, has prepared a very substantial review of the unsuccessful search for effective regulation of armaments since 1945. In view of past experience the outlook is hardly promising.

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ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY. Edited by Donald G. Brennan. New York: Braziller, 1961, 475 p. $6.00.

This is perhaps the most extensive discussion of arms control that has yet appeared between covers. Published originally as the Fall 1960 issue of *Daedalus,* now revised and supplemented by several new contributions, it offers a comprehensive treatment of the topic by authorities representing a wide spectrum of viewpoints.

THE NATION'S SAFETY AND ARMS CONTROL. By Arthur T. Hadley. New York: Viking, 1961, 160 p. $3.00.

A brief, lucid if not always persuasive discussion of methods of stabilizing armaments so as to reduce the likelihood of hair-trigger reactions to assumed attacks or all-or-nothing responses to military threats.

ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES FOR THE PUBLIC. Edited by Louis Henkin. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1961, 207 p. $3.50. (Paper, $1.95.)

Essays by Louis Henkin, William R. Frye, Robert R. Bowie, James E. King, Jr., Jerome B. Wiesner, Malcolm Mackintosh, Harry Willetts and Jacques Freymond, prepared for the Nineteenth American Assembly.

STRATEGY FOR THE 60's. Edited by Jay H. Cerf and Walter Pozen. New York: Praeger, 1961, 155 p. $4.00. (Paper, $1.50.)

A summary and analysis of 13 studies prepared by various research centers for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND WORLD REVOLUTION. By Günther Nollau. New York: Praeger, 1961, 357 p. $7.50.

This work, a translation from the German original, "Die Internationale" (1959), is concerned chiefly with the Comintern, its history, organization and methods of operation. Includes chapters on the Cominform and "proletarian internationalism" since Stalin.

MARXISM: AN HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY. By George Lichtheim. New York: Praeger, 1961, 412 p. $8.50.

An analysis of Marxian theory, its evolution in practice, and the rise and subsequent petrifaction of the Marxist movement in the century from 1848 to 1948.

THEORIE, TAKTIK, TECHNIK DES WELTKOMMUNISMUS. Compiled by Hans Koch. Pfaffenhofen/Ilm: Ilmgauverlag, 1959, 504 p. DM. 24.80.

A collection of citations by topic from the classics of Marxism-Leninism.

COMMUNISM AND THE GENERAL STRIKE. By Wilfrid H. Crook. Hamden (Conn.): Shoe String Press, 1960, 483 p. $8.75.

A comparative study of the theory and practice of general strikes in various countries, chiefly in the years since 1931.

COLD WAR AND LIBERATION. By John F. O'Conor. New York: Vantage Press, 1961, 611 p. $7.50.

After reviewing the history of Soviet expansion, the author urges a program of "mutual assistance" for the subject peoples behind the Iron Curtain as the best means of avoiding war or further erosion of the free world.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND HOW IT WORKS. By David Cushman Coyle. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 222 p. $3.75.

A revised edition of a useful survey of the principles and operations of the U.N. and related organizations.

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FIELD ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. By Walter R. Sharp. New York: Praeger (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1961, 570 p. $9.50.

A thorough though rather jargon-ridden study of management of aid programs.

BETRAYAL AT THE UN. By DeWitt Copp and Marshall Peck. New York: Devin-Adair, 1961, 335 p. $4.75.

A rather sensationalized investigation of the tragic and still uncertain story of Paul Bang-Jensen, a U.N. official who was dismissed following a dispute concerning documents relating to the Hungarian revolution, and who subsequently committed suicide or, as the author believes, was murdered.

SHAPING OUR TIMES. By Harold Courlander. New York: Oceana Publications, 1960, 242 p. $3.50. (Paper, $1.75.)

A brief account of the U.N., its origins, goals and operations.

THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. New York: Wiley, 1961, 372 p. $6.95.

A study of the "interlocking patterns of international politics and law."

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD. By B. V. A. Röling. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1960, 126 p. Florins 15.

An essay, by the professor of international law at the University of Groningen, on the problems introduced into international law by the entry of many new nations into the world scene.

ON MILITARY CONVENTIONS. By Vladimir Dedijer. Lund (Sweden): Gleerup, 1961, 138 p. Kr. 15.

An essay, by a prominent participant of the Jugoslav Partisan Movement during the war, dealing with the special agreements reached between belligerents in wartime.

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE GREAT POWERS. By Sir William Hayter. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 74 p. $2.75.

An essay by an experienced professional diplomat on the diplomatic styles and methods of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States.

THE RULING SERVANTS. By Eric Strauss. New York: Praeger, 1961, 307 p. $6.75. (London: Allen and Unwin, 30/.)

The author studies the political evolution of Russia, France and Great Britain in pursuit of the question whether the development, and hypertrophy, of bureaucracy is a cause or a symptom in modern mass society.

THE ORIGINS OF INTERVENTIONISM. By Robert Sobel. New York: Bookman Associates, 1961, 204 p. $4.50.

A monograph on the influence of the Russo-Finnish war of 1939 on American attitudes toward foreign affairs. In the author's view this event was a watershed with respect to questions of isolationism and intervention.

A CAREER DIPLOMAT. THE THIRD CHAPTER: THE THIRD REICH. By Hugh R. Wilson, Jr. New York: Vantage Press, 1961, 112 p. $2.75.

Chiefly a selection from the correspondence and diary of the American Ambassador to Germany, 1938–39.

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A STUDY OF HISTORY. VOLUME XII: RECONSIDERATIONS. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1961, 740 p. $10.00.

In this volume Mr. Toynbee reviews his monumental study, takes good-humored account of criticisms that have been put forward, and offers some revisions.

THE STRATEGY OF TRUTH. By Wilson P. Dizard. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961, 213 p. $4.50.

An account, by a U.S.I.A. official, of the American overseas information efforts.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1960. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1961, 583 p. $6.95.

The most recent volume in this authoritative series incorporates a number of editorial refinements and provides a wealth of carefully selected documentation on such matters as the negotiations on disarmament and nuclear weapons tests, the U-2 incident and the abortive summit conference, the Cuban and Congo crises, and the new security arrangement with Japan.

CITIZENSHIP TODAY: ENGLAND—FRANCE—THE UNITED STATES. By D. W. Brogan. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960, 116 p. $3.00.

In these lectures Mr. Brogan discusses both theory and practice.

SPACE RESEARCH BY ROCKET AND SATELLITE. By R. L. F. Boyd. New York: Harper, 1961, 128 p. $2.25.

A concise review.

LA PUISSANCE NAVALE DANS L'HISTOIRE. TOME III: DE 1914 À 1959. By R. de Belot and André Reussner. Paris: Éditions Maritimes et d'Outre-Mer, 1960, 409 p. NF. 28.

This third volume of a general history of naval power deals with developments in the two world wars, and particularly with the evolution of naval strategy.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

IMPORT LIBERALIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT. By Walter S. Salant and Beatrice N. Vaccara. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961, 388 p. $6.75.

This careful study makes a major contribution to our understanding of some key issues in foreign trade policy. While the results of its detailed analysis cannot be summarized in a sentence, the gist of them is that even substantial increases in competitive imports would probably have less drastic effects on domestic employment than is often assumed.

EQUILIBRIUM AND GROWTH IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: ECONOMIC ESSAYS BY RAGNAR NURKSE. Edited by Gottfried Haberler and Robert M. Stern. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 380 p. $7.50.

A collection of essays and reviews on economic development and international trade by a distinguished scholar who died in 1959.

COEXISTENCE: ECONOMIC CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE. By Henry G. Aubrey with the assistance of Joel Darmstadter. Washington: National Planning Association, 1961, 323 p. $5.00.

This study undertakes to investigate several questions: What use is being made

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of economic instruments in Soviet and Western policy? What is the impact on the less developed areas? What are the tasks and alternatives for Western policy?

THE NEW STATECRAFT. By George Liska. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, 246 p. $5.00.

The author, a professor at the University of Chicago, undertakes to develop a theory of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy.

TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. By Alec Nove and Desmond Donnelly. New York: Macmillan (for the Institute of Economic Affairs), 1961, 183 p. $6.00.

A discussion of the prospects and mechanics of trade between the United Kingdom and the Communist countries.

ECONOMIC SURVEYS IN UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By P. K. Mukherjee. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1959, 263 p. (Taplinger, distributor, $5.50.)

A critical study of the methodology to be employed in conducting surveys of underdeveloped economies.

THE EMERGING NATIONS: THEIR GROWTH AND UNITED STATES POLICY. Edited by Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961, 171 p. $4.50. (Paper, $2.50.)

Based on a study prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, this collaborative work of a group of very competent scholars in a variety of disciplines tackles the problem of the "transitional nations" and their significance for U.S. policy.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. By Murray D. Bryce. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, 282 p. $7.50.

This book by a Canadian economist is intended as a practical "down-to-earth" guide for tackling the job of economic development in underdeveloped countries or regions.

THE CHALLENGE OF ABUNDANCE. By Robert Theobald. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1961, 235 p. $4.50.

An inquiry into the economic, social and political problems arising from increasing material abundance—problems that the author believes will increasingly become a central preoccupation of the richer societies in the next decade.

THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By Eugene Staley. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1961, 483 p. $5.50. (Paper; New York: Praeger, $2.50.)

This revised edition (1954 edition noted here July 1954) brings a classic in the field up to date by dealing first with world-wide trends since 1953, then with developments in U.S. policy and finally with the necessity for reconsidering and redirecting our policy.

JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES. Edited by Wolfgang G. Friedmann and George Kalmanoff. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 558 p. $15.00.

A general analysis, with accompanying case studies, of the positive and negative features of joint international business ventures—collaborative enterprises between capital-exporting countries and host countries.

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HIGH-LEVEL MANPOWER IN OVERSEAS SUBSIDIARIES. By John C. Shearer. Princeton: Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, 1960, 161 p. $3.00.

A study, based on the experience of U.S. subsidiaries in Mexico and Brazil, of the problem of developing administrative and managerial manpower.

THEORIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. By Bert F. Hoselitz and Others. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1961, 344 p. $7.50.

Seven papers on various models and views of economic growth, from the mercantilists and physiocrats to contemporary theories.

EXCELLENCE: CAN WE BE EQUAL AND EXCELLENT TOO? By John W. Gardner. New York: Harper, 1961, 171 p. $3.95.

The president of the Carnegie Corporation tackles the problem of quality in our educational system.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS. By C. Wilfred Jenks. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1960, 159 p. $5.50.

An estimate of the contribution made by the International Labor Office to maintaining standards of human rights.

The Second World War

KRIEG IN EUROPA. By Frido von Senger und Etterlin. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1960, 459 p. DM. 24.

The author, a professional army officer, reflects on his extensive experiences in several theaters of the Second World War. Far superior, both in style and in insight, to most such postwar memoirs from Germany.

MALTA CONVOY. By Peter Shankland and Anthony Hunter. New York: Ives Washburn, 1961, 256 p. $4.00.

The story of Operation Pedestal, one of the convoys sent in 1942 to relieve Malta.

The United States

THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1960. By Theodore H. White. New York: Atheneum, 1961, 400 p. $6.95.

In the fall of 1959 Mr. White, an experienced reporter and novelist, began work for this study. For the next year he obviously lived with the campaign the length and breadth of the country. The result is a quite extraordinarily interesting and illuminating account of the way "the Americans chose their President in 1960"—from the primaries, through the conventions, the grueling travels of the candidates, to Kennedy's narrow victory in November. A first-rate piece of contemporary history writing.

FIRSTHAND REPORT. By Sherman Adams. New York: Harper, 1961, 481 p. $5.95.

Mr. Adams, who served as Assistant to the President from 1953 until his clouded resignation in 1958, here gives a personal and extremely well-informed account of the Eisenhower Administration during those years. An important source for the historian, the book makes excellent reading. Several chapters deal with leading issues in foreign policy, and with John Foster Dulles' major role in the Cabinet.

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PRESENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. Edited by Alfred J. Junz. New York: Praeger, 1961, 232 p. $4.00. (Paper, $1.75.)

A symposium by a group of American scholars on various aspects of American national politics and government.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN A NEW ERA. Edited by Stephen D. Kertesz. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961, 601 p. $10.00.

A substantial symposium of studies dealing with American diplomacy since 1945—issues, regional problems, policy making and organization.

POLITICS AND TRADE POLICY. By Joe R. Wilkinson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 151 p. $3.75.

A study of the economic and political factors influencing our tariff and trade policy in the last 30 years.

REFERENDUM FOR ISOLATION. By John Chalmers Vinson. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961, 148 p. $2.50.

A monograph on the defeat in the Senate of Article Ten of the League Covenant.

AS WE ARE. By Henry Brandon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 282 p. $4.50.

A British correspondent presents his taped interviews with 17 prominent Americans on a variety of contemporary political and cultural topics.

GROWTH AND STABILITY OF THE POSTWAR ECONOMY. By Bert G. Hickman. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1960, 426 p. $6.00.

An "empirical examination of major factors affecting the growth and stability of the American economy since World War II," with particular attention to the pattern of postwar cycles of inflation and contraction.

ECONOMIC ISSUES OF THE 1960s. By Alvin H. Hansen. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, 244 p. $7.50.

In this discussion of issues that will face the United States in the 1960s Professor Hansen suggests that the next decade will "unavoidably become a battleground between the forces tending to produce the gadget society and those pointing the way to a truly civilized community."

NO TRANSFER. By John A. Logan, Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961, 430 p. $6.75.

A historical study of the principle which the author, now president of Hollins College, defines: "The United States cannot see with indifference the transfer of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere to another non-American power."

Western Europe

INSIDE EUROPE TODAY. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1961, 376 p. $4.95.

Mr. Gunther's "Inside Europe" described the continent in 1936. Now, 25 years and many Insides later, he again takes us on a country-by-country tour to observe the changes. A genial and skillful piece of reportage focusing chiefly on Western Europe, its leaders, its political situation and its prospects.

EUROPE AT SIXES AND SEVENS. By Emile Benoit. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 275 p. $5.00.

As the title nicely indicates, Professor Benoit is dealing with the relations between the "Inner Six"—the European Economic Community—and the "Outer

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Seven"—the Free Trade Association—and the implications of this economic grouping for Europe and the United States.

LE MARCHÉ FINANCIER ET LES NOUVELLES ENTREPRISES. By Adrien P. Timmermans. Louvain (Belgium): Centre de Recherches en Économie et Gestion des Entreprises, 1960, 551 p. Belgian Fr. 480.

A study of recent developments in financing and investment in Belgium.

PRESSEN UNDER BESÆTTELSEN. By L. Bindsløv Frederiksen. Århus (Denmark): Institute of Press Research and Contemporary History, 1960, 551 p. Kr. 29.50.

A lengthy account of the Danish press during the German occupation, 1940–1945. English summary.

SCHIZOPHRENIC GERMANY. By John Dornberg. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 302 p. $4.95.

The author, News Editor of *Overseas Weekly*, an American-owned publication in Germany, appraises the political and emotional climate of postwar Germany. As the title indicates he finds much instability: "Fascism, anti-Semitism, militarism, cartelism: these are elements that are neither dead nor alive in Germany today."

DAS ERBE ADENAUERS. By Rüdiger Altmann. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1960, 210 p. DM. 12.80.

A discussion of the political problems that will await Germany following Adenauer's retirement from the political scene: the burden of "Chancellor democracy," the author feels, may be a heavy one.

STAATSKUNST UND KRIEGSHANDWERK. VOLUME II: DIE HAUPTMÄCHTE EUROPAS UND DAS WILHELMINISCHE REICH (1890–1914). By Gerhard Ritter. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1960, 393 p. DM. 30.

In this second volume of his study of militarism in Germany Professor Ritter covers Wilhelminian Germany and the mounting crisis of the European *Staatensystem*.

DIE MINDERHEITENFRAGE UND DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER MINDERHEITENSCHUTZVERTÄGE AUF DER PARISER FRIEDENSKONFERENZ 1919. By Erwin Viefhaus. Würzburg: Holzner, 1960, 244 p. DM. 24.

A study of minority problems in Central and Eastern Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the origin of provisions for minority protection in the Versailles treaties.

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. By Hugh Thomas. New York: Harper, 1961, 720 p. $8.50.

A young scholar, of a generation without personal involvement, has written an admirable history of the Spanish Civil War, perhaps the best to have appeared.

THE GRAND CAMOUFLAGE. By Burnett Bolloten. New York: Praeger, 1961, 350 p. $6.50.

A very richly documented study—the product of many years' research and material gathering—of the reasons for the Communists' success in taking over the anti-Franco forces in the course of the Spanish Civil War.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

KHRUSHCHEV: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT. By Konrad Kellen. New York: Praeger, 1961, 271 p. $5.00.

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A brief biography with particular emphasis on Khrushchev's career since 1945. The author offers a number of suggestive observations about the Soviet leader, his outlook and personality.

POWER AND POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. By R. Conquest. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 485 p. $7.95.

After an interesting introductory essay on Kremlinology—the study of the struggle for power in the Soviet Union—the author bravely, yet circumspectly, tackles some of the murky issues of the past 15 years: the Leningrad Case, the Doctors' Plot, Beria's Fall, the Anti-Party Group and Khrushchev's Ascendancy. A useful study but one which presupposes considerable familiarity with the subject on the part of the reader.

THE CHALLENGE OF COEXISTENCE. By Milton Kovner. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961, 130 p. $3.25.

A concise study of Soviet foreign economic policy in light of Soviet political objectives.

THE COMING TESTS WITH RUSSIA. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1961, 37 p. $2.50.

A report of Mr. Lippmann's interview with Nikita Khrushchev last April.

THE GRAND TACTICIAN: KHRUSHCHEV'S RISE TO POWER. By Lazar Pistrak. New York: Praeger, 1961, 296 p. $6.00.

An able and informative account of Khrushchev's ascent up the Party ladder during the Stalin era.

THE RED PHOENIX: RUSSIA SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Harry Schwartz. New York: Praeger, 1961, 427 p. $6.00. (Paper, $1.95.)

A review of postwar Russia drawn from Mr. Schwartz's articles in *The New York Times*.

SOVIET LEADERS AND MASTERY OVER MAN. By Hadley Cantril. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1960, 173 p. $4.00. (Paper, $1.65.)

A leading social psychologist's effort to analyze the Soviet view of man and the means of manipulating him.

YOU CAN TRUST THE COMMUNISTS. By Fred Schwarz. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1960, 187 p. $2.95.

The title simply means that the Communists can be counted on to try to carry out their objectives.

DIE SUDETENKRISE IN DER INTERNATIONALEN POLITIK. By Helmuth K. G. Rönnefarth. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1961, 2 v. DM. 40.

A massive German study of the Sudeten problem through the Munich crisis.

YUGOSLAVIA. By Muriel Heppell and Frank B. Singleton. New York: Praeger, 1961, 236 p. $5.95.

A general historical survey in the "Nations of the Modern World" series.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

A PRIME MINISTER REMEMBERS. By Francis Williams. London: Heinemann, 1961, 264 p. 21/.

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The author of numerous works on the British labor movement and its leaders has prepared, on the basis of Lord Attlee's private papers and a series of taped interviews, the former Prime Minister's memoirs of the momentous years from 1939 to 1951. While the text is somewhat uneven, the interview technique makes for livelier reading than we usually associate with Lord Attlee.

BRITISH LABOR AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP. By Herbert E. Weiner. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 111 p. $3.25.

An interesting study of British labor's "attachment to the idea of public ownership," an attachment that has caused the trade-union movement more problems than benefits.

THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IN GREAT BRITAIN. By E. Victor Morgan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 207 p. $5.20.

A study of the various institutions that make up the structure of ownership of the nation's assets.

BRITISH BROADCASTING IN TRANSITION. By Burton Paulu. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961, 250 p. $5.00.

In this sequel to his "British Broadcasting" (1956) the author deals with the effects of the introduction of commercial competition in the broadcasting services. Mr. Paulu concludes that British television has been improved by competition.

THE SUPREME COMMAND 1914–1918. By Lord Hankey. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, 2 v. 84/. (New York: Macmillan, $19.00.)

This is a major contribution to the history of the First World War. Based very considerably on Lord Hankey's diary and papers, its central focus is the British Supreme Command and the evolution of the machinery for conducting the war. Lloyd George is unmistakably the hero of the piece.

SOCIAL PURPOSE FOR CANADA. Edited by Michael Oliver. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, 472 p. $7.95. (Paper, $4.95.)

A symposium of essays chiefly in criticism, as the editor puts it, of the "glitter of prosperity which covered a reality of purposelessness, mediocrity and inequity."

TRADE PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA. By A. J. Reitsma. Leyden: Stenfert Kroese, 1960, 195 p. Florins 15.

An analysis, by an economist at the University of Queensland, of the tariff problem in Australia.

The Middle East

ARAB NATIONALISM AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM. By John Marlowe. New York: Praeger, 1961, 236 p. $6.50.

A good general survey of Arab nationalism and of the unsuccessful efforts of Great Britain and Nasser's Egypt in turn to bring about a political unity in the Middle East.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD. By Simon G. Siksek. Beirut: Middle East Research and Publishing Center, 1960, 140 p. £ Leb. 19.

An examination of legal principles by a Lebanese lawyer.

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Seven studies centering on the role of Islam in the Middle East and Africa.

DIE ARABER. By Arnold Hottinger. Zurich: Atlantis, 1960, 406 p. Swiss Fr. 24.80.

A quite extensive survey of the Arab world, its historical background and present vicissitudes.

LE ROI SAUD OU L'ORIENT À L'HEURE DES RELÈVES. By Benoist-Méchin. Paris: Michel, 1960, 575 p. NF. 18.

In this sequel to the author's earlier works on Mustapha Kemal and the career of Ibn Saud he carries the story of the Middle East on from 1953.

THE POWER STRUGGLE IN IRAQ. By Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1960, 90 p. $2.00.

An essay on events in Iraq in the two years after July 14, 1958, when the Hashimite monarchy was wiped out.

LA VIE PARLEMENTAIRE EN IRAK (DE 1921 À 1957). By Ali Ghalib Al-Ani. Neuchâtel: University of Neuchâtel, 1960, 149 p.

A somewhat formal dissertation devoted more to laws and constitutions than to actual political practice.

TURKEY AND THE UNITED NATIONS. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Institute of International Relations of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Ankara and the Carnegie Endowment), 1961, 228 p. $4.00.

A further volume in the series of studies on international organization sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

THE EDGE OF THE SWORD. By Lt. Colonel Netanel Lorch. New York: Putnam, 1961, 475 p. $7.95.

A detailed history of the war in Palestine, 1947–1949. The author was an officer in the Israeli Defense Army and later Chief of the Military History Division of the Israeli General Staff.

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A detailed and richly documented history of the background and origins of the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 regarding the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

NO ALTERNATIVE: ISRAEL OBSERVED. By D. R. Elston. London: Hutchinson, 1960, 207 p. 25/.

A personal but very interesting and effective report by a correspondent of the London *Times* on the formative years of Israel from 1945 to the Suez crisis.

NORTH FROM KABUL. By Andrew Wilson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1961, 190 p. 25/.

Picaresque travels through Afghanistan in 1959, a time when Russian influence was becoming increasingly apparent.

South and Southeast Asia

INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Selig S. Harrison. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 244 p. $5.95.

A collection of speeches and remarks of some 88 American and Indian experts

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at a conference held in 1959. There are some lively and informative exchanges. One of the discussants was Senator, now President, Kennedy.

INDIEN ODER CHINA. By Heinrich Bechtoldt. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961, 331 p. DM. 19.80.

The editor of *Aussenpolitik* compares the prospects for India and Communist China, and the fateful implications of the outcome of this race for modernization.

WHERE THE LION TROD. By Gordon Shepherd. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 176 p. $4.50.

An unpretentious, amusing but melancholy travel book devoted to a search for "what the British left behind them in India of enduring value."

MR. GANDHI. By Ranjee Shahani. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 211 p. $4.95.

An effort to discover the kind of man Gandhi was, his "being and becoming," not "his jousts with destiny."

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An extremely critical appraisal of Indian economic policy.

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A constructive study, giving attention to social objectives and problems of equity in mobilizing resources for development.

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This work is based on a field study of the structure and functioning of government in rural areas of the State of Bombay.

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A comparison of the features and principles of the Indian Constitution with those of Britain, the U.S., Germany and other states.

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A personal sketch of General Ayub, President of Pakistan.

PAKISTAN SEEKS SECURITY. By Aslam Siddiqi. Lahore: Longmans, 1960, 201 p. Rs. 9/8.

A brief study of the foreign relations of Pakistan, with particular reference to regional agreements.

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A useful handbook.

GOA'S FREEDOM STRUGGLE. By T. B. Cunha. Bombay: Dr. T. B. Cunha Memorial Committee, 1961, 551 p. Rs. 6.

Selected writings of T. B. Cunha, a leading Goan nationalist, who died in 1958.

SÜDOST-ASIEN IM BRENNPUNKT DER WELTPOLITIK. By Wolfgang Appel. Würzburg: Marienburg-Verlag, 1961, 165 p. DM. 14.80.

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A report on recent political developments from Ceylon to the Philippines.

LAOS: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. Edited by Frank M. LeBar and Adrienne Suddard. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1960, 294 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $6.50.)

This volume is one of the series "Survey of World Cultures."

BUNG KARNO'S INDONESIA. By Willard A. Hanna. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1961, v. p. $4.75.

A collection of 25 reports written for the American Universities Field Staff and based on visits to Indonesia in 1959 and 1960.

THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF INDONESIA. By Datus C. Smith, Jr. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961, 125 p. $2.95.

A well-written introduction to the topic, designed primarily for young people; a volume in the "Portraits of the Nations Series."

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR: SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU (JUNE–NOVEMBER 1950). By Roy E. Appleman. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961, 813 p. $10.00.

This volume, the first to be published in a projected five-volume official history, is an extensive account of the initial American engagement, the withdrawal to the Pusan perimeter, the Inchon landing and the drive north to the Yalu River.

L'ESTREMO ORIENTE FRA DUE MONDI. By Giorgio Borsa. Bari: Laterza, 1961, 469 p. L. 2800.

A general history of international relations in the Far East from 1842 to 1941. The author is a member of the faculty of political science at the University of Pavia.

RED CHINA: AN ASIAN VIEW. By Sripati Chandra-sekhar. New York: Praeger, 1961, 230 p. $4.00. (Paper, $1.75.)

A report with particular emphasis on agricultural and demographic problems. The author, Director of the Indian Institute for Population Studies in Madras, spent the winter of 1958–59 traveling through China.

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This imposing political biography deals centrally with the origins of the Pacific War in 1941 and with Tojo's role in that disastrous sequence of events.

Africa

PROFILES OF AFRICAN LEADERS. By Thomas Patrick Melady. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 186 p. $4.95.

Sketches of a number of leaders in Africa south of the Sahara.

INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT POSSIBILITIES IN TROPICAL AFRICA. By Edward Marcus and Mildred Rendl Marcus. New York: Bookman Associates, 1960, 286 p. $7.50.

Two professional economists explore investment possibilities and problems in tropical Africa. Aware of the many problems, the authors are quite enthusiastic about the potentialities that will be of mutual benefit.

MUNTU. By Janheinz Jahn. New York: Grove Press, 1961, 267 p. $5.50.

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A long-time student of Africa and a co-editor of *Black Orpheus* finds a degree of homogeneity and sophistication in African culture which others have missed. A valuable contribution if not always convincing.

THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION. By James Cameron. New York: Random House, 1961, 279 p. $3.95.

A foreign correspondent of the London *News Chronicle* interprets the mounting "winds of change" throughout the African continent.

POLITIK IM SCHWARZEN AFRIKA. By Franz Ansprenger. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961, 516 p. DM. 39.

A substantial study of native political movements in what was French West and Equatorial Africa.

THE WAR IN ALGERIA. By Jules Roy. New York: Grove Press, 1961, 128 p. 75 cents.

A poignant, subjective but effective protest against the continuing conflict in Algeria. The author, born in Algeria, is particularly despairing of the attitude of the *colons*.

BARRICADES ET COLONELS: 24 JANVIER 1960. By Merry and Serge Bromberger and Others. Paris: Fayard, 1960, 446 p. NF. 12.50.

Four French journalists combine to present a picture of the Algerian crisis of January 1960.

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A study of the legal status of the territories of the Sahara, the economy of the region and its political and military organization.

GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY IN BRITISH WEST AFRICA. By David E. Carney. New York: Bookman Associates, 1961, 207 p. $5.00.

A dissertation on the role of public agencies in the economic development of Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria between 1947 and 1955.

A WEST AFRICAN TRADE UNION. By W. A. Warmington. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research), 1960, 150 p. $3.40.

A study of the Cameroons Development Corporation Workers' Union.

ZIK: A SELECTION FROM THE SPEECHES OF NNAMDI AZIKIWE. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961, 344 p. $4.75.

Selections from the speeches of Nigeria's leading nationalist, now Governor-General of the Federation.

AWO: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF OBAFEMI AWOLOWO. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 315 p. $4.50.

The autobiography of the former premier of the Western Region of Nigeria and now leader of the Opposition in the Federal Government.

AGONY OF THE CONGO. By Ritchie Calder. London: Gollancz, 1961, 160 p. 16/.

The author, asked by the U.N. and the World Health Organization to undertake a fact-finding mission, here reports on the troubled scene in the six provinces of the Congo.

CONGO DISASTER. By Colin Legum. Baltimore: Penguin, 1961, 174 p. 85 cents.

A brief but very informative survey of the background to the Congo crisis in 1960.

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MATATA AM KONGO. By Peter Scholl-Latour. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961, 307 p. DM. 12.80.

A report by a German correspondent on the tumultuous course of recent events in the Congo up to the death of Patrice Lumumba.

THE POLITICAL KINGDOM IN UGANDA. By David E. Apter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 498 p. $10.00.

A scholarly study of political change in Uganda with particular attention to the Kingdom of Buganda. The author is associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

THE PREMISE OF INEQUALITY IN RUANDA. By Jacques J. Maquet. New York: Oxford University Press (for the International African Institute), 1961, 199 p. $5.60.

A study by a social anthropologist of the native political organization of Ruanda, especially the problem of Tutsi domination over the Hutu.

THE VISION SPLENDID. By C. E. Lucas Phillips. London: Heinemann, 1960, 384 p. 25/.

A historical review and statement of the case for continued European leadership in the Central African Federation.

THE STORY OF THE RHODESIAS AND NYASALAND. By A. J. Hanna. New York: Humanities Press, 1961, 288 p. $4.50.

An able, single-volume survey of the history of three territories that have subsequently formed a federation.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM. By D. V. Cowen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 258 p. $7.00.

Professor Cowen, head of the Department of Comparative Law at the University of Cape Town, proceeds from an inquiry into the political and social quandaries of contemporary South Africa to more general considerations of the principles of government and law.

ROAD TO GHANA. By Alfred Hutchinson. New York: Day, 1960, 190 p. $3.50.

The story of the flight of a colored South African, one of the accused in the treason trials, and of his journey to Ghana.

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THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. By Dexter Perkins. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961, 124 p. $3.00.

In these lectures a leading American historian deals with U.S.-Latin American relations from the perspective of security, politics and economics.

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A variety of subjects are covered in these papers prepared for a conference of the International Economic Association held in Rio de Janeiro in 1957.

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Two useful bibliographical references for Latin America.

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A study of the abortive efforts by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica to form some type of larger federal union.

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Four essays on the political and social perspectives of the West Indies.

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Impressionistic observations on life in Cuba, based on a visit in the winter of 1960–61.

THE CONDUCT OF THE CHACO WAR. By David H. Zook, Jr. New York: Bookman Associates, 1961, 280 p. $6.00.

A general history, both military and political, of the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay in the years 1932–35. The author is assistant professor of military history at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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